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ABSTRACT
This dissertation develops and defends a utilitarian approach to global distributive
justice: that part of political ethics that is concerned with the distribution of benefits and
burdens across the members of distinct societies. Surprisingly little has been written by
utilitarians, or by welfare consequentialists in general, on this topic. Many philosophers
believe that utilitarianism is incapable of arriving at morally acceptable conclusions
concerning global distributive justice, to the extent that it does not merit serious
consideration in philosophical debates in the area. The central thesis of the dissertation
is that that view is mistaken, and that utilitarianism in fact provides an attractive and
useful way of conceiving of our global distributive duties.
The main argument begins by distinguishing three types of goal at which principles of
distributive justice might be directed. One such goal is the attainment by individuals of a
minimally decent level of welfare, a second the treatment of individuals in accordance
with norms of fairness, a third the obtaining of a certain degree of equality across
individuals, for reasons independent of the first two goals. I then consider whether or
not there is a utilitarian case for each of these goals at the global level. I argue that, while
the utilitarian case for global equality per se is currently weak, a concern at the global
level both for what I call "decency" and for distributive fairness can and should be
incorporated into the framework of utilitarianism.
I present an account of precisely what form these goals ought to take at the global level,
how they intersect with concerns about domestic distributive justice and collective self-
determination, and how they translate into duties on the part of individual states and
international institutions. I also draw out the implications of the resulting principles and
duties for some specific aspects of global political economy and international law
(including trade in goods, services and ideas; development; and immigration). The
result is a distinctive conception of the ground, scope and content of global distributive
justice that I hope will appeal, at least in part, to utilitarians and non-utilitarians alike.
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Introduction
When we hear that nearly a fifth of the world's population lives on less than $2 a
day, or that 64% of Indian women cannot read, or that the most recent leg of the
Doha round has once again failed to broker a pro-poor deal on agricultural trade,
or that the gap between the world's richest and the world's poorest is, on some
measures, higher today than it ever has been, most of us feel that there is
something morally amiss with the world. In particular, we feel that there is
something morally amiss with the way in which the good and bad things that that
world contains are distributed amongst those who live in it.
Over the past couple of decades there has been a surge of interest on the part of
moral and political philosophers in explaining what precisely it is that is wrong
with the current global distribution of advantages, and what it is that we are
morally obliged to do about the situation. Theorists working from a wide range of
different perspectives - political liberals, liberal nationalists, capability theorists,
luck egalitarians, Kantians, Marxists, communitarians, libertarians - have
attempted to show how their by now fairly well worked out accounts of domestic
distributive justice should (or should not) be extended to the global sphere. The
broad routes of approach are now well established, and debates concerning how
particular positions are to be further developed and defended have become
increasingly sophisticated and well populated. However, throughout all this
activity, one attractive moral-political theory with a venerable history has yet to
be well represented. The aim of this dissertation is to fill that gap.
The view in question is utilitarianism, which (for the moment) can be roughly
defined as the position that all moral duties derive from a single fundamental
requirement: to maximize the sum of wellbeing of all of the world's people, taken
together. Utilitarianism can usefully be understood as comprising three basic,
logically independent components (Sen and Williams 1982, 3-4): welfarism, the
thesis that ethics is, ultimately, exclusively concerned with wellbeing,
consequentialism, the thesis that the moral status of actions, rules, institutions
and other entities is determined exclusively by their tendency to produce good
states of affairs, and sum-ranking, the thesis that the value of a state of affairs is
determined! additively, by summing up the value of its components.
Utilitarianism is thus a specific version of the broader family of welfare
consequentialist accounts of morality, distinguished by its commitment to sum-
ranking.
Not only utilitarianism, but welfare consequentialist theories in general, currently
have a very weak presence in the philosophical literature on global distributive
justice. This no doubt has much to do with the fact that such approaches are
currently not well represented in moral and political philosophy generally. It may
also be due to the fact that questions of justice are not seen as welfare
consequentialism's strong suit and that as a result its proponents are wont to
focus their efforts elsewhere. What little welfare consequentialist material there
is on matters of global distribution, while good as far as it goes, is ultimately
unsatisfying. This is so for one or more of the following reasons, depending on
the case: i) it focuses on questions of individual rather than collective conduct
(Singer 1972, Mulgan 2002, Murphy 2003); ii) it is incomplete, developing the
case for a minimal set of duties concerning the protection of basic interests, and
leaving questions of more extensive duties unaddressed (e.g. Sen 1992, Goodin
1985, Elfstrom 1990); iii) it concerns mainly specific, applied problems, rather
than (also) more foundational issues (Singer 2002); iv) it is chiefly critical rather
than constructive (Arneson 2005); v) it is based on an unattractive version of
welfare consequentialismi; or, vi) it is simply too short to provide the depth of
discussion required.2
One reason, then, why the project of developing an attractive utilitarian
approach to global justice is worthwhile is that no one has done it, to a
satisfactory degree, as of yet. It is often of interest to work out the implications of
a theory in an area where it has not yet been thoroughly or adequately applied,
especially a theory of such historical influence and lasting appeal as
utilitarianism. My interest in the question is not exclusively of this disinterested
nature, however. I am a utilitarian, and I think that the relative lack of material
on global distributive justice by others of like mind is regrettable for two further,
symmetric reasons: utilitarianism ought to be good for research on global
distributive justice, and research on global distributive justice ought to be good
for utilitarianism.
As far as the first of these is concerned, I hope to show in the following that a
utilitarian approach to global distributive justice allows us to narrow in on the
pressing issues, clear away some irrelevant but distracting considerations, and
make a compelling case for a set of precise and plausible goals, principles and
duties in this area. As for the second, there are two chief reasons why research
on global distributive justice can be expected to contribute to the broader project
of defending utilitarianism. The first is defensive in nature. There exist some
apparently tempting views concerning what it is that utilitarianism implies
regarding global distributive justice that cast doubt on the acceptability of
utilitarianism more generally. Thus, to take one example, if we think that
utilitarianism implies that we ought to institute a world government charged
1 This is the case with the literature in neoclassical welfare economics and, in my view, Sen (1992,
inter alia). Welfare economics is hampered by its restriction to the limited normative criterion of
pareto efficiency, which both leaves too many alternatives unranked and is problematically
conservative where redistribution is concerned, due to its rejection of the possibility of
interpersonal welfare comparisons. Attempts to get around the latter problem by the Kaldor-
Hicks move of measuring benefit in terms of willingness to pay result in the preferences of the
rich being given more weight than those of the poor, and those aspects of well-being that are not
well captured in monetary terms being neglected (see Hausman 2005 for an extended
discussion). Much of Sen's work has been dedicated to pointing out these and other flaws in
mainstream welfare economics, and his approach does not share them. His alternative is,
however, problematic for other reasons, some of which I canvass in Chapter 1.
2 Bailey, for instance, devotes just over one page to global distributive justice in the conclusion of
an 161-page book entitled "Utilitarianism, institutions and justice" (1997).
with redistributing the :resources of the developed world to the developing world,
to the point at which the citizens of the latter are as well off as the citizens of the
former, and if we think that this result is counter-intuitive, we will be less likely
to accept utilitarianism. Utilitarians need to develop explicit positions on global
distributive justice, if only to head off misinterpretations of this sort. If
utilitarianism is to get a fair hearing in the literature, some claims about what it
actually recommends in the global context must be advanced and defended.
A second way in which research on global distributive justice can be expected to
contribute to a more general defense of utilitarianism is more positive in nature.
It is arguable that utilitarians are selling themselves short by not emphasizing
the global implications of their theory. This is because utilitarianism may have
advantages over other theories in the global setting that it does not have in the
personal or domestic settings. The problems that arise in the global case are so
large that they almost certainly require a collective or institutional rather than
an individual or personal solution; for citizens of the developed world, the global
context also raises the problem of poverty in a particularly pressing way, given
that systematic and radical poverty is heavily concentrated outside that world. In
both of these areas, utilitarians are arguably on home ground. As several
theorists have claimed, utilitarianism is at its most plausible when applied to
collective rather than individual actions; it is also especially well equipped to
accommodate the urgency of reducing human suffering and extreme
deprivation. A well-developed utilitarian account of global distributive justice
might, then, provide an example of an area where the general approach is
particularly attractive. A second advantage that utilitarianism possesses over
other moral and political theories in the global arena is that it has the resources
to answer some questions pertaining to that domain which seem significant, but
which do not even arise for some competing theories. As I will argue in Chapter
2, one such question concerns the moral justification for the existence of the
state.
I trust that utilitarians will agree, on the basis of the above considerations, that
the project of developing a utilitarian account of global distributive justice is an
interesting and worthwhile one. But my hope is that the chapters to follow will
also be useful even for those who reject utilitarianism. I see two grounds for
optimism on this front. The first is the fact that one's own philosophical position
is generally improved for having a robust opponent. Too often, however,
hypothetical utilitarian approaches to global distributive justice are presented in
the literature in a highly unpersuasive form. The general quality of the discussion
would be improved on all sides if this were remedied. The second reason is that,
despite some fundamental disagreements, utilitarians share some important
concerns and commitments with their opponents. All plausible moral theories are
to some degree concerned with the consequences of actions and institutions for
3 See, among others, Goodin 1995: "The strength of utilitarianism, the problem to which it is a
truly compelling solution, is as a guide to public rather than private conduct. There, virtually all
its vices - all the things that make us wince in recommending it as a code of personal morality -
loom instead as considerable virtues" (8).
human welfare. While utilitarianism takes this concern about as far as it could
possibly go, non-utilitarians are able to come along at least part of the way.
Moreover, the potential for fruitful borrowing goes both ways. There is some
very good material in non-utilitarian writing on global distributive justice, on
which I will be drawing throughout. These facts together hold out the prospect
that at least some of the conclusions that I draw below will be of the kind that
non-utilitarians can likewise take on board.
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 ("Utilitarianism and
Distributive Justice') addresses the question of how the concept of distributive
justice ought to be understood from a utilitarian perspective. (What role do
principles of distributive justice play within a utilitarian theory? What
distinguishes duties of distributive justice from other moral requirements?) It
then applies the results of that discussion to the case of domestic distributive
justice, both for purposes of illustration, and in order to lay some foundations for
later chapters. Chapter 2 ("Global Distributive Justice: How to Begin") moves
on to questions of global distribution in particular, setting up some basic
elements of a utilitarian approach to the area, including an account of the stance
that utilitarians ought to take toward the modern state system. Chapter 3 ("The
Competition") then provides a brief discussion of some of the more prominent
non-utilitarian approaches to global distributive justice present in the literature.
Its first aim is to situate the basic utilitarian approach to distributive justice
outlined in the previous chapters within the broader theoretical landscape,
thereby rendering the distinctive features of that approach more apparent. Its
second aim is to highlight some of the problems that are faced by other
approaches, thereby helping to motivate the search for an alternative.
Chapters 4 to 6 contain the heart of the dissertation. The organizing assumption
on which they are based is the following. Principles of distributive justice -
understood, generically, as those moral principles that govern the distribution of
benefits and burdens across individuals - can usefully be divided into three
categories, by reference to the goal or object at which they are directed. One such
goal is the attainment by individuals of a minimally decent level of welfare. A
second goal is the treatment of individuals in accordance with norms of fairness.
A third goal is the obtaining of a certain degree of equality across individuals
along certain dimensions, for reasons independent of the first two goals.
Chapters 4 ("Decency") and 5 ("Fairness and Equality") address each of these
three goals in turn in relation to the special case of global distributive
justice, considering whether or not there is a utilitarian case for them at the
global level, and, if so, the form that the principles or duties arising from them
should take. To anticipate: I will argue that the goals of decency and fair
treatment both have strong utilitarian warrant at the global level (the claim
regarding the latter taking more arguing than that regarding the first), but that an
analogous case for global equality, at least insofar as it is separable from the first
two concerns, is currently hard to make. Chapter 6 ("The Combined Approach")
discusses the question of how the principles and goals advocated in the preceding
chapters are to be concurrently pursued, and applies the complete account to the
relatively under-theorized area of justice in immigration. The latter application
provides a way both of testing the force of my account in a specific policy area,
and of generating some substantive conclusions concerning a network of policies
and institutions that have a highly consequential impact on global wellbeing.
It is not part of my project here to provide a full defense of utilitarianism in
general, i.e. as a comprehensive account of morality tout court. Before moving on
to the following chapters, however, I do need to say something more both about
what utilitarianism involves, and about why it ought to be considered a
worthwhile object of philosophical attention. The remainder of this introduction
will be dedicated to those tasks.
The core thesis of utilitarianism, in its classical form, can be expressed as follows:
An act (or policy, institution, motive, decision-procedure...) is morally right if and
only if the total amount of wellbeing for all minus the total amount of ill-being for
all that is produced by that act (etc.) over the long run is equal to or greater than
this net amount for any other available act (etc.).
This claim, while superficially simple, incorporates commitments to a large
number of extremely controversial theses about ethics. Since I cannot discuss all
of these here, I will instead focus on the three central features mentioned earlier
(welfarism, consequentialism and sum-ranking), going into some more detail on
what they involve, and the key reasons why I find each, and the combined view,
appealing.
1. We(farism
Welfarism is the thesis that ethics is, ultimately speaking, exclusively concerned
with wellbeing.4 It is opposed then, to the thesis that ethics incorporates a
foundational role (also or instead) for values such as beauty, autonomy or
understanding, the realization of human excellence or virtue, the obtaining of
certain types of relation between persons, or respect for rights, insofar as each of
these is separable from wellbeing. The welfarist thesis has two main attractions.
The first is the intuitive appeal of its basic idea: viz., that when something is
morally good, it is ultimately because that thing makes lives go better, and go
betterfor those who live the lives in question. This idea is so basic that is hard to
give a positive argument for it: one either feels its appeal, or one does not. I feel
it pretty strongly.5 The second key attraction is welfarism's ability to provide an
4 On one very broad, classical, understanding of the domain of ethics, it includes all of the
normative standards that apply to conduct: including those springing from prudential,
perfectionist and aesthetic modes of value. The most plausible interpretation of welfarism,
however, has it as going for the modern, narrower understanding of the domain of ethics, as
pertaining, roughly, to those standards that apply to our treatment of other beings.
5s Likewise Sumner:
The idea that the unifying - and justifying - function of all of our ethical categories is
ultimately to make our lives go better, or to make the world a better place, is one that I
intuitively compelling account of what underlies moral status. The concept of
wellbeing is usually applied exclusively to living things of a certain degree of
neurological complexity (paradigmatically humans and other animals, not
plants).6 But ethics, too, is generally considered to concern, excusively, the way
in which living things of this sophisticated kind ought to act or be treated. We do
not consider my treatment of, say, a garden gnome an ethical concern, unless we
can connect that treatment to the concerns of a reasonably sophisticated living
being in some way. A neat way to connect these two thoughts is to claim that the
subject-matter of ethics is ultimately wellbeing.
Almost all moral theories give wellbeing some role in ethics, and it is hard to
imagine one being remotely plausible if it did not. The parts of welfarism more
likely to raise objections are its claims that a) wellbeing is foundational to ethics,
rather than of only derivative ethical value, and that b) it is the only value to have
such status. There are three routes that a welfarist can take in response to an
opponent's claim that a good other than, or instead of, wellbeing (such as
autonomy, beauty or human perfection) has intrinsic moral value. One is to
argue that the excluded good in question is morally valuable, but only
instrumentally so, by virtue of the contribution that it makes to wellbeing. A
second route is to argue that the excluded good is not morally valuable, even in
this instrumental way. Either it has no value at all, or, more appealingly, it has
value of a non-moral kind, such as aesthetic or perfectionist worth.7 A third route
of response involves appealing to both of the preceding moves at once, by
claiming that a given excluded good is not only a standard contributor to
wellbeing, but that it also displays aesthetic and/or perfectionist value.8
Welfarists believe that the above moves together render welfarism capable of
accommodating most of our central intuitions about value.
Any welfarist conception of morality will incorporate an account of wellbeing: a
theory of what it is for a life to go well for the person (or other living being) whose
find utterly compelling. If that is not the point of the whole business of moral thinking,
then I find it difficult to imagine what the point might be. What else could morality be
for? And if it is not for anything - if it has no point - what claim can it have on our
allegiance? (Sumner 2000, 1)
6 We can say that certain things make a plant's life go better for it (being watered, not being
trampled on, etc.) But I think that most people would consider it odd or merely metaphorical to
say that the lack of those things reduced the plant's wellbeing.
7 Something has perfectionist value when it is "a good instance or specimen of its kind, or
...exemplifies the excellences characteristic of its particular nature" (Sumner 1996, 23).
Something has aesthetic value, on the other hand, when it is appealing, attractive or admirable in
some way. Another option that might be mentioned here is aretaic value: that which
characterizes the actions of the virtuous agent, as captured in such classical notions as nobility,
integrity, fortitude, humility, courage etc. I do not mention this above since it seems to me to be
not a fully distinct mode of value, but rather some sort of amalgam of moral and aesthetic value.
8 This last story seems the right one to tell, in many instances, concerning physical and
intellectual achievement. Athletic feats or scientific theories are often praised for all of the
following: a) their elegance or beauty, b) their embodiment of the standards of their fields, and c)
their contribution to human welfare (either that of the achiever or of others).
life it is. Utilitarians have traditionally opted for either a) a desire-satisfaction
account, according to which what it is that makes one's life go well is the
satisfaction of (some subset of) one's desires, preferences, wants, or wishes, or b)
some variant of hedonism, according to which a person's wellbeing is exclusively
a function of the pleasure or enjoyment that she attains.9 But, as a formal matter,
it is open to them to go for one of a range of other options, including a so-called
"objective list" account, according to which a person's wellbeing is determined, in
some more or less direct manner, by her relationship to one or more "objective"
goods other than pleasure or desire-satisfaction alone.lo
The philosophical literature on wellbeing is long in the tooth and characterized by
pervasive disagreement. There are two main reasons why it is very difficult to
decisively resolve the debate between the foregoing and other accounts. The first
is that no existing account seems able to fit all of our pre-theoretical ideas about
the nature of wellbeing. Deciding on one account over the others is, at base, a
matter of working out which of those ideas one most wants to hang on to, and
which of them one is more willing to discard. People inevitably resolve this issue
differently, and there therefore comes a point at which efficacy of argument runs
out. Another problem for the conclusive resolution of this question is the
difficulty of constructing, for purposes of evaluating the merits of the various
accounts, test cases a) on the details of which we can trust ourselves to get a firm
and clear grip, and b) on which distinct accounts give distinct verdicts.
If this situation is frustrating for an ethicist, however, it is less so for a political
theorist, for the following reason. Whatever they say about the fundamental
nature of wellbeing, when it comes to settling on a list of the standard
contributors to it, proponents of the main candidate accounts mentioned above
tend to converge on very similar items. The standard list is something like the
following:
pleasure or enjoyment; physical and mental health; social interaction (especially,
close personal relations); autonomous action; certain sorts of understanding;
various forms of accomplishment; some minimal degree of desire satisfaction;
and the pursuit and achievement of personally endorsed goals.
The possibility of this consensus arises from the fact that most, if not all, of the
goods standardly listed by objective list theorists are, as a purely empirical
9 Hedonistic accounts come in two main types, depending on the story they tell about what it is
that makes a mental state pleasant. On the sensation model, adopted by Bentham, a mental
state's being pleasant is purely a matter of its positive feeling tone, an intrinsic, unanalysable,
homogenous quality that is present to varying degrees in all pleasurable experiences. On the
attitude model, advocated by Sidgwick, what makes a mental state pleasant is not a phenomenal
property of that state, but rather the reaction that the subject of the mental state has towards it: a
mental state is pleasant just in case it is liked or enjoyed (see Sumner 1996, 91).
10 The term "objective" does not carry any great meta-ethical weight. It simply refers to the fact
that accounts of the kind under consideration involve "a substantive judgment about what things
make life better, a judgment which may conflict with that of the person whose wellbeing is in
question" (Scanlon 1993, 188).
matter, recognizable both as common objects of human desire, and as reliable
producers of human pleasure or enjoyment. I think that this broad consensus
suggests that we can largely set aside, for purposes of political theory, the
question of which goods directly contribute to wellbeing, and which do so only
indirectly. Given that, as a matter of fact, a person aiming to promote the good(s)
championed by one account will generally end up doing a good job of promoting
the good(s) championed by the other, the deeper philosophical issue ends up
being of little practical import.
Whatever their view about the fundamental nature of wellbeing, then, I suggest
that welfarists should opt for an objective list account of wellbeing when
considering broadly political questions. When I speak of wellbeing in what
follows, then, I will be assuming such an account; in particular, one that
highlights the constituents mentioned above."
2. Consequentialism
There exists some controversy in the literature over which claims a theory must
endorse if it is to count as consequentialist. I consider acceptance of the
following thesis to be both necessary and sufficient for a diagnosis:
Consequentialism. What an agent ought to do (or, which institution ought to be
instantiated, which motive or character-trait ought to be inculcated, which
decision procedure or rule ought to be followed, etc.)12 is solely a function of an
ordering of the available options in terms of the overall goodness in which each
results.13
Along with the above thesis, there is also a cluster of additional commitments
that are closely associated with the consequentialist tradition, but are arguably
not essential to it, all of which are endorsed by classical utilitarians. Among the
more central are the followingl4:
11 Lest this move come across as an objective list theorist privileging her own view, I should out
myself as, currently, a sort of reconstructed hedonist.
12 For ease of exposition, in the remainder of this introduction I treat acts as the sole evaluand.
13 Consequentialism implies, among other things, Commensurability: the thesis that different
options or states of affairs can be ordered in terms of a common measure of value. In the case of a
welfarist theory, commensurability implies the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of
wellbeing. There is a huge literature on this question. The approach that Harsanyi adopts in the
following passage seems to me to be sensible: "A willingness to make interpersonal comparisons
is no more than an admission that other people are just as real as we are, that they share a
common humanity with us, and that they have the same basic capacity for satisfaction and
dissatisfaction, in spite of the undeniable individual differences that exist between us in specific
detail." (1982, 52). I will be assuming in what follows that interpersonal welfare comparisons are
possible, at least at a coarse grain, and will be working with an intuitive understanding of how to
go about making them.
14 Sinnott-Armstrong's helpful discussion (2006) lists a series of others.
Universalism. The consequences for all people (or all sentient beings15) are to be
taken into account when determining the moral rightness of an act.
Equal consideration. All who count are to count equally. At the fundamental
level, benefits or harms to one matter exactly as much as similar benefits or
harms to another.
Agent-neutrality. The value of the outcome of a given act is to be assessed from
an impersonal point of view, not from the perspective of the agent.
We can call Classical Consequentialism the conjunction of these three theses
with Consequentialism.
Classical consequentialism has three key sources of appeal. The first can be
introduced as follows. Any moral theory will, somewhere, incorporate an account
of value: an account of those properties that make things good or bad. It will
then, somewhere, incorporate an account of how we ought to respond to the
values that the theory identifies. As Pettit has emphasized, a consequentialist
account is distinguished, in regard to the second of these components, by its
claim that the appropriate way to respond to a value is to promote it (2002, 97).
Non-consequentialists, on the other hand, will claim that, in at least some cases,
the proper way to respond to a value is to honor it (where this involves,
standardly, refraining from damaging any particular instance of it, or protecting
it from the potentially damaging actions of others). Often, of course, honoring a
value will be a way of promoting it, but in some cases the two will diverge, as in
the textbook case where the consequentialist endorses the killing of one to save
the lives of five. In a case of genuine divergence (and many consequentialists will
deny that the foregoing example is one such) the consequentialist will forgo the
honoring in favor of the promoting, whereas the non-consequentialist will not.
One source of classical consequentialism's appeal is arguably the line that it takes
on this issue. If promoting a value is not the only way to respond to it, some
argue, it certainly seems like the most rational way.16 To identify some thing, x,
as (intrinsically) good or valuable is arguably to be committed to the idea that it is
good that x obtain. But if this is so, how can it be rational to claim that a state of
affairs A which is identical in every other respect to a state of affairs B, except
that A contains less of x than B, is better? Surely if we think that x is intrinsically
15s Although, on my view (see fn 11) there is no moral justification for excluding (some) non-
human animals from the discussion, for simplicity I join other theorists of global distributive
justice in focusing exclusively on humans from now on.
16 Scheffler identifies something like this feature as the source of the 'spellbinding force" of
consequentialism (the phrase is Foot's):
[Consequentialism] appears to embody a notion of rationality which we recognize from
myriad diverse contexts, and whose power we have good independent reason to respect....
what we may call maximizing rationality. The core of this conception of rationality is the
idea that if one accepts the desirability of a certain goal being achieved, and if one has a
choice between two options, one of which is certain to accomplish the goal better than the
other, then it is, ceteris paribus, rational to choose the former over the latter. (1994, 142-
3)
good we ought to think it morally preferable to produce A over B, if doing so is
within our power.
This argument can, however, be challenged. The non-consequentialist can claim
that, while promotion is the appropriate response to value in some cases, it is not
always so. Different values - or the same values in different contexts - call for
different responses. One way to support this thought is to appeal to the domains
of aesthetic or perfectionist value. It is not at all obvious that the best way to
respond to beauty is to make more of it, rather than to contemplate or appreciate
it. Similarly, while perhaps we ought not to gratuitously slice off a spider's leg,
it's not clear that the essential nature of spiders gives us any reason to promote
spider octopedia. But this suggests that to identify something as valuable is not,
ipsofacto, to identify it as the appropriate object of promotion.17
It is at this point that a second source of the appeal of classical consequentialism
might become apparent. Pettit argues that, while we can conceive of both
promoting and honoring as appropriate ways to respond to value in ethics, it is
simpler to appeal to only one of these modes, especially if that one is able to make
sense of most of the ways that we think it appropriate to act (2002, 104).
Classical consequentialism's simplicity, in this and other respects, arguably
provides an important part of its appeal. The theory is based on a few key
axioms, which can be applied to a huge variety of evaluands, and promise
determinate answers to all moral problems (however difficult it may be to
determine those answers in practice). In these respects classical
consequentialism contrasts with many non-consequentialist theories, which tend
to incorporate a variety of independent fundamental principles dedicated to
particular problems, and can leave one wondering how, in cases of conflict
between their various demands, a final verdict is, even in principle, to be reached.
Simplicity is not, however, always regarded as a virtue in an ethical theory. While
it perhaps ought to be considered a tiebreaker between theories, when all else is
equal, beyond that it is not clear what advantage it provides.1" Pettit seems to
think that all is not equal in the case at hand. Arguably his underlying concern in
making the above point is not the idea that non-consequentialism is too complex
per se, but rather that its complexity is ungrounded. Pettit complains that non-
consequentialists offer no deep justification for switching between honoring and
promoting in different cases: their moves from one mode to another are effected
in an arbitrary way (2002, 104). This seems to me to be a fair complaint.19
17 See Scheffler, who follows up the thought in the previous footnote with the caution: "But it is,
after all, not obvious that maximizing rationality constitutes the whole of rationality" - we need to
take account of the "more comprehensive tapestry of full human rationality." (1994, 150)
18 Bernard Williams is well known for pressing this point. See e.g.:"[T]he fact that utilitarianism
starts out with so little luggage provides no presumption at all in its favor. The question can only
be whether it has enough luggage for the journey it must make." (1985, lo6, italics in original)
19 It should be noted that a similar complaint can also be raised against those consequentialists
who take a non-promoting approach to aesthetic or perfectionist value. The complaint in this
case is less pressing however, for two reasons. The first is that the case in question is one of
distinct responses to distinct domains of value, a move which might be viewed as less arbitrary
than the positing of distinct responses within a single domain of value. The second is that some
A third source of the appeal of classical consequentialism is arguably the
attractive account that such a theory provides of the key moral values of equality
and impartiality, as spelled out in the theses of universalism, equal
consideration, and agent-neutrality given earlier. Thus Mulgan lists as one of
the strong virtues of consequentialism the idea that "on the face of it, [it] treats
all agents perfectly equally and is thus pefectly impartial" (2002, 14). I share the
view that the consequentialist treatment of these values is a natural and attractive
one. However, it is clear that others disagree. Classical consequentialism is
certainly an interpretation of equality and impartiality, but it is hard to argue that
it is the only plausible one.2 0
I think that the above three features - consistency with a familiar and central type
of rationality, relative simplicity, and incorporation of a natural interpretation of
equality and impartiality - do point to some genuine virtues in classical
consequentialism. Nonetheless, since the case that they present is hardly
airtight, they are properly conceived of, not as clinching the deal in favor of
classical consequentalism, but rather as suggesting that it is at least worthy of
exploration.
3. Sum-ranking
As a formal matter, any consequentialist theory must have three basic
components. First, it must provide an account of some set of ultimate goods
(e.g., for utilitarians, the single good of wellbeing). Second, it must select an
interpersonal aggregation function: a way of combining different instances of
the basic good (or goods) that it selects into a single global value, thereby
allowing overall states of affairs to be ranked from best to worst. Third, it must
consequentialists, at least, will deny that aesthetic and perfectionist value constitute genuine,
independent domains of value in any case. If this is so, then beauty or species-exemplification will
not, in themselves, generate reasons for action, and will not therefore be regarded as an example
of a value that calls for types of action other than promotion.
20 See, for example, Rawls' contrasting view on impartiality:
An impartial judgment, we can say, is one rendered in accordance with the principles
which would be chosen in the original position. An impartial person is one whose
situation and character enable him to judge in accordance with these principles without
bias or prejudice. Instead of defining impartiality from the standpoint of a sympathetic
observer, we define impartiality from the standpoint of the litigants themselves...The fault
of the utilitarian doctrine is that it mistakes impersonality for impartiality (1971, 165-6).
Rawls is similarly critical of the utilitarian interpretation of equality. On his view, one of the
reasons that utilitarians are unable to provide an attractive account of what it is to treat persons
equally is that at the morally fundamental level, their theory seems to leave no room for persons
at all, as opposed to mere containers for wellbeing (see 1971, 24).
[N.B. Although the page numbers that I will reference when citing A Theory of Justice are those
in the 1999 Revised Edition, I will refer to the text throughout by its original publication date
(1971), in order to clearly distinguish it from Rawls' The Law of Peoples (1999).]
provide an account of how the resulting ranking of states of affairs is to guide our
actions - an account of what it is that are we to do with the global value that we
have defined.
The classical consequentialist answer to the third question listed just now is that
we ought to maximize the global value in question: we are to produce the highest-
ranked state of affairs that we are in a position to produce. Although objections
have been raised against this claim (see e.g. Slote 1985), it is widely endorsed by
contemporary consequentialists, and I will be assuming here that utilitarians are
committed to it. The much more controversial question among consequentialists
is the second listed above, i.e. that of which interpersonal aggregation function
we are to select.
Some of the more prominent options in the contemporary philosophical
literature, for the purposes of a welfarist theory, are the following:
1. Arithmetic addition ("simple aggregation", "sum-ranking"). The best
outcome is that in which the total amount of wellbeing, summed across all
persons, is the greatest.
2. Egalitarianism. One outcome is intrinsically better than another, in at
least one respect, when the distribution of wellbeing across persons in the
former is more equal than it is in the latter. Extreme (or monistic)
egalitarians claim that this principle is the sole fundamental criterion for
the moral evaluation of states of affairs. Moderate (or pluralist)
egalitarians claim that it is one such criterion, but that it ought to be
combined with, or traded off against, another principle or principles, such
as arithmetic addition.
3. Prioritarianism. The best outcome is that which appropriately balances
two factors, one "aggregative" and one "distributive". Roughly, i) more
total wellbeing is better than less total wellbeing, and ii) more wellbeing
for those who have less of it is better than more wellbeing for those who
have more of it.21
4. Sufficientarianism. The best outcome is that in which the greatest
number of people attain a "sufficient" level of wellbeing, as specified by
some absolute threshold. Like egalitarianism, this option comes in both
an extreme (or monistic) and a moderate (or pluralist) variant.
Classical utilitarians select the first of these four options: they rank outcomes by
the single criterion of the sum of wellbeing that those outcomes contain.
21 Prioritarianism is best understood as a family of moral principles, which differ chiefly over the
questions of 1) how to specify the worst-off class, 2) how much extra weight to accord to the
wellbeing of that class, and 3) whether or not the priority given to the worst-off class tapers off
(perhaps to the vanishing point) as wellbeing levels increase.
In adjudicating between the various possible interpersonal aggregation functions,
we face similar difficulties to those we face when selecting a theory of wellbeing.
The first is that each function appears to have quite serious problems. Where the
above options are concerned, sum-rankers appear to endorse i) violations of basic
rights and ii) extremely unequal distributions of resources in some (actual or
hypothetical) situations. Egalitarians i) appear to approve (in at least one
respect) "leveling down": a move from one state of affairs to another in which the
population under consideration is held constant, and everyone in it is worse off,
and ii) to endorse the foregoing move for a reason in tension with welfarism.22
Simple sufficientarians i) struggle to set their relevant welfare threshold in a non-
arbitrary way, ii) give us no way to rank states of affairs in which all parties enjoy
wellbeing levels above (or all suffer wellbeing levels below) that threshold, and
iii) in some situations of resource scarcity, require an allocation of resources that
is intuitively wasteful or inefficient.23 Prioritarians i) have trouble explaining
how we are to non-arbitrarily set the weight that is to be given to the worst-off24,
ii) in according greater significance to a welfare increase to some over an
identical welfare increase to others, arguably violate the thesis of Equal
Consideration that I earlier suggested to be one of the key attractions of classical
consequentialism, iii) like egalitarians, are committed to the existence of a form
of "impersonal" value that looks in tension with welfarism25, and iv) share the
apparently worrying implications of sum-ranking in regard to some cases.
Hybrid versions of one or more of the above functions have the unenviable
feature of combining several of these faults at once, whilst also looking
unappealing ad hoc.
The second difficulty in choosing between these and other available functions (of
which there are many)26 is that, as in the case of competing accounts of the
nature of wellbeing, it is hard to construct test cases a) on the details of which we
can trust ourselves to get a firm and clear grip, and b) on which distinct functions
22 The more equal state of affairs in a case of leveling down is not betterfor anyone. Preferring it
therefore seems to conflict with the basic welfarist idea, expressed by Sumner as follows: "ethics
has ultimately to do with ensuring that lives go well, or at least that they not go badly...If
something will improve the conditions of no one's life, make no one better off, then what ethical
reason could be given for recommending it?" (Sumner 1996, 191-2)
23 In situations of scarcity we are often faced with hard choices between small wellbeing gains for
some, and larger wellbeing gains for others. Simple sufficientarians will never let the larger gains
take priority, when letting the smaller take priority instead will result in more persons attaining
their magic line. But in some such cases it seems that it is the larger gains that ought to prevail.
24 Should, for example, an increase in the wellbeing of the worst off count ten times as much as an
identical increase in the wellbeing of the best off (and maybe five times as much as an identical
increase in the wellbeing of the comfortably off?) Or should the relevant numbers be 6 and 3? 1.5
and 1.1?
25 Holtug, in making this point, notes that, unlike egalitarians, prioritarians are at least "not
committed to the existence of intrinsic values that contain only impersonal elements...the better
outcome necessarily includes improvements in individual welfare" (2006, 28, italics his). My
view - which Holtug seems to share - is that this fact does not dispel the concern.
26 Another pair of prominent options hold, respectively, that the best outcome is that in which the
mean level of wellbeing is the greatest, or that which maximizes the product of individual utilities
(the Bernoulli-Nash social welfare function).
give distinct verdicts. To illustrate a), consider the usual sort of putative counter-
example to simple aggregation, based on its supposedly objectionable distributive
consequences. Such counterexamples generally present us with two states of
affairs, P and Q, one of which, we are told - P, say - contains a greater sum total
of wellbeing than the other. But then we are told that P is distributively
unattractive in some way: it involves, say, 80 badly off people, and 20 extremely
well off people, whereas Q involves loo comfortably off people. The person
making the objection then tells us that, intuitively, Q is preferable to P, even
though arithmetic addition ranks P higher. Note that, in order for a supposed
counterexample such as this to show sum-ranking to be counter-intuitive, we
have to be convinced both i) that the aggregation has been done properly, i.e. that
P really does contain a greater sum of wellbeing than Q, and ii) that the implied
result of sum-ranking - the claim that we ought to prefer P to Q - is implausible.
But, in the case of many supposed counter-examples, there will arguably be
doubts about one or other of i) or ii). Some of the reasons why we may fail to be
convinced of i) are the following:
1) In some cases, the stipulated welfare attributions will be simply
implausible. To take another common sort of example, being tortured and
losing one's life is so bad that, whatever the objector claims, it just seems
unbelievable that the satisfaction that 20 sadists would get out of inflicting
it would actually outweigh that badness.
2) In other cases, where the stipulated welfare attributions are not prima
facie implausible, we will nonetheless find it difficult to vividly imagine
what it is like to experience the levels of welfare described, causing us to
underestimate just how valuable (or disvaluable) attainment of those
levels may be. (Worse, we may find it difficult to even conceive of the
difference between the distinct welfare levels stipulated in some of these
examples, if, as psychologists have suggested, we find it difficult to
categorize a single dimension into more than seven or so distinct levels.)
3) Our judgments may be affected by vaguely felt concerns about distant
effects, such as those on unmentioned parties, or those delayed in time.
Even if we are told that such factors are to be understood as accounted for,
lingering doubts may nonetheless affect our response to the states of
affairs that we are asked to compare.
Where i) is in doubt, our preference for a state of affairs in which the sum of
wellbeing is stipulated as lower may in fact indicate a preference for a state of
affairs that, on our own (inarticulate) calculations comes out as the higher of the
two. Where i) is not reasonably in doubt, on the other hand, ii) may be
unobvious: that is, it may no longer be clear that, say, benefiting the well-off few
rather than the worse-off many really is the wrong course of action.
Given the above difficulties, there is room for reasonable disagreement on the
question of which interpersonal aggregation function a welfare consequentialist
ought to choose. My basic reason for preferring sum-ranking is the following.
Any remotely plausible version of (welfare consequentialist) egalitarianism or
sufficientarianism will have to be a moderate version. Like prioritarianism, it will
have to incorporate some purely aggregative element. But this means that prima
facie counter-intuitive aggregation results are bound to arise at some point,
whichever option we select. As consequentialists (and, for that matter, arguably
not only as consequentialists) we are stuck with those results. And if we cannot
avoid them, it seems unwise to add extra problematic elements to our view in the
fruitless attempt to escape them. These other problematic elements, present, as
noted earlier, in each of egalitarianism, prioritarianism and sufficientarianism,
undermine the commitments to a) welfarism, b) impartiality c) completeness
and/or d) simplicity that make up much of the appeal of the classical welfare
consequentialist program. This is a lot to lose for a dubious ability to avoid some
prima facie horrors sometimes.
This is hardly a decisive argument in favor of sum-ranking, not only because the
merits and demerits of each of the options mentioned above merit a much more
thorough discussion, but also because there are many other possible aggregation
functions not mentioned here that may be more promising. I am not, however,
too worried about not having at hand the decisive argument in question, at least
for the purposes of this dissertation. This is because I suspect, although I cannot
argue for the claim here, that the precise nature of the interpersonal aggregation
function that a welfare consequentialist selects (at least, out of the range of
sensible options) will not have very far-reaching implications for the conception
of global distributive justice with which he or she ends up. The conclusions that I
reach in the following chapters seem to me likely to be broadly acceptable to
prioritarians, moderate egalitarians and moderate sufficientarians as well as
utilitarians, and to proponents of other candidate functions besides. If this claim
does not seem especially plausible now, the reasons for making it should become
clearer as the chapters proceed.
In the preceding introduction to utilitarianism, I have been mainly focusing on
the theory's virtues. It is also, however, notoriously open to an extensive array of
serious objections. Although I will touch on and respond to some of these
objections in the ensuing chapters and the conclusion, as I noted at the outset it
is not my aim here to defend utilitarianism as a general account of morality. Nor,
for that matter, is it my aim to defend it as the one way forward where theorizing
about global distributive justice, in particular, is concerned. That latter aim
would require both the above-mentioned general defense of utilitarianism, and a
comprehensive weighing up of its merits as an approach to global distributive
justice against all available alternatives, neither of which I plan to do.
My ambitions are more limited, although still, I think, ambitious, especially given
the current philosophical climate where utilitarianism is concerned. Although I
am of the view that utilitarianism gives the best available account of our
considered moral judgments regarding global distributive justice, I here adopt
the more modest goal of showing that it at least provides one plausible account of
those judgments. The overall thesis that I wish to advance in the dissertation as a
whole is the claim that utilitarianism deserves to be taken seriously as an
approach to global distributive justice. Even if the majority view continues to be
that we ought to ultimately reject it, it ought not to be dismissed in the cavalier
way in which it currently is in the literature. As I hope to show in what follows, it
has too much going for it for it not to deserve a more cordial hearing than that.
Chapter 1. Utilitarianism and distributive justice
1.1 Introduction
Anyone out to construct a theory of distributive justice is faced with two basic
tasks. The first task is that of formulating a consistent and compelling set of
principles concerning what it is that distributive justice demands. The second,
more foundational, task, on which the broad shape of proposals concerning the
first depends, is that of providing an analysis of the idea of distributive justice
itself: of what it is that makes a theory or principle one of distributive justice,
rather than of something else. These two tasks are presented in Rawls' A Theory
of Justice in terms of a distinction between a "conception" and a "concept" of
justice (1971, 5). A concept of justice specifies the role that justice is to play
within a moral theory; a conception of justice provides a substantive account of
the principles that fill out that role.
This chapter approaches both of these tasks from a utilitarian perspective. The
first part addresses the "concept question", by means of a brief discussion of the
nature and role of principles of distributive justice within a utilitarian theory.
The second part addresses one special and important case of the "conception
question", by providing an outline of a utilitarian account of domestic distributive
justice. This case will be used both to illustrate the points made in the earlier
part of the chapter, and to lay some foundations for later chapters.
1.2 What we talk about when we talk about distributive justice
What does the concept of distributive justice involve? Utilitarian theorists of
distributive justice who are out to answer this question without putting
themselves out of a job are faced with the following problem. Certain central
elements of the common-sense concept of distributive justice appear to be in
tension with some of the core features of utilitarianism. Those elements are the
following:
Distributive focus. Distributive justice is commonly understood to be concerned
with the distribution of goods or bads amongst the members of a group, rather
than with the amount of goods or bads that that group enjoys. It concerns, to
employ a familiar metaphor, the way in which the pie is cut rather than how large
the pie is. Utilitarianism, however, is distribution-insensitive: it is fundamentally
concerned with the amount of good that is produced by a given action (rule,
institution, motive, etc.), rather than the way in which the good in question is
distributed amongst the individuals affected.
Emphasis on individuals. The point of distributive justice, in ordinary moral
thought, is to ensure that individuals are accorded what is due to them. Its focus
is on the claims of individual persons, rather than on "the claims of general
interest" (Raphael 2001, 207). In contrast, the ultimate concern for the overall
good that characterizes utilitarianism translates into a lack of interest, at the
morally fundamental level, in the qualities and claims of specific individuals. The
utilitarian can only make sense of the idea of what is due to each individual by
reference to the relationship of that individual to the overall good.
Focus on Desert. In everyday moral thought, distributive justice is connected in
some intimate way to the desert of individuals.27 Judgments of desert are
concerned with fitting types of treatment to the specific qualities and actions of
individuals, in particular to those for which individuals can appropriately be
praised or blamed. While judgments of desert refer exclusively to the past or
present qualities or actions of individuals, however, utilitarian judgments, by
virtue of their consequentialist nature, are "forward-looking": they evaluate all
objects exclusively by reference to their future effects.
Pluralism. The common-sense notion of distributive justice is pluralistic in
nature, containing not only desert, but also needs and rights, as apparently
mutually irreducible criteria of distribution. For utilitarians, by contrast, all
moral concerns ultimately reduce to a single master principle: the maximization
of aggregate wellbeing.
Taken together, the above considerations have suggested to some that the
accommodation of distributive justice within the framework of utilitarianism
presents a serious and fundamental problem. This problem is acknowledged by
utilitarians themselves. Mill remarks that "In all ages of speculation, one of the
strongest obstacles to the reception of the doctrine that Utility or Happiness is
the criterion of right and wrong, has been drawn from the idea of justice", and
calls it "the only real difficulty in the utilitarian theory of morals" (1863).
Hastings Rashdall writes in a similar vein that "it is a matter of life and death to
our position" to find a common denominator for justice and benevolence (1907,
264-6).
1.2.1 Indirect utilitarianism: a solution, and some problems
The way out of this apparent difficulty is to be found in the thesis known as
indirect consequentialism: the claim that agents should (at least normally) decide
how to act by reference to rules that are justified by the consequences of their
general acceptance.28 This thesis derives from the idea that, due to such factors
27 Thus Mill writes:
[I]t is universally considered just that each person should obtain that (whether good or
evil) which he deserves; and unjust that he should obtain a good, or be made to undergo
an evil, which he does not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest and most emphatic form
in which the idea of justice is conceived by the general mind. (1863)
28 A focus on the general acceptance of a rule rather than on general compliance with that rule is
necessary in order to accommodate consequences of the former that are broader than the latter
(e.g. the effects of accepting a rule on individuals' self-respect, sense of security, or the quality of
interpersonal relations). "General" acceptance should be understood as acceptance by the
as our cognitive limitations29, our proneness to self-deception, and our need to
co-ordinate our actions with those of others, applying the principle of utility
directly whenever faced with a choice of actions is unlikely to be the best decision
procedure, even judged on strictly utilitarian grounds. Instead, what seems most
likely to further the utilitarian goal is application of a set of more specific,
subsidiary principles concerning which procedure or policy to follow in a
particular set of circumstances, or in response to a particular decision problem.
For this reason, utilitarians posit what are known as "secondary principles",
selected and justified on the basis of the "primary principle" of utility. As Sumner
suggests, this equates to supplementing the utilitarian "theory of justification"
with a "theory of decision-making" (179), where the best decision-making
strategy (the best secondary principle for a given decision problem) is "the most
successful, the standard of success being given by [the] theory of justification"
(181).
It is worth emphasizing that the distinction between direct and indirect
consequentialism pointed to here differs from the familiar distinction between
act and rule consequentialism. The latter concerns the consequentialist's theory
of justification, not her theory of decision-making. Rule consequentialists claim
that the rightness of an act is determined by its conformity with a rule that is
justified by the consequences of its general acceptance, whereas act
consequentialists claim that the rightness of an act is determined by the
consequences of that act itself. It is hard to find an act consequentialist these
days who is not an indirect consequentialist. But it is theoretically possible for
rule consequentialists to be indirect consequentialists also. This will be the case
if the set of rules that they recommend as a decision procedure differs from the
set of rules that they propose as a criterion of rightness. (For a clear discussion of
these issues, see section 4 of Hooker 2004).
Principles of justice should be understood within utilitarianism as secondary
principles of the kind referred to above. They are aimed at identifying a set of
policies, rules or procedures, general acceptance of which can be expected to
maximize aggregate wellbeing over the long term. The subdivisions of justice
can then be distinguished by the specific type of moral problem that the
principles in question are designed to address. Thus, criminal, compensatory,
civil-political and distributive justice will refer, respectively, to the sets of
secondary principles that are to be used to evaluate i) laws concerning
"overwhelming majority" rather than by everyone, the latter being unrealistic. There are several
issues to settle in formulating indirect consequentialism more precisely that are not important for
my purposes here; see Hooker 2004, especially sections 6.2 - 6.3, for a more extended discussion.29 As Hardin explains:
[T]here are at least three in-principle cognitive obstacles to our calculating the overall
good of the consequences of our actions: (1) we lack the information required to carry out
such calculations... (2) we lack relevant causal theories of the implications of our actions,
and (3) we could not do the necessary calculations in any case because our minds have
limited capacity (1988, 8)
punishments for crimes, and procedures for applying those laws, ii) the type and
amount of restitution that is to be made for injuries of various kinds, iii) the
distribution of basic personal and political liberties3o, and iv) the distribution of
benefits and burdens (other than basic liberties and punishments) amongst
individuals. Distributive justice can itself be partitioned into further
subdivisions, distinguished according to the specific distributive problem that is
at issue. Sometimes what we are concerned to do is to identify a set of norms to
guide distributions amongst small-scale groups of individuals, such as families,
teams, or other local associations. At other times, we are interested in
identifying criteria for evaluating much larger distributions, such as the
allocation of burdens and benefits amongst the members of a single political
community, or amongst people who live in distinct political communities
(perhaps, amongst all living human beings). We can call these subdivisions,
respectively, local, domestic, and global distributive justice.
An important feature of principles of distributive justice, as they are standardly
understood, and as I will be understanding them here, is that the duties arising
from them are primarily collective rather than individual in nature. Its concern
with the distribution of benefits renders utilitarian distributive justice, in at least
some of its aspects, a branch of what is commonly called "beneficence" in the
literature. But it is distinguished from other branches of beneficence in being a
mass operation (c.f. Hardin 1988, 40). Because principles of distributive justice
concern the way in which goods and bads are distributed across whole groups of
people - and often quite large groups - they can generally be satisfied practically
only by means of collective action, often through institutions. While individuals
will have moral duties to do their part in promoting the state of affairs called for
by a principle of distributive justice, then, the duty of distributive justice itself
falls in the first instance on the group.31
The way in which the move to indirect utilitarianism provides resources to solve
the problem with which we began should be clear. In its indirect form, those
features of utilitarianism that cause it to clash with the everyday conception of
distributive justice are likely to be significantly attenuated. The secondary
principles of justice that utilitarians select will be pluralistic, and may be
explicitly distributive, focused on the claims of individuals, or accommodating of
30 Given that personal and political rights differ in significant respects from other socio-economic
goods, I find it analytically useful to mark off their distribution as a separate sub-category of
justice. This is not to deny that, in practice, questions regarding the proper distribution of the
basic liberties and other socio-economic goods will often be closely related, given that the
distribution of the former will often be highly consequential for the distribution of the latter, and
vice versa.
31 C.f. Hardin 1988, 126. It is worth emphasizing that some moral problems - including some that
I will discuss in the following chapters - generate duties of both distributive justice and individual
beneficence. For instance, where overseas famine relief is concerned, the question of what
amount of its tax revenue one's government ought to contribute to alleviate the famine is a
question of distributive justice; the question of what you personally should do with your after-tax
income to promote the same goal is a question of individual beneficence. I will here be concerned
exclusively with questions of the former kind.
backward-looking notions such as desert.32 The indirect strategy does, however,
introduce some new challenges of its own. Three of the more important
objections to indirect utilitarianism are the following:
1. Wishful thinking. Indirect utilitarians generally claim that the secondary
principles that would be sanctioned by the principle of utility will be quite similar
in form to principles of everyday moral thought, or to attractive principles
proposed by non-utilitarian moral theorists. But this is self-delusion.
Utilitarians do not give us convincing arguments for why their theory supports
the attractive principles that they propose, rather than any of the infinitely many
other options instead.
2. Wrong reasons. Even if utilitarians could convince us that their secondary
principles 'would coincide in content with prima facie attractive moral principles,
their account would remain fundamentally unsatisfying. This is because the
ultimate justification that utilitarians give for their secondary principles is highly
counter-intuitive: if utilitarians ask us to do the right thing, they ask us to do it
for the wrong reasons.
3. Instability. Even if it can be shown that, as a general matter, compliance with
a given secondary principle will maximize utility, there will almost certainly arise
specific occasions on which violating that principle will maximize utility instead.
This means that utilitarians cannot account for our sense of the stringency of
principles of justice and rights: their account renders those principles and rights
insecure.33
32 Another welcome feature of indirect utilitarianism worth briefly mentioning is the way in which
it helps to answer the following general objection to utilitarianism as a political theory. Rawls and
others have claimed that explicit acceptance of utilitarianism as the moral foundation of public
life would have disturbing effects on the way in which citizens see and relate to each other,
undermining self-respect, "civic friendship and social solidarity" (Rawls 1971, 90-2). The
alternative in which utilitarianism is not taken as the public conception of justice, but is instead
cabined off for the exclusive use of a governing elite ("government house utilitarianism") is felt to
be distasteful or dangerous. It is debatable whether or not explicit appeal to utilitarianism in
public life would have these effects. But even if it would, the move to indirect utilitarianism
suggests that utilitarians should not be too concerned. This is because, on an indirect approach,
direct appeal to the principle of utility in the course of public affairs, not only by the general
population but across the board, will be the exception rather than the rule. On such matters as a)
the interpretation and application of secondary principles, b) adjustments to those principles over
time, c) exceptional cases and d) new challenges in hitherto unaddressed domains of moral
decision, explicitly utilitarian reasoning may sometimes be useful. But it is the secondary
principles recommended by the principle of utility that are to play by far the most significant role
in guiding public policy. Of course, if it turned out that, even despite this, an underlying public
acceptance of utilitarianism did have the negative effects on self-respect and fraternity mentioned
above, and if those effects were severe, utilitarians might have to reconsider the role of their
theory in public life.
33 Two other familiar challenges are the psychological dissonance objection, according to which
acceptance of indirect utilitarianism produces a kind of deliberative schizophrenia in the moral
agent ("I shouldn't lie!" "But wait - right now I should lie!"), and the abdication objection,
according to which the move to indirect utilitarianism equates to utilitarianism ushering itself
Each of these objections points to a reasonable concern, and much of what I say
in the following chapters can be understood as an attempt to answer them, in
regard to the special case of global distributive justice. It might be useful to
briefly say something in advance about the general form of response that I will
adopt in each case.
If indirect utilitarians are to answer the wishful thinking objection, they need to
provide a convincing set of reasons why full-blooded utilitarians should be
expected to support the secondary principles that they propose, instead of
supporting other (perhaps less intuitively attractive) secondary principles
instead. It will not be enough for utilitarians to point to the fact that the plausible
secondary principles that they propose contain welfarist or consequentialist
elements. This is because there is a major difference between contributing to
welfare (which general acceptance of most familiar moral principles can perhaps
be expected to do in some way or another) and maximizing its sum total. Some
plausible case needs to be made that general acceptance of one's secondary
principles will achieve the latter, much more ambitious, goal. In taking on this
task, it would be foolish to hope that secondary principles can be derived either in
a strict deductive fashion from the principle of utility, or by means of amassing
heroic amounts of empirical data. The most that can be done is to offer a set of
considerations that, together, provide a prima facie case for a strong contingent
connection between the principle of utility and the secondary principles with
which one ends up.
In responding to the wrong reasons objection, utilitarians should acknowledge
that there is no clear basis in everyday moral thought for the suggestion that
utility maximization lies at the root of all morality. But they should emphasize
that it is debatable how to interpret this fact. While common sense does not
deliver a utilitarian theory of justification, it is not clear that it rejects one either.
Common sense is arguably just silent on the question of what it is that ultimately
justifies many of its principles. Where the wrong reasons objection has more
force is when it points to more specific, first-order moral considerations for or
against certain policies or actions that utilitarianism does not seem able to
accommodate. Here the utilitarian has two main strategies open to her. She can
attempt to show that the considerations in question are, on reflection,
unattractive in some way, or she can attempt to show that her theory, properly
interpreted, does in fact incorporate them.
If the instability objection is to be undermined, two things will need to be done.
First, a plausible case will need to be made that, in practice, morally sanctioned
violations of utilitarian secondary principles will be rare. The plausibility of this
claim will depend on the strength of the initial arguments given for the principles
in question. Second, the utilitarian will need to explain our intuitive resistance to
entirely off the scene (Smart and Williams 1973, 135; Rawls 1971, 158-9). Although I do not find
either of these objections compelling, I lack the space to address them here.
violating her principles, in those rare cases where violations are permitted or
required. Utilitarians will generally claim that it makes sense as a psychological
matter that we should find it difficult to temporarily suspend attachment to
principles that generally serve us well. It can also be argued that such resistance
is to be welcomed by utilitarians, insofar as inflexible devotion to good principles
can be expected, over the long run, to maximize the general welfare.
It is reasonable to wonder how far one can go with the above strategies, and I am
sure that some people will not consider what I say in the following chapters to go
far enough. I do, however, think that an acceptable response can be made to
each of the above objections, and will try my best in what follows to make that
case. The best way to commence this task is to descend from the fairly high level
of abstraction at which the discussion so far has operated, and consider in more
detail some issues concerning the content of principles of distributive justice, on
an indirect utilitarian theory.
1.3 Domestic distributive justice: Outline of a utilitarian approach
Although the focus of this dissertation is on global distributive justice, it will be
useful, for two reasons, to consider the case of domestic distributive justice first.
For one, at least some of the key considerations that are relevant at the domestic
level extend to the global level, and those considerations are easier to get a grip
on in the domestic case. The smaller scale, more transparent structure, and
more familiar nature of the domestic context allow us to sidestep some
complications that are best postponed until later. For another, it will turn out on
the story that I tell that domestic distributive justice, although not continuous
with global distributive justice, is (in a sense to be explained) an important part
of it. I will therefore need to provide an account of what the principles of
domestic distributive justice consist in if my case is to be complete and
convincing at the global level.
It is now standard, among utilitarians and non-utilitarians alike, to understand
principles of domestic distributive justice as applying to the core social, political
and economic institutions of a society: what Rawls terms that society's "basic
structure". It is the "way in which the major social institutions distribute
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages" (Rawls
1971, 6) that determines whether or not a society is just. We can call the basic
structure the "subject" of domestic distributive justice. The "agent" of domestic
distributive justice - the entity responsible for ensuring that the basic structure is
just - is generally understood to be the state (in a democracy, the people, acting
through the state's legislature).34 I will assume these two theses in what
34 It is important to keep the subject of domestic distributive justice - social institutions, or more
precisely the way in which those institutions distribute advantages - distinct from the agent. It is
easy to confuse the two, because the term "institution" is ambiguous between two readings (Pogge
1989, 21-3). On the first reading, the term refers to "organized patterns of socially constructed
norms and roles, and socially prescribed behaviors expected of occupants of those roles, which are
created and re-created over time" (Goodin 1996, 19). Institutions in this sense are social
practices, or forms of collective activity. On the second reading "institution" refers not to
follows.35 Drawing on the above discussion, we can therefore say the following.
Utilitarian principles of domestic distributive justice are those secondary
principles that are to be used to morally evaluate the way in which a) the basic
structure of a society b) allocates benefits and burdens (excluding basic liberties
and punishments) amongst c) the members of a political community governed by
a state.
Which principles should an indirect utilitarian select for this purpose? In
answering this question we need to keep in mind the specific constraints that
agents working within domestic social and political institutions face. The most
significant are the following:
a) epistemic constraints: our limited knowledge, in general, of the
qualities and circumstances of individuals and the likely outcomes of our
actions or policies on their future levels of wellbeing.
b) practical constraints, such as limits on information processing and
technical capacity.
c) social constraints, especially i) pervasive disagreement concerning the
good, ii) conflicts of interest across individuals, and iii) problems in
coordinating action amongst many actors.
d) principled constraints deriving from the nature of wellbeing. If, as is
plausible, autonomous action and the achievement of goals by individual
agents themselves are important contributors to wellbeing, individuals
must necessarily take some responsibility for their own wellbeing if they
are to achieve it.
e) efficiency constraints. Some attempts to directly increase the wellbeing
of other individuals may result in a reduction of incentives on the part of
those individuals to attend to their own wellbeing, which may end up
reducing the aggregate total.
In what follows I will refer to these factors collectively as "the strategic
constraints". Each of them suggests that an attempt by utilitarian policy-makers
to implement the principle of utility directly - by judging every social
arrangement against it - would surely misfire.36 As a result, utilitarian theorists
practices but to actors (or, in Rawls' terms, "associations"), such as organizations or corporations.
(Think "government" vs. "form of government"). In speaking of institutions, I will here have the
former reading in mind.
35 Neither is entirely clear or uncontroversial. There exists some debate both over what exactly
should count as part of the basic structure, and over whether or not individual citizens, in their
private capacity, are to be regarded as agents of domestic distributive justice. (See Cohen 2000,
Scheffler 2006, Miller 1999, 12).
36 I take it that this is fairly evident, but to elaborate: constraint a) suggests that policy-makers are
unlikely to be very good at reliably working out how to increase the wellbeing of any single
individual, at least beyond a certain point. Constraint b) suggests that performing this calculation
of domestic distributive justice cannot simply assert the principle of utility and
then vacate the premises,37 but must instead engage in some of the key
controversies that animate the non-utilitarian camp. Chief among these
controversies, and the ones on which I will focus here, are the following:
1) The "distribuand" question. What are the goods the distribution of
which is the concern of domestic distributive justice?
2) The "metric" question. What it is that domestic social and political
institutions are to use for the comparative evaluation of individual
advantage?
3) The "principle(s)" question. Against which criteria should the way in
which the domestic basic structure distributes the distribuand be judged?
1.3.1 The distribuand and metric of domestic justice: desiderata
Wellbeing itself can be neither the distribuand nor the metric of justice. In a
distribuand, we are looking something we can detach from individuals, move
around, and allocate to others. In a metric, we are looking for something that is
epistemically accessible to second parties and capable of being situated, in a
publicly verifiable fashion, in relation to a scale of some kind. Wellbeing fails on
both of these fronts. Given that wellbeing is, on any plausible account, at least
partly subjective in nature, it is difficult for persons other than the subject to
reliably measure. And all that can be distributed by social institutions, strictly
speaking, are the means to wellbeing, not wellbeing itself.
In selecting alternative candidates for each of these roles, a utilitarian needs to
keep in mind the following four desiderata, derived from the strategic constraints
listed above:
Accuracy. The distribuand or metric ought to be a reasonably accurate
proxy for wellbeing. If we cannot distribute or measure wellbeing
directly, we ought to at least try to distribute or measure something that is
reliably correlated with, or productive of, it.
for an entire population at once is going to be a still more challenging task. Constraint c) i)
suggests that any attempt to base social policy directly on a moral principle as controversial as the
principle of utility would be likely to incite resistance. Constraints c) ii) and iii) suggest that what
is required is a framework of settled, simple, easily communicable rules to coordinate collective
action in everyday situations, and to deal with the conflicts that arise within it. And, finally, both
constraints d) and e) suggest that any attempts to generate wellbeing will need to reserve an
important role for freedom of action and individual discretion on the part of each member of the
population.
37 This is why the following reply by Peter Singer to Andrew Kuper is unsatisfying: "I'm not sure
why Kuper says that I have no theory of justice. It's no great secret that I'm a preference
utilitarian, and so he could have inferred that I believe that goods ought to be distributed so as to
maximize the satisfaction of preferences in the long run." (Singer 2005, 180). By itself, the
principle of utility is not a theory of justice.
Generality. Social policy should be focused on those factors that have
proven over time to be the most reliable contributors to human wellbeing.
We should be looking for goods that as a general matter have this result,
whatever the variance in their importance from person to person.
Workability. The metric must not be too inaccessible or complex to
identify, and the distribuand must be reliably capable of manipulation by
human agents in the context of social institutions.
Transparency. The extent to which various individuals hold the
distribuand or score on the metric ought to be publicly verifiable to a
reasonable degree of certainty, in order to alleviate concerns about
corruption, inefficiency or unfairness in public decision-making.
1.3.2 The distribuand ofdomesticjustice
In order to have a good chance of fulfilling the accuracy requirement on the
distribuand of domestic distributive justice, a utilitarian should start by returning
to the basic contributors to human wellbeing that I listed in the introduction. I
suggested that the list in question should include at least the following:
pleasure or enjoyment, physical and mental health, social interaction (especially,
close personal relations), autonomous action, certain sorts of understanding,
various forms of accomplishment, some minimal degree of desire satisfaction,
and the pursuit and achievement of personally endorsed goals.
In light of the strategic constraints, there is no feasible way for political agents to
directly regulate the distribution of these things. The appropriate question when
selecting the distribuand of justice is, then, the following: What sorts of "proxy"
goods or opportunities are most likely to produce the above contributors to
wellbeing? I suggest the following list:
1. health care, food, clothing, housing, a safe and unpolluted
environment38
2. education
3. income and wealth
4. decent and comfortable work
5. leisure time
6. the "social bases of self-respect" (Rawls 1971): whatever, over and above
the preceding (except the basic liberties) is a) needed in a particular social
context for an individual to have a sense of him or herself as a worthwhile
and dignified person, and b) a feasible object of social distribution.39
38 These goods are grouped together because they relate to the basic biological requirements of
survival.
39 C.f. Adam Smith: "By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are
indispensably necessary for the support of life, but what ever the customs of the country renders it
indecent for creditable people, even the lowest order to be without." (1776, 469).
Call these "standard goods". In assessing the proposal that standard goods are
the appropriate distribuand of justice, we should consider how well the above list
fares on the four desiderata that I listed earlier. The criticisms most likely to
arise here concern the generality and workability requirements. The list will
violate generality if it can be shown that it either includes socially distributable
items that are unnecessary for human wellbeing, or does not include such items
as are necessary. To alleviate such concerns, I should emphasize, first, that the
aim of the above list is to suggest the kind of things that we should be looking for
in a distribuand, rather than to press a fixed set of specific items, and, second,
that I intend it to be interpreted in a sufficiently flexible fashion to allow for
variation in the appropriate distribuand across different societies.
We can distinguish two ways in which inter-societal variation in standard goods
might occur, one which I will term weak, the other strong, variation. Weak
variation will occur when two societies share the same list of standard goods,
abstractly specified, but differ over their specific interpretations of what it is that
each good involves. Strong variation in standard goods will occur, on the other
hand, when there is no single (complete) list of goods, even abstractly conceived,
that applies within both of a given pair of societies. Weak intersocietal variation
in standard goods is likely to be endemic, due to political, economic, socio-
cultural and environmental differences across countries. There is, for instance,
no single type of education that it is appropriate to aim for in every existing or
imaginable society. Strong variation, on the other hand, is likely to be much
rarer: the list given above draws on quite basic aspects of the human biological
and social condition that are plausibly universal. Nonetheless, I mean to leave
open the possibility that some goods on the list might be entirely removed, and
others added, according to the case at hand. In deciding, as a practical matter,
what precisely ought to be on the list in the case of a given society, we can take up
the suggestion, made by both Sen (1987, 1992) and Scanlon (1975), that the value
of a given resource within a community is best determined by public moral
deliberation within that community regarding its importance in contributing to a
variety of worthwhile lives.
A broadly similar concern is likely to arise in regard to the workability criterion,
and can be given a similar response. Thus, it might be objected that, whether or
not all people do need all of the items on the list in order to live good lives, only
some societies are capable of securing some of those goods. Again, my proposal
is intended to accommodate this point. The nature of the items on the list ought
to be decided on a case-by-case basis by reflection on the options available to the
particular society at issue. Miller sums up the approach that I am advocating
here when he writes:
There is no canonical list of primary goods...but instead a moveable boundary
between justice-relevant and justice-irrelevant goods, the position of the
boundary depending partly on the technical capacities of our social institutions,
and partly on the degree of consensus that can be reached about the value of
particular goods (1999, 11)
1.3.3 The metric of domestic justice
I think that a resourcist approach to the distribuand of justice, of the general kind
offered above, is (or ought to be) uncontroversial. The more interesting question
concerns not the distribuand, but rather the metric of distributive justice: what it
is that social institutions are to use for the comparative evaluation of individual
advantage. When assessing the justice of the distribution of standard goods
amongst the members of a population, what should we look to in order to work
out whether person A is doing better than person B? The chief competing
accounts in the literature on this question are the capabilities and resourcist
approaches. Resourcists argue that in making such assessments we should look
to individuals' holdings of the goods themselves. A is doing better than B if she
has a higher index of the standard goods that apply within the society at issue.
Capabilities theorists (e.g. Sen 1987, 1992, 2000; Nussbaum 2000) argue that we
should look instead to the capability sets of individuals (understood as the
capacity of individuals to attain various valuable functionings). A is doing better
than B if she has a more extensive set of valuable capabilities than does B.
A helpful way of understanding the resourcism / capabilities debate is as a
dispute over the extent to which principles of justice ought to be based on facts
about the standard, as opposed to the idiosyncratic, needs of individuals.
Resourcists rely on ideas about standard human needs not only to decide the
types of things with which justice ought to be concerned (the distribuand
question), but also to measure and compare levels of advantage. Capabilities
theorists dispute the latter move. Their motivation for doing so is the idea that
we cannot straightforwardly read a person's quality of life off the resources that
we find in her command. By virtue of the differential capacities of individuals to
"convert" resources into valuable functionings, possession of a given bundle of
resources will have differential impacts on the wellbeing of different
individuals.40 If we are to properly take into account such individual differences
we need to look behind the resources that people hold to facts about their
capacities to "do" and "be".
I think that the resourcist approach gives the better answer on this question -
and due precisely to the feature highlighted by Sen. Resources are the
appropriate metric of distributive justice because they abstract from individual
differences. To see this, let us return to the desiderata given earlier. The chief
40 Sen suggests two reasons why the conversion capacities of individuals, and hence the effect of a
given resource on their quality of life, may vary. The first derives from differences in the
"internal" features of individuals: smaller people, for instance, generally need less food to sustain
a given degree of activity than do larger people. The second is due to differences in "external"
features, i.e. differences in the environments in which individuals find themselves, such as "public
educational arrangements ...the prevalence or absence of crime and violence ... epidemiology and
pollution ... [and] the nature of community relationships" (Sen 2000, 70).
advantage of the capabilities approach is in relation to the accuracy criterion.
Capability sets are clearly a closer proxy to wellbeing than are resource holdings,
for the reason that Sen highlights. But this fact is a very mixed blessing. This is
because fulfillment of the accuracy criterion beyond a certain degree undermines
fulfillment of the other three criteria of generality, workability and transparency.
A capabilities metric is much harder to operationalize politically than is a
standard goods metric for the following three reasons: i) there are many morally
relevant functionings, ii) many non-material functionings are very hard to
measure, and iii) capabilities or opportunities to achieve those functionings are
even harder to get an empirical grip upon than are the functionings themselves (it
is impossible to measure an individual's capability set directly). Given the
severity of these operational difficulties, a resourcist approach to the metric of
justice seems to me to be the only feasible option.41
That said, there remains an important role for capabilities as a supplement to an
otherwise robustly resourcist account (c.f. Cohen 1995). This is because,
although as a general rule the extent to which a person possesses a given
capability is difficult or impossible to measure, some specific, basic capabilities
present an exception to this rule. Cases of physical and mental disability, or of
extreme destitution, present good examples. When a person lacks a leg, it is not
difficult to ascertain and verify to the satisfaction of the public whether or not
that person can walk unaided. Given the plausible connection between severely
limited capabilities of this sort and welfare deficits, there is therefore a utilitarian
reason for departing from an exclusively resourcist metric in such exceptional
cases. This will plausibly result in a utilitarian justification for the channeling of
extra resources to those with special needs in just the way that Sen argues is
necessary.42 Sen's approach, then, is not best understood as a straightforward
alternative to a resourcist account but rather as a useful pointer to a friendly
amendment.43
1.3.4 Principles of domestic distributive justice.
41 Similarly, see Rawls, who notes that it is "true that any use of primary goods must make certain
simplifying assumptions about citizens' capabilities" but that "the idea of effective basic
capabilities without those or similar assumptions calls for more information than political theory
can conceivably acquire and sensibly apply" (1999, 13).
42 That addresses the problem of "internal" differences, in at least some important cases. What of
that of "external" differences? (fn 40 supra). Again, I don't think that the cases to which Sen
points call for a fundamental departure from resourcism. We should merely be careful to adopt a
sophisticated understanding of what it is for someone to have access to resources, according to
which certain environmental factors are understood to diminish that access.
43 It is not entirely clear that Sen would object to this characterization. In Development as
Freedom, he includes as one of three acceptable ways of incorporating capability considerations
into social evaluation the "supplementary approach", which "involves continued use of traditional
procedures of interpersonal comparisons in income spaces, but supplements them by capability
considerations" (82). As this quotation suggests, Sen's main concern in this book is to undermine
an exclusive focus on income comparisons, a concern, it is worth noting, that the resourcist
approach that I advocate here accommodates, even without the explicit capability
supplementation.
I have so far argued that what I above termed "standard goods" should be both
the distribuand and the metric of utilitarian domestic distributive justice, with
the qualification that such goods be supplemented in their metric role by the use
of capabilities in certain special cases. The third fundamental issue that a theory
of domestic distributive justice needs to settle concerns the principle (or
principles) on the basis of which these standard goods ought to be distributed
amongst the members of a political society. Within a utilitarian framework, this
question takes the following special cast. Our goal is to identify a secondary
principle (or set of principles), suitable for guiding the design and workings of
domestic social and political institutions, general acceptance of which can be
expected to maximize the aggregate wellbeing of the population over the long
term. Answering this question in the detail required for the purposes of a
comprehensive account of domestic distributive justice would take us far afield.
The following should therefore be taken in the spirit of a general schema,
gesturing at the direction that that more comprehensive account would take.
The Maxificing principle
I suggest that we start with the following idea:
Maxificing. Utilitarian domestic distributive justice requires that the basic
structure of a society - its social, political and economic institutions, taken
together as one scheme - be arranged so as to maximize over time the number of
its members who possess an adequate amount of standard goods, where an
"adequate amount" is:
i) the amount of those goods that is normally necessary in the society in
question if an individual is to attain a minimally decent level of welfare
ii) subject to increase in the case of individuals with transparent
limitations in basic capabilities.
The term "maxificing" (which I take from an unpublished manuscript of John
Roemer's) is shorthand for "maximize the number of people who satisfice", where
(on my interpretation) to "satisfice" is to attain the "adequate amount of standard
goods" specified above. This maximizing priniciple should be distinguished from
a perhaps more familiar candidate, according to which justice requires that each
person satisfices, a requirement that I consider to overestimate the capacities of
domestic social and political institutions.
There are three main questions to be answered in regard to Maxificing. In what
does a minimally decent level of welfare consist? What amount of standard
goods is normally necessary if an individual is to attain a minimally decent level
of welfare, thus specified? And why should this principle be attractive to a
utilitarian?
Although the idea of a minimally decent level of welfare is admittedly imprecise, I
think it possible to reach a reasonable degree of social consensus on what it
involves. It is perhaps best identified in terms of the things that it rules out. We
can be confident that a minimally decent level of welfare is not achieved, for
instance, 'when a person: routinely works lengthy days of hard or dull and
repetitive labor; suffers, or is routinely at significant risk of suffering, physical or
emotional abuse; lacks income, to the extent of being unable to purchase basic
necessities; and is in acute or chronic physical or mental distress. The amount of
standard goods that is normally necessary if an individual is to avoid outcomes of
this kind is likely to vary to some extent with the particular society at issue. But,
I think that we can say at least the following as a general matter. A person will
need enough food to achieve the normal daily caloric requirements for a person
of her age, weight and lifestyle; a private room heated to a comfortable
temperature in a building meeting basic health and safety standards; non-toxic
air quality; stable and respectable employment, with at least one full day off work
per week; safe access to public spaces; and sufficient income or wealth for
discretionary spending on some desired goods beyond those listed so far. In
most modern societies education at least up to the level of basic literacy and
numeracy, and usually beyond, will also be necessary. The case of health care is
somewhat more difficult, given that individuals differ more radically in their
health needs than they do in their needs for the other items on the list of standard
goods given earlier. We cannot, then, specify the precise amount of health care
that is required, even generally, in order for individuals to attain a minimally
decent welfare level. We can presumably, however, say something general about
the level or type of health itself that is generally required if a person is to attain
that level. We can understand an adequate amount of health care to be whatever
amount is required to secure a person that level or type of health.44
In determining whether or not a given individual possesses an adequate amount
of standard goods overall, we ought to allow room for some intrapersonal trade-
offs between specific goods. This is because the general case, at which I have
suggested social policy ought to be directed, admits of exceptions. In particular,
some people do not want the amount of a given standard good that is generally
necessary in their society in order to attain a minimally decent level of welfare.
This is usually because they prefer to trade off some amount of that good for
greater amounts of other goods: as when an executive works 7-day weeks in order
to advance her career or gain a six-figure salary. Because a certain degree of
desire-satisfaction is a central contributor to wellbeing, principles of distributive
justice ought to permit room for such intrapersonal trade-offs. In practical
terms, this will generally mean that social policy ought to be aimed at ensuring
44 1 am no philosopher of health. Intuitively, however, we ought to be able to say something like
the following. A minimally healthy person is one who, at least, a) is mobile, b) can perform a
range of everyday physical tasks, c) does not suffer acute or chronic pain, and d) lacks various
forms of generally recognized disease. It is clear that some people are able to attain a minimally
decent level of wellbeing even while suffering deficits judged against this standard. But such
exceptions to the rule should not cause too much concern where the principle under
consideration is concerned. That principle is intended to provide a general guideline for the
purposes of social policy. When our focus is on the lower ranges of wellbeing, it is appropriate to
err, if anywhere, on the side of generosity.
that individuals have access to an adequate amount of specific standard goods,
rather than ensuring that individuals have those goods.
Maxificing should appeal to a utilitarian for the following set of reasons. First,
each of the evils that achievement of an "adequate" level of standard goods
eliminates seriously undermines one or more of the standard contributors to
human wellbeing that I listed in the introduction (and again at 1.3.2). People
who are overworked, ill, hungry, physically insecure and stigmatized generally
experience low levels of wellbeing, and these levels are often "transferred" to their
family members or to others with whom they come into contact. Second, people
whose lives are stunted by suffering and deprivation represent a tragic waste of
human potential. Their talents and ideas are unable to be developed and put to
use, to the detriment of the welfare of future as well as present generations.
Third, identifying and remedying the evils that Maxificing is directed at
eliminating is in many cases not an especially difficult task: the extent to which
people experience these basic evils is reasonably transparent and, at least given
relatively propitious circumstances and well-functioning institutions, it does not
take a great deal of resources to fix them. All of the above means that the policy-
maker reliably gets a big bang for her buck, in utilitarian terms, if she focuses her
attentions on basic welfare.
I can think of two main reasons why one might doubt the utilitarian credentials
of Maxificing. The first of these can be answered; the second points to a need for
supplementation. The first source of doubt runs as follows. I noted in the
introduction that utilitarians are distinguished from other welfare
consequentialists by their commitment to sum-ranking: all that matters to them
in evaluating state of affairs is the total amount of welfare that those states of
affairs contain. But then what business have they focusing on absolute
thresholds of welfare, rather than purely the aggregate sum? This, it might be
suggested, looks suspiciously like a retreat to sufficientarianism rather than
arithmetic addition as an interpersonal aggregation function. The response to
this objection involves reiterating that Maxificing is intended as a secondary, not
a primary, principle. The appeal to threshold welfare levels that it incorporates
is being proposed as a way of evaluating societies not from the "perspective of
morality", as it might be put, but from the perspective of distributive justice.45
The reason that such an appeal makes sense for utilitarians from the latter
perspective, although not from the former, is that, as noted just now, minimally
45 To illustrate in a little more detail how these two evaluatory perspectives differ, imagine that we
have two societies, A and B, each with loo citizens, and in each of which 50 citizens attain a
decent threshold level of welfare. In B, however, the other 50 citizens are much better off than are
the other 50 citizens in A. Judging these societies from what I above called the "perspective of
morality", sufficientarians will rank A and B equally; utilitarians will rank B higher than A. But
judging the same societies from the perspective of distributive justice, utilitarians and
sufficientarians might well (though need not) agree in their rankings. Assume for the moment
that Maxificing is the sole principle of distributive justice, according to both utilitarianism and
sufficientarianism, and that both societies are doing the best they can on the Maxificing front,
given the institutional options available to them. In this case, both utilitarians and
sufficientarians should rank A and B as equally distributively just.
decent levels of welfare are relatively easy to identify and manipulate politically,
and therefore deal well with some of the strategic constraints listed earlier.
Egalitarianism
A second reason for doubting the utilitarian appeal of the maxificing principle is,
however, more compelling. This is the worry that Maxificing is unjustifiably
unambitious: it does not sufficiently exploit the wellbeing-enhancing capacities of
modern social and political institutions. One wonders if it could not somehow be
combined with another secondary principle, compliance with which would result
in greater social welfare. A useful way to approach this question is to consider
the various ways in which equality in income and wealth across individuals (or
"material egalitarianism") can be expected to contribute to social welfare.
Two of the more familiar reasons for thinking so are the following:
1. Income and wealth have diminishing marginal utility: Paris Hilton's
next $50 plausibly produces much less additional wellbeing in her hands
than that same $50 would in the hands of a homeless person. This fact
suggests that a move to a more equal domestic income and wealth
distribution would on balance produce more wellbeing than it cost.
2. Inequalities of income and wealth have been argued to depress
economic growth, as compared to an alternative state of affairs in which
income and wealth are more equally distributed (see Ray 1998, pp.197-
241). This result is claimed to be especially likely in developing countries,
where large poor populations lack the capital to invest in education,
health care and sustainable livelihoods. If economic growth results in
greater social welfare (which, it is worth stressing, may or may not be the
case), this fact would provide a further utilitarian reason to flatten out the
income and wealth distribution.
Beyond these more traditional economic arguments for material egalitarianism,
we can identify a series of additional arguments of a more social or political
cast46:
1. Inequality of wealth can undermine political liberty. Wealthier citizens,
by virtue of their potential financial contributions and influential social
connections, have greater ability to push their agendas through the
political process. The political liberty of those who have fewer resources is
thereby rendered ineffective.
2. Inequality of income or wealth can lead to oppressive or dominating
relationships, with their attendant loss of autonomy.47
46 The following list draws extensively on Scanlon 2003.
47 This concern differs from the first, insofar as it refers to relationships within the interpersonal
sphere more generally, not solely to those that arise in relation to formal political institutions.
3. Material inequality can lead to dissatisfaction, insofar as the enjoyment
that people gain from the goods in their possession depends not only on
the objective features of those goods, but also on the way in which those
goods stack up relative to the goods of others.
4. Inequality of wealth tends to decrease social solidarity, thereby
diminishing opportunities for beneficial social interaction amongst
members of distinct socio-economic groups.
5. Inequality of wealth may undercut the justice of democratic and liberal
institutions. The same undermining of social solidarity mentioned in 4.
above can reduce the motivation of citizens to vote on the basis of the
common good rather than on the basis of their own partisan concerns.
Material inequality can also result in procedural unfairness, to the extent
that it distorts what would otherwise be a balanced consideration of the
interests of the various parties affected.
6. Inequalities of income or wealth can lead to feelings of inferiority,
humiliation and loss of self-respect on the part of individuals at the
bottom of the wealth distribution.
7. Great social inequality tends to lead to stigmatizing status differences, a
phenomenon that occurs when the feelings referred to in 6. come to be
recognized as a matter of common knowledge amongst the members of a
society. Such status differentiation, and the practices of deference and
privilege that accompany it, both reinforce the feelings in question and
produce wider social effects that are of distinct concern in themselves.48
If, as seems very plausible, political and personal liberty, fulfilling social
relationships, a politics of the common good, self respect, autonomous agency,
satisfaction with one's social position, and a certain kind of status equality are
important contributors to human wellbeing, and if relative equality of income
and wealth is a necessary condition for the achievement of each of these things, it
would seem that we can derive a strong prima facie argument for material
egalitarianism from utilitarianism. It is also worth noting that some of the social
and political arguments listed here extend to the case of inequalities in standard
goods other than income and wealth, making these arguments much broader in
scope than the economic arguments noted earlier.
48 The corruption of personal and political relationships that characterizes inegalitarian regimes is
one obvious such effect. There may also be less obvious ones. Recent research suggests that there
exist significant differences in health outcomes between those of differing social status: "Not only
do the poor have much worse health and much lower life expectancies than those who are not
poor, but those who are relatively affluent and enjoy high status have worse health than those who
are at a still higher status" (Hausman & McPherson 2006, 205) - to the extent that Swedes with
PhDs have lower mortality than Swedes with BAs. A recent study also suggests that the health of
those with lower social status is worse when they live in neighborhoods predominantly occupied
by those of higher status than when they live in "low-status" neighborhoods (Stanford School of
Medicine, 2006).
We should, however, consider an important objection. It might be that the above
arguments call only for the raising of all citizens to a certain absolute level of
resources, not to a level equal to that of their fellow-citizens, and that, to this
extent, they do not move us beyond the maxificing principle discussed in the
previous section. To see how this objection might go, consider, first, the
argument from diminishing marginal utility. The homeless person in the
example given above is not simply less well off than Paris Hilton, but very badly
off, in absolute terms. In order to show that the diminishing marginal utility of
resources provides a utilitarian argument for something more extensive than
Maxificing, we need to select a case in which both parties enjoy higher than
decent levels of wellbeing. But, in fact, in cases of the latter kind it is less obvious
that the less well-off party would derive greater marginal utility from a given
additional injection of resources. Similarly, in regard to the argument from
economic growth, when everyone in a society is reasonably well off it is less likely
that sending resources down to the lower reaches of the income distribution
actually would increase GDP.49 Likewise, the danger that inequality in standard
goods will undermine egalitarian interpersonal relations, social solidarity, self-
respect and equal social status may apply only in those cases where those at the
bottom end of the economic distribution are so badly off as to fail to attain a basic
level of welfare. And if the desirability of political liberty and robustly democratic
politics can be derived from the maxificing principle itself, as might be argued5o,
there may be no significant novelty in reasons 1. and 5. above. That leaves us
with the concern about dissatisfaction at one's social position relative to that of
others, a phenomenon that is insufficiently strong and universal to take us very
far by itself.
I am willing to believe that the arguments canvassed above may call for the
raising of individuals to a certain absolute level of resources, rather than to a level
equal to that of all of their fellow citizens. However, even if this were so, it would
not show that satisfaction of the maxificing principle is sufficient to secure
domestic distributive justice. This is because it is highly doubtful that the
absolute level in question is the level required for a minimally decent life. We
can easily imagine a society in which all persons had sufficient standard goods to
attain minimally decent levels of wellbeing, but in which inequalities in those
49 A further, more general, problem with the argument that inequality reduces growth is its weak
empirical support. The World Bank notes that "[d]espite the great attention devoted to the
question of a systematic relationship between overall inequality and growth at the country level,
the body of evidence remains unconvincing." (2005, 103). The most that can be drawn from the
data so far is the more measured claim that in some cases, some specific types of equality (not
necessarily in income and wealth) can be expected to promote growth via improved investment.
Thus the World Bank claims that "judicious redistribution - of income to grandmothers, of power
to poor women farmers, of credit to entrepreneurs in small firms - can increase the productivity
of resources, such as land, human capital, and physical capital." (2005, 104).
50 Such an argument might appeal to Sen's finding that freedom of the press is associated with a
reduction in the likelihood of famine in developing countries (Dreze & Sen 1989), or to the claim
that a thriving democracy is necessary if political pressure is to be sustained for the sorts of
redistributive policies that Maxificing is likely, in practice, to require.
goods nonetheless resulted in a distortion of political outcomes in favor of a
wealthy minority, a loss of self-respect, social solidarity or security from
domination, or (perhaps) reduced economic growth, in a way that was net
welfare-reducing for the society as a whole, as against a politically available
alternative in which standard goods were more equally distributed. This suggests
to me that the maxificing principle will not alone address all of the concerns that
a utilitarian might reasonably have about domestic inequality. Instead, an
independent secondary principle calling for at least a certain degree of
egalitarianism not only in income and wealth, but also in other standard goods, is
plausibly necessary.
1.4 Conclusion
The result of the foregoing discussion, I suggest, is the following outline of a
utilitarian conception of domestic distributive justice. The basic structure of a
society - its social, political and economic institutions, taken together as one
scheme - ought to be set so as to:
1. Maxificing. Maximize over time the number of its members who possess an
adequate amount of standard goods. 51
and:
2. Resource Egalitarianism. Eliminate large inequalities in possession of
standard goods across its members over the lifespan.
I suggest that, in the design and assessment of the domestic basic structure, the
first of these ought to take priority over the second. The first priority of justice
ought to be to maxifice; then, within that constraint, utilitarians ought to favor
institutions that result in more rather than less equal distributions of standard
goods over the long term.
While I consider this conception to be attractive as far as it goes, it is by no
means complete. As I have just noted, the question of precisely how much
equality is desirable in a domestic society - along with the questions of what
considerations or conditions diminish or override that desirability, and of
whether the case for equality is stronger in regard to some standard goods than
others - all need to be answered before we can formulate the second principle in
a more precise way. Nor is the utilitarian argument for the conception complete.
Non-utilitarians can be expected to raise versions of both the wishful thinking
and wrong reasons objections described earlier (1.2.1 supra) against it. That
is, even if they find the above conception attractive, they are likely to wonder
whether utilitarianism a) genuinely supports it over other potential candidates
51 Where, as noted above, an "adequate amount" is that amount normally necessary in the society
in question if an individual is to attain a minimally decent level of welfare, subject to increase in
the case of individuals with transparent limitations in basic capabilities.
for the role, and/or b) tells the right story about why it is attractive.52 But, if the
account of domestic distributive justice given here can therefore only be a partial
one, that partial one has provided foundations for what follows, in two ways.
First, it has illustrated how an indirect utilitarian account of distributive justice,
ought, in general outline, to proceed. Second, it has shown that some commonly
expressed ideas about distributive justice - the importance of securing a basic
level of welfare for individuals, and of securing equality along certain
dimensions across those individuals - might be supported by some of the core
ideas in classical utilitarianism. Both of these elements will be put to use in the
global case to come.
52 One important version of the "wrong reasons" objection appeals to considerations of fairness.
Many of us think that social inequalities not only raise questions about an inefficient or wasteful
distribution of resources and threaten to undermine certain valuable social and political
outcomes. They also seem, in certain cases, unfair. I think that this suggestion is important, but
the issues that it raises within a utilitarian framework are sufficiently complex to warrant
postponing discussion of it until Chapter 5, where I take up the question of fairness in relation to
global distributive justice.
Chapter 2. Global Distributive Justice: How to Begin
2.1 Introduction
According to the preceding chapter, the role of principles of global distributive
justice within utilitarianism is to provide criteria for evaluating the distribution
of benefits and burdens (other than basic liberties and punishments) across
persons who live in distinct political communities. The thesis of indirect
utilitarianism holds that the appropriate principles to select for this role are
those the general acceptance of which has the greatest tendency to promote
aggregate wellbeing over the long term. A utilitarian conception of global
distributive justice aims to provide an account of the substantive content of such
principles. The previous chapter suggests that this task will involve, inter alia,
specifying what it is that we ought to be concerned with distributing at the global
level, the shape that a just global distribution of that distribuand (or
distribuands) ought to take, the appropriate metric(s) for global interpersonal
comparisons, and the appropriate ordering of priorities amongst any competing
goods or requirements. It will also involve some account of the nature of the
political, social or economic institutions that are to be judged against the
principles selected, and an account of how the responsibilities of various global
agents to secure fulfillment of those principles are to be understood.
In approaching questions of this scope and complexity, it can be difficult to
know where to begin. This chapter will consider how a utilitarian ought to
commence the task of constructing an account of distributive justice at the
global level, rejecting one option, and advocating another. The result will be the
setting in place of some basic elements of a utilitarian framework for theorizing
about global distributive justice, on which the following, more substantive,
chapters will draw.
2.2 From domestic distributive justice to global distributive justice
One appealingly simple way of approaching the task of constructing a theory of
global distributive justice is a strategy we can term direct transposition: an
application of the principles developed for the case of domestic distributive
justice, substantially unaltered, to the global population as a whole. We are to
treat the world, on this approach, as one big global society, held to the same
distributive norms as are individual political communities.5s
The use of the term "direct" must be understood loosely here, given that any
attempt to implement this strategy will have to acknowledge the need for some
53 Among the more famous instances of this strategy is Beitz's claim (1979, inter alia) that the
Rawlsian difference principle ought to be applied not only to the domestic basic structure of
individual societies, but also to the global basic structure (see also Pogge). Rawls himself was
more circumspect (see infra, 3.2.2 - 3.2.3)
adjustments in the principles applying to the domestic case, if the latter are to
make minimal sense as global principles. If we take as our candidate conception
of domestic distributive justice the skeletal one developed in the previous
chapter, at least the following three amendments would be necessary. First,
there would need to be a change in the subject of global distributive justice from
the domestic to the global basic structure. The latter is generally understood to
incorporate such elements as the existing body of international public and
private law, the multilateral trading regime, international financial institutions
such as the IMF and World Bank, and other sites and products of international
regulation. Second, the move to the global level would necessitate a change in
the distribuand of justice, due to the fact of weak and strong variation in
standard goods across societies referred to at 1.3.2 supra. Given that a given
standard good will often take different forms in different societies (weak
variation), and that in some cases something that counts as a standard good in
one society may have no counterpart at all in another society (strong variation),
most societies will have their own unique set of standard goods. This means that
if we were to advocate standard goods, simpliciter, as the distribuand of global
distributive justice, it would be unclear which set we meant to refer to. The most
promising way for the advocate of direct transposition to work around this fact
proceeds by reference to the distinction made in Chapter 1 between standard
goods abstractly specified (e.g. education, wealth), and particular specifications
of those goods (e.g. the ability to read and write English, U.S. dollars). Call the
former "global" and the latter "domestic" standard goods. In order to
accommodate the fact of weak variation, globally transposed principles will need
to refer solely to global standard goods. In order to accommodate the fact of
strong variation, the set of global standard goods will need to comprise those
abstractly specified goods whose specific instantiations appear most frequently
on the various lists of domestic standard goods.54 Thirdly, the shift to the global
case will call for a change in the metric of distributive justice: the unit (or units)
that are to be used for the comparative evaluation of individual advantage.
Global standard goods will presumably fill this role in the global case, just as
domestic standard goods do in the case of domestic distributive justice
(supplemented by capabilities in certain special cases). In order to assess, for the
purposes of global distributive justice, whether or not person A from society X is
doing better than person B from society Y, we would look to their respective
holdings of global standard goods. A will be doing better than B if she has a
higher index of those global goods than B.
If the direct transposition strategy is correct, once adjustments of the above
reasonably straightforward kind are effected, it should be appropriate to apply
the principles developed for the case of domestic distributive justice to the world
as a whole. In our case, this would result in the following conception of global
distributive justice:
54 Thus, if income and wealth play a major role in sustaining human wellbeing in most societies,
they will count as global standard goods even if in some societies they do not play such a role. This
move can be understood as a global application of the generality condition (1.3.1 supra) on the
distribuand of justice.
The global basic structure ought to be set so as to:
1. Global maxificing. Maximize over time the number of people who possess an
adequate amount of global standard goods
2. Global resource egalitarianism. Eliminate large inequalities in possession
of global standard goods across all people over the lifespan.
- with 1. taking priority over 2.
This strategy would certainly be convenient. It also has a pleasingly
cosmopolitan air: in refusing to treat the domestic case as particularly special, it
looks like something well placed to appeal to the eminently non-parochial
utilitarian. What should we think of it?
2.2.1 Against direct transposition
The first thing to note in assessing the direct transposition strategy is that, while
it generates principles of domestic and global distributive justice that look
superficially very similar, that appearance of similarity is lessened when we
consider what an application of the global principles under view would actually
involve. As I will now argue, a global transposition of our domestic principles
will result in 1) greater difficulty in identifying the relevant set of standard
goods, and in weighing up distinct standard goods against each other, 2) cruder
interpersonal comparisons of welfare, and 3) indeterminacy concerning who the
agent of distributive justice is supposed to be.
1. Difficulty of selecting and weighing global standard goods. I suggested in
the previous chapter that at the domestic level we can rely on public moral
deliberation to decide which goods are to function as the distribuand and metric
of justice. But such deliberation will be much more difficult to organize, and
much less likely to be appropriately representative, at the global level. Any list of
global standard goods settled upon will consequently be much more contested.
It will also be more difficult at the global level to settle on a trade-off schedule: a
way of weighing up distinct standard goods against each other. Such a schedule
is necessary for applying the maxificing principle in situations of resource
scarcity, where different goods - say, health care and education - cannot be
concurrently attained, or attained at the desirable level, for some or all members
of a given population. In the case of a single society, we can generally assume
that there exists sufficient agreement on basic values and priorities for it to be
possible to settle on a schedule of weightings that most members of the
population can, at least broadly, endorse. At the global level, however, this
assumption is much less secure. It will be very difficult to construct in a
principled way a uniform trade-off schedule that applies across all 193 of the
world's politically, economically and culturally diverse nations.
2. Cruder interpersonal welfare comparisons. We can identify three reasons
why welfare comparisons between persons from distinct societies, by means of
global standard goods, will be much more rough and ready than welfare
comparisons between persons in a single society, by means of domestic standard
goods. First, some welfare-relevant holdings of standard goods may have to be
treated as welfare-irrelevant when interpersonal comparisons are made at the
global level. This is because, as noted earlier, in selecting the set of global
standard goods, we may need to "filter out" some goods that are significant
contributors to wellbeing in some societies but not in others. Given that the
goods filtered out would not count as standard goods if they did not tend to have
significant effects on the welfare of those who held them, this move is likely to
result in misrepresentations of the welfare levels of some individuals. Second,
inter-societal welfare comparisons by means of global standard goods are unable
to adequately account for the relative, as opposed to absolute, aspects of
individual advantage. The simple case of wealth is illustrative. The value of a
given bundle of currency to a particular person depends to a considerable extent
on the amount of currency held by others within her society. As Sen notes,
"being relatively poor in a rich community can prevent a person from achieving
some elementary "functionings" (such as taking part in the life of the
community) even though her income, in absolute terms, may be much higher
than the level of income at which members of poorer communities can function
with great ease and success" (2000, 71). Similar points apply to the case of
education, and possibly housing (for the latter, see Goodin 1995, 252-3). Third,
the use of global standard goods to compare individual welfare across societies is
not well placed to accommodate the fact that the members of some societies
may, quite generally, have less expensive needs or goals than the members of
others. To take up the case of wealth again, we cannot assume that individuals
who reside in different societies derive a similar level of welfare from bundles of
currency satisfying purchasing power equivalence, because the goods that those
bundles can be used to buy may be considered a necessity in one society, but
merely a luxury in another.55
3. No obvious agent ofjustice. It is fairly clear at the domestic level which agent
should be primarily charged with ensuring that the domestic basic structure
satisfies principles of distributive justice of the kind argued for in Chapter 1. The
impressive powers of coordination and enforcement possessed by the modern
state render it the obvious candidate for the role. When those same principles
are transposed to the global level, however, it becomes quite unclear which agent
is suited to ensuring that they are fulfilled. As the world is now structured, and
is likely to remain structured for the foreseeable future, the highest political
authorities are the governments of individual states. But the idea of charging
these individual states with the task of fulfilling the global principles given above
is quite unattractive. Due to the extensive reach of those principles, and the
difficulty of determining their precise requirements (see above), it is highly
doubtful that the world's states could set themselves to implement them in a
manner that could be expected to even approximately hit the desired target.
55 In addition to these points, there are also a number of pressing problems with the construction
of the PPP measure itself that I set aside here.
The advocate of direct transposition is committed to claiming that the above
considerations do not alter the appeal of her domestic principles when the latter
are globally transposed. I think this overly sanguine. There is not much that
utilitarians can do about the difficulty of formulating an accurate and workable
list of global standard goods, constructing a satisfying single schedule for
weighing those goods up against each other, and making precise global
interpersonal welfare comparisons on the basis of them. They can, however,
respond to this fact in better and worse ways. They can, for instance, attempt to
formulate principles of justice that do not depend so heavily on constructing the
list and schedule, or on making the comparisons, in question. (This will not be a
worrying evasion if, as suggested above, global standard goods are not likely to
be an especially accurate proxy for wellbeing in any case). And, importantly,
they can try to identify principles that are better attuned to the capacities of real
world agents. An inability to see precisely how a principle of justice might
translate into action is not just a matter to be shelved until later, for the
"implementation" phase. This is because it is the very point of principles of
justice (within an indirect utilitarian theory, but not only there) to provide goals
that are reasonably close to earth: goals that it is sensible to suggest that human
agents pursue. This means that it is not clear that we even have a genuine
principle of global distributive justice until we can see how that principle might
interact with the capacities of the world's major actors.
The above points suggest that the case of domestic distributive justice does not
provide the convenient springboard for constructing a theory of global
distributive justice that one might have hoped it to.56 Nor, I think, should this be
viewed as big news. It would in fact be surprising, given the strategic character
of utilitarian principles of justice, if the significant differences that obtain
between global and domestic politics did not translate into significant
differences in the distributive principles appropriate to each sphere. We need to
come at the task from a different direction.
2.3 Starting with the state
In my view, the best way to proceed is via a critical examination of what is by far
the most salient and significant feature of present-day global institutional
organization: the division of the world into a plurality of distinct, territorially-
based political communities, each governed by its own state. The very first step
in constructing a theory of global distributive justice, I suggest, ought to be a
consideration of the extent to which this form of global organization - call it "the
state system" - is morally justified.
56 Chapter 5, section 5.6, provides some further reasons for doubting the appropriateness of the
global resource egalitarian principle in particular. Section 5.5.1 also casts doubt on the
appropriateness of treating the "global basic structure" as the subject of global distributive justice.
These additional considerations, I hope, should together serve to cement the conclusion in the
text above for those who remain unconvinced.
Not everyone agrees that political philosophers ought to be in the business of
evaluating institutional arrangements as basic as the state system, for something
like the following reason. The fundamental purpose of normative political
theory is to guide action. Such theory is meant to tell us (at some admittedly
abstract remove) what we are to do in the here and now, starting as and where
we are. If it is meant to provide present-day guidance in this way, it will need to
assume from the outset some fundamental facts concerning present-day reality.
Many political theorists are of the view that these facts ought to include not only
basic elements of "the human condition...but also political, legal, social and
economic arrangements as we more or less now find them..." (James 2006, 701;
c.f. Rawls 1999 11-12).57 Searching around for a moral justification for such
arrangements is, on this view, unnecessary at best, and destined for failure at
worst, given that it will often be very difficult to convincingly construct the
desired justification, due in part to the difficulty of considering all of the relevant
alternatives.58
I am sympathetic to this line of thought in the case of some moral questions
regarding some institutions. When considering whether or not justice requires
reform of an election procedure within one's local lawn bowling association, for
instance, one does not generally need to start one's answer with a lengthy
discursus on the question of whether or not that association ought to exist. Nor
does one need to resolve one's views concerning the relative merits of capitalism
and market socialism when considering how one's state's property or labor laws
ought to be revised. Most of the moral decisions that we make do not concern
entire institutions in this way, but take place "at the margin" - and, given the
various strategic constraints listed earlier, this is generally quite a good thing.
However, in the context of some types of moral inquiry, I think that there is
reason to probe more deeply, asking not merely how an institution ought to be
rearranged, but also what can be said in favor of its existing at all.59 This is most
clearly the case in regard to basic institutional arrangements that have truly
immense consequences for human wellbeing. In such cases, even if we cannot
57 C.f Sidgwick:
The utilitarian, in the existing state of our knowledge, cannot possibly construct a
morality de novo either for man as he is (abstracting his morality) or for man as he ought
to be and will be. He must start, speaking broadly, with the existing social order...
(Sidgwick 1907, 473)
58 As Sidgwick puts it: "when we abandon the firm ground of actual society we have an illimitable
cloudland surrounding us on all sides, in which we may construct any variety of pattern states..."
(1907, 22).
59 See Brandt:
It looks as if morality has to operate on two levels, on one level being free to criticize and
attack the institution of private property (marriage, etc.) - this is the level proper for
reformers - and on another level being required to accept this institution as a going
concern and to support principles regulating behavior on the assumption the institution
is there - the morality for everyday life" (1992, 351).
hope to conclusively determine whether or not the institution in question is
something that, taken as a whole, we ought to endorse, asking the question
anyway has two points in its favor. The first and most important is the guard
that is thereby provided against unwarranted conservatism. When an institution
is highly consequential for human welfare, it is reasonable to worry that ignoring
the moral case for and against its existence will massively skew one's conclusions
about what it is morally appropriate to aim for, even at the margin.60 Second,
even if the answer to the question of whether or not a given basic institution
ought to exist is unlikely to have any practical upshot (since there is little we can
expect to do to eliminate or replace it, even if that were shown to be morally
ideal), an answer to that question might nonetheless provide some benefit, by
going some way towards "reconciling us to our social world" (Rawls 1999, 124-
8). We might feel better about the profoundly consequential institutions that we
are stuck with if we had a better idea of what might be said in favor of their
existence.
2.3.1 How I learned to love the state system
The state system is, on any account, one of the highly consequential basic
institutional arrangements referred to just now. I think that utilitarians need to
consider, then, whether or not it is something that they can in good faith endorse.
My view is that they can, for the following set of reasons.
1. The global division of moral labor. As Robert Goodin (1995) has emphasized,
the state system plays a valuable role as an "administrative device" for the
promotion of global welfare. Goodin points out that, as a general matter, the best
way of ensuring that the interests of a group of people are protected or promoted
is often to divide up that group of people into smaller sub-groups, each of which
is assigned its own special agent or protector. This strategy is a way of reducing
the strategic constraints on welfare promotion referred to in Chapter 1, insofar as
it alleviates problems of information, collective action, and limits on altruistic
motivation that might otherwise be pressing.61 Goodin suggests that we view the
6o C.f. Martha Nussbaum's and Pogge's criticism of Rawls' theory of global distributive justice:
By assuming the fixity of states as his starting point ... Rawls has effectively prevented any
serious consideration of economic inequalities and inequalities of power among states
[and has seen to it that] [...] we do not get any interesting answer to the question why
states might be thought to matter (Nussbaum 2006, 236).
[Rawls'] endorsement of this institution [the state] can have force...only if it has been
subjected to moral examination (like other social institutions). Otherwise Rawls would
be begging a crucial question, provided we allow, as reasonably we must at the outset,
that justice may fail to require the states system in its present form (Pogge 1989, 258,
italics in original).
61 This argument finds one of its classic statements in William Paley's Principles of Moral and
Political Philosophy:
state system as an instance of this general type of case. From a utilitarian
perspective, we can think of that system as involving a "global division of moral
labor". Given that we generally have better information about, greater capacity to
affect, and stronger motivation to assist those nearest to us than those living far
away, a system of special duties towards compatriots is a much more effective
means of promoting aggregate global welfare than is a global philanthropic free-
for-all.
2. Specific goods. While the above argument provides a significant component of
the utilitarian justification for the state system, it only takes us part of the way.
One of the reasons why this is so is that it fails to capture some of the specific
reasons why the existence of independent political communities is so important
to people. It is not just that the goods provided by a system of distributed
responsibilities would be less efficiently secured in the absence of such a system.
It is also that there exist some goods which can arguably only be provided in a
world of relatively self-contained political communities of the kind we see in the
world today. Among those goods are the following:
Democracy.62 Consider the following (non-exhaustive) list of preconditions for
the meaningful exercise of democratic agency:
1. Accountability: Democracy requires that the representatives of the
relevant demos be accountable to the members of that demos. This
requires that the actions of the representatives in question satisfy
transparency and publicity requirements, and that their decisions be
guided in some reasonably direct and traceable way by the will of the
people they represent.
2. Identification: If the members of a demos are to consider the decisions of
a ruling body to be the expression of their own political autonomy, they
must identify, in some broad sense, with the ruling body in question.
They must not feel that decision-making is taking place at such a high
remove, or in such a distant arena, that they have no genuine connection
to its operations.
The good order and happiness of the world are better upholden whilst each man applies
himself to his own concerns and the care of his own family...than if every man, from an
excess of mistaken generosity, should leave his own business, to undertake his
neighbour's, which he must always manage with less knowledge, conveniency, and
success. (cited McMahan and McKim, 115).
See also Sidgwick 1907, 433-4.
62 1 assume here that democracy is a good. It is the most successful arrangement we know of for
securing the value of collective self-determination, a utilitarian argument for which is provided at
4.5.1 infra.
3. Impact: if individuals are to exercise political autonomy in a substantive
sense, they must exercise it in relation to those aspects of their lives which
are central and fundamental rather than merely trivial or peripheral.
It is plausible that these three conditions can only be jointly satisfied within the
context of a system of distinct political communities of roughly the nature we find
in the contemporary world. We can see this by means of a consideration of the
alternative arenas in which democratic agency might be exercised. The
possibility of fully meaningful democratic agency at the global level is arguably
undermined by conditions 1 and 2. Even international bodies or institutions that
fall far short of the scale implied by a global assembly (such as the UN General
Assembly or the European Parliament) are plagued by charges of
unaccountability, or of the preemption of decision-making by bureaucratic or
technocratic elites. It would be both premature and pessimistic to think that
global institutions cannot be made more democratic than they currently are.
Presumably what is required is the development of new forms of governance,
perhaps quite unlike those associated with the traditional state (c.f. Cohen and
Sabel 2005). Nonetheless, I think it likely that considerations purely of scale will
mean that whatever forms of global democracy we do manage to develop at the
global level will not be able to provide the personal and immediate benefits in the
form of political participation that are afforded by democracy at the level of the
state. The third condition (impact) works in the opposite direction, to cast doubt
on the adequacy of exercises of collective autonomy at levels of organization
below the contemporary polity for securing the full measure of democratic
agency. While one would not want to underplay the value of collective self-
determination in such smaller-scale settings, the latter do not have the pervasive
and long-lasting influence on the life prospects of individuals that renders
political autonomy at more encompassing levels of association so significant.
Political community. For many, membership of (or "belonging" to) a political
community is a good in itself, independently of the political and socioeconomic
benefits - such as participation in self-government or social insurance schemes,
access to public goods, and a framework in which to pursue economic
opportunities - that such membership often brings. It is this idea that Rawls has
in mind when he writes:
It is surely a good for individuals and associations to be attached to their
particular culture and to take part in its common public and civic life. In this way
belonging to a particular political society, and being at home in its civic and social
world, gains expression and fulfillment. This is no small thing (1999, 111).
As Rawls continues, this fact "argues for preserving significant room for the idea
of a people's self-determination and for some kind of loose or confederative
forms of a Society of Peoples" (1999, 111).
Cultural diversity. A world of relatively autonomous political communities such
as we have at present provides a fertile environment for the fostering of diverse
(national and other) cultures. This cultural diversity provides several important
benefits that a utilitarian ought to value. Not only are many individual cultures
sources of delight and sustenance for the individuals enveloped in them, but the
availability on the global plane of a diversity of ways of life enriches the set of
options accessible to individuals generally, thereby increasing the scope of
personal autonomy.
Institutional experimentation. The good of cultural diversity can be understood
as partly a "system-level" consequence of the organization of the globe into
relatively self-contained political communities, rather than a good internal to
those communities themselves. A similar type of good is provided by the scope
for large-scale institutional experimentation that such a form of global
organization affords. Just as the states in a federal system of government
provide a useful way of simultaneously trying out alternative institutional
structures, the existence of a variety of distinct political communities within a
global state system results in a much richer understanding of the scope of
institutional possibility, and of the merits of specific social, economic and
political policies, than would be available in a more unitary system.
3. The moral weight of the status quo. The above arguments together suggest that
utilitarianism supports a global institutional set-up involving a plurality of
discrete populations, each governed by its own unique set of political institutions.
They do not, however, show that the political institutions in question should take
the form of the modern state in particular (understood, roughly, as "a particular
form of political and economic organization centering around governments that
have eminent domain in a demarcated territory, control overwhelming force
within it, and interpret and enforce international law beyond its borders" (Pogge
1989, 257)). A full moral justification for the existence of every aspect of the state
system per se would take us far afield. We can however take a shortcut, by means
of the following two points. One, the modern state system does in fact fulfill the
desiderata given just now. Two, given that that system is now in place, it is very
difficult to imagine a shift to an alternative system that also fulfilled those
desiderata resulting in a net improvement in global welfare. If we had come to
settle on another arrangement, it might well be the case that that alternative
would have served us just as well or better. But given that the world is now
structured as it is, it is likely to be exceedingly difficult to switch to that
alternative in a costless fashion. If aiming to institute such an alternative were to
be justified, we would at least have to have a very good reason for thinking that
what could only amount to a radical global revolution would generate a
significant improvement in human welfare. At present it seems safe to say that
we have no idea as to whether or not this would be the case.
None of the above arguments should be taken to imply that everything about the
state system, as we know it today, is morally optimal. Although the citizens of
contemporary developed countries are generally, and on balance, well served by
their states, the majority of the world's population lives in states whose record is
considerably more qualified than this. Even the "good" states have a number of
significant vices that the above discussion does not canvass. And there are
several features of the system taken as a whole that are highly problematic
(including its encouragement of nasty forms of nationalism, and the threat that it
poses of apocalyptic war). These points, however, are not arguments for
dismantling the state system, but rather for reforming it in a more healthy
direction.63 The general endorsement given here should not be taken to rule out,
for instance, reforms in such current norms as the unlimited power of states to
exclude foreigners from their territories, and the exclusive right of states to the
resources found within those territories. Reforms in these areas might place
limits on state sovereignty comparable in extent to those we have seen recently in
the area of international human rights protection. The current suggestion is only
the modest, though important, one that the basic system of dividing the world's
population into territorially based communities, organized under a state and
charged with special responsibility for the welfare of their own members, is (now)
an essential part of the best strategy for maximizing global welfare. From a
utilitarian perspective, this implies that the existence of that system is morally
justified.64
2.4 Upshots
Having at hand a moral justification for the state system, I now want to suggest,
helps to structure utilitarian thought on global distributive justice in two helpful
ways. The first is that it provides a respectable utilitarian justification for the
division of questions of distributive justice into "global" and "domestic"
categories. The discussion in Chapter 1, along with many discussion of domestic
distributive justice, left unanswered the question of why we should think of
matters of justice in such terms at all. For all that had been said at that point, it
might well have been a mistake to pay any attention, when formulating
fundamental principles of justice, to the current division of the world into
independent political communities. That move now, however, looks like a
perfectly legitimate one. If they are to do their delegated moral task in a
successful manner, individual political communities will need to be held to
secondary principles concerning the way in which their basic institutions
distribute advantages. But it also makes sense from a utilitarian perspective to
posit principles of global justice to which those communities can be held.
Contemporary states are impressive producers of resources and highly effective
coordinators of action. As a result, they have the potential to enhance the welfare
63 Schell suggests that the nuclear threat requires a wholesale reform of the state system: "On the
one side stand human life and the terrestrial creation. On the other side stands a particular
organization of human life, the system of sovereign, independent states" (1982, 218). I doubt it.
64 A useful, if heavy-handed, way to underscore the preceding arguments is to contrast the state
system with one extreme, highly unattractive alternative. This is the dreaded "world state": a
global authority with analogs of the executive, legislative and judicial functions of the
contemporary state, and comparable powers of taxation, redistribution, and enforcement.
Practically, it is hard to see how, without some radical changes in quite basic features of the
human natural and social condition, the functions and powers listed just now could be performed
on a fully global scale. And even if the practical obstacles could be surmounted, it is hard to
disagree with Kant's (1795) claim that a world state could only be a global tyranny.
not only of those within their borders but also of those without, and principles of
global distributive justice are needed to guide them in performing this task.
The second way in which the moral case for the state system helps to structure
utilitarian thinking about global distributive justice is that it lays down certain
basic parameters within which to work when constructing one's global principles.
In an ocean as vast as this it helps to have some flags to swim between. The story
about the state system told above provides those flags, by placing limits on the
shape that principles of global distributive justice can properly take. Those
principles, first, cannot make as extensive demands on us as domestic principles
do, if they are not to undermine the specialized focus on sub-sets of the world's
population that constitutes the core of the "global division of moral labor".
Citizens must be permitted - in fact, required - to give priority through their
institutions to co-citizens in certain resource allocations if the many benefits of
membership in a political community are to be secured and sustained. But,
second, co-citizen priority cannot plausibly be permitted to extend to the point at
which the interests of non-citizens are accorded no weight at all. In today's
world, an extreme view of the latter kind could only be justified on the basis of a
position that accorded state borders something other than purely instrumental
significance, which the story told above did not do. Instead, principles of global
distributive justice will need to fall within the bounds supplied by these two
extremes. Spelling out this intermediate terrain will be the goal of Chapters 4-6.
Chapter 3. The Competition
3.1 Introduction
The aim of the previous two chapters has been to set up some basic elements of a
utilitarian framework for theorizing about global distributive justice. Before
developing that framework in more detail, it will be useful to pause to introduce
some of the more prominent competing approaches to global distributive justice
that are present in the philosophical literature. The first half of this chapter
provides a selective survey of the theoretical landscape in the area, with the twin
aims of clarifying the distinctive basic commitments of the utilitarian position
that I favor, and of laying out some points of reference for the later discussion.
The second half highlights some of the more significant concerns that I have
regarding the adequacy of the competing theories that I have discussed, and
points out some respects in which the approach to be developed in the following
chapters promises to have the upper hand.
3.2 The associative conception
In choosing which theories to focus on here, I have been selective in the following
two ways. I have restricted myself, first, to those accounts that present the
distribution of resources across societies as a matter of global political morality,
generating substantive moral obligations 65, and, second, to those such accounts
that I consider to pose the most serious challenge to my own approach. The
latter are those theories that are both a) possessed of considerable prima facie
appeal, and b) in strong disagreement with the utilitarian position. This process
of double filtering has led me to three accounts in particular: Nagel's "political
conception", Pogge's "institutionalist" approach, and Rawls' "political
constructivism".
While each of these accounts is distinct from the others in important ways, all
three are variants of a general position concerning duties of justice that Julius
(2005) terms "the associative conception". To see what that position involves, as
a general matter, consider the following set of fundamental questions that a
complete theory of justice needs to address:
1. Concept: What is the content of the concept of justice? What role do principles
of justice play within a moral theory?
2. Ground: What feature (or set of features) is it that makes it the case that a
person (or group of persons) has a duty of justice to another person (or group of
persons)? What puts people into the "justice relation"? (Julius 2005, 176.)
65 This restriction rules out libertarian accounts such as Kukathas (2006), as well as those offered
by proponents of the "realist" school of international relations (Waltz 1979, et al.). I find it so
overwhelmingly plausible that obligations of this sort do exist in some form, that I find it very
hard to take theories that deny such a claim seriously.
3. Scope: Which people (or sets of people) are in the justice relation thus
identified?
4. Content: What does justice require, as a substantive matter?
The associative conception provides an answer to the second of these questions:
the feature that unites each of its diverse variants is a distinctive thesis
concerning the ground ofjustice. That thesis is the claim that questions of justice
arise in the context of certain forms of association or interaction amongst
persons. Duties of justice are "associative duties", deriving "from shared
membership in a group or participation in a personal relationship" (Scheffler
2001, 50). We can distinguish two forms of the associative conception, one
strong and one weak. According to the strong version, all duties of justice depend
on special relationships for their application. According to the weak version, at
least some duties of justice do not so depend. The three accounts that I discuss
below are all strong variants of the associative conception. In outlining each, I
will briefly describe the specific ground of justice selected by the theory, the
justification given for selecting that ground, and the implications of these for
global distributive justice.
3.2.1 Nagel's "political conception"
The form of association that Thomas Nagel regards as the ground of justice is co-
citizenship, as constituted by the following special kind of political relation: that
of being co-subject to, and co-author of, coercively backed law. One is subject to
a law if one can be legally coerced to comply with it. One is the author of a law if
that law is made "in one's name" (or if, as Nagel likes to put it, one's "will is
implicated" in that law). The morally significant relation that holds between me
and my co-citizen is the complex fact that we are both jointly coerced by our
state's laws and, at least in principle, jointly author the laws which do the
coercing. In Nagel's strong version of the associative conception, it is this
complex fact that uniquely gives rise to duties of justice.
Nagel's argument for co-citizenship as the ground of justice goes, in brisk
summary, as follows. One ought not to be coerced to comply with a law unless
one can reasonably be understood to have authorized that law.66 If such
authorization is to occur in regard to any given law, the reasoning on which that
law is based must be consistent with an acknowledgement of each of its co-
66 This principle has long been a theme in Nagel's work, and is well expressed in his (1991):
The pure ideal of political legitimacy is that the use of state power should be capable of
being authorized by each citizen - not in direct detail but through acceptance of the
principles, institutions and procedures which determine how that power will be used.
This requires the possibility of unanimous agreement at some sufficiently high level, for if
there are citizens who can legitimately object to the way state power is used against them
or in their name, the state is not legitimate. (8)
authors as equals.67 Laws that do not pass this authorization requirement are
illegitimate, as is the government that enforces them. Equal treatment of co-
citizens, as specified by liberal egalitarian principles of justice, is thus the price
paid for legitimate governance.
Nagel argues that, despite increasing levels of global economic and political
interdependence in recent decades, the complex relation of co-subjection and co-
authorship holds only within the setting of the state. He concludes from this that
duties of justice do not extend either between individual states, or across the
global domain as a whole. Nagel acknowledges that we have a strong positive
duty to relieve the suffering of, and a strong negative duty to respect the "pre-
political" human rights of, those who live in states other than our own, but he
views such duties as requirements of "humanity" rather than of justice. Not only
egalitarian justice, but justice period, is an exclusively intra-state affair.
3.2.2 Pogge's "institutional" approach
According to Thomas Pogge, it is the relation of co-entanglement in an
institutional scheme that puts two or more people into the justice relation. By
"institutional scheme" Pogge has in mind something like the Rawlsian "basic
structure", viz. "the way in which the major social institutions distribute
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from
social cooperation" (Rawls 1971, 6). Pogge interprets "social institutions" in this
passage roughly as Robert Goodin defines them, viz. as "organized patterns of
socially constructed norms and roles, and socially prescribed behaviors expected
of occupants of those roles, which are created and re-created over time" (Goodin
1996, 19). Pogge argues that any "comprehensive and reasonably self-contained
system of social interaction" (1989, 21) incorporates an institutional scheme or
basic structure of this kind. In his view, it is the joint involvement of two or more
persons in such a scheme or structure that uniquely sets the stage for questions of
justice.
The question of why institutional schemes should have this special connection to
justice can be subdivided into two. One: why should institutional schemes
generate special moral duties? Two: why should the latter duties be ones of
justice in particular? Pogge's answer to the first of these questions is based on
67 In understanding this idea, it is important to keep in mind that the type of authorization that
Nagel is after is idealized rather than actual in nature. Many people quite happily endorse laws
based on unequal consideration. What Nagel will say in such cases is that, while persons can give
their heartfelt support to an unequal law, in doing so they are (morally) mistaken. Thus:
This does not mean that we are not justified in taking political steps which substantial
numbers of people will be unable to accept...But the idea in such cases is that when we
come through to the other side of the transformation, perhaps only after a generation or
two, the resulting arrangement will command the acceptance, out of a mixture of
impartial and personal motives, of a much wider range of persons than the old
arrangement did - that it will prove a viable and superior form of collective life. (1991,
26)
two claims, one positive, one normative. The positive claim points to the
consequential effects of social institutions on the lives of individuals. Such
institutions "embody, preserve, and impart differential power resources with
respect to different individuals and groups" (Goodin 1996, 20), often with far-
reaching consequences for the lives of the latter. The normative claim with which
this positive claim is paired is the familiar moral principle that we have a negative
duty not to harm others. In particular, if we can help it, we ought to neither
contribute to, nor benefit from, burdens suffered by those others. What do these
two claims together suggest? Through our involvement in institutions we
characteristically both contribute to and benefit from burdens imposed on others.
Moreover, the institutions in question are not fixed features of the natural order,
but human constructions, which might be otherwise: there are accessible
alternatives, within our collective power to select, that would have different
distributive consequences. If our participation in such institutions is to be
morally acceptable, judged against the no-harm principle, we need to ensure that
the institutional scheme that we have selected satisfies certain special conditions
concerning the distribution of advantages. Why are these special conditions
spelled out in principles of justice in particular? For Pogge, this seems to be
purely a matter of definition. The subject-matter of justice just is "the moral
assessment and justification of social institutions", that of morality "the
assessment of conduct and character" (1989, 17). Presumably Pogge takes this
distinction to reflect ordinary moral judgments in this area.
What does the above story imply regarding global distributive justice? Pogge
considers the form of association that he selects as the ground of justice to exist
at the global level. The world as a whole (now) represents a "comprehensive and
reasonably self-contained system of social interaction" (1989, 21). There exist
institutions at the global level - such as the global economy and the body of
international law - that have profound effects on people's lives.68 Moreover,
those profound effects are a consequence of human action: "a global institutional
scheme is imposed by all of us on each of us" (1989, 276). It follows from Pogge's
approach that duties of justice therefore extend globally. Moreover, the duties in
question are, on Pogge's view, strongly egalitarian. Pogge holds that the same
argument that Rawls develops for domestic egalitarianism can be directly
transposed to the global context, where the difference principle likewise properly
reigns: "[W]e can justify our global institutional order only if we can show that
the institutional inequalities it produces tend to optimize (against the backdrop
of feasible alternative global regimes) the worst social position" (1989, 247).69
68 See e.g. Pogge 1989, 274:
Accounting for the prevailing rates of malnutrition and infant mortality requires [...]
reference to how the existing global economic scheme assigns eminent domain over
natural assets and how it regulates international cooperation through unconstrained
market mechanisms...our global framework of basic institutions figures prominently in
the true macroexplanations of morally significant phenomena [...]
69 Pogge interprets the argument in the domestic case as going roughly as follows. Given that no
person has a justified claim to special treatment in regard to the design of the basic structure of
3.2.3 Rawls' "political constructivism"
Rawls defends the strong version of the associative conception, writing that
there are certain "relations of individuals to one another which set the stage for
questions of justice" (1971, 130). Nonetheless, Rawls differs from Nagel and
Pogge, who are with him thus far, in an important respect. Both Nagel and
Pogge are monists about justice: they consider a single type of relation to ground
all duties of justice. Rawls, in contrast, is a pluralist about justice, and that in
two ways. He holds that forms of association which are intuitively quite distinct
can each give rise to principles of justice (call this "relational pluralism") And he
is also a pluralist concerning principles of justice themselves (call that "principle
pluralism"). According to Rawls, different kinds of justice-generative relations
call for different principles. In order to be just or fair, the rules that regulate
different forms of association do not need to be the same. Instead, they need to
be sensitive in each case to the particular nature of the form of association at
issue. As Rawls puts the point, "the correct regulative principle for anything
depends on the nature of that thing" (1971, 25).
There is, then, for Rawls, no single ground of justice. Instead there are several
grounds, in the form of different types of association. Within domestic political
communities, one salient such relation is citizenship, which is a form of "social
cooperation", in Rawls' special understanding of that notion. It involves ongoing
voluntary interaction amongst free and equal persons (each of whom is assumed
to be motivated to cooperate by an idea of his or her good), regulated in
accordance with mutually recognized norms of reciprocity and fairness. Rawls
famously argues that the principles of justice appropriate for regulating social
cooperation of this kind are strongly egalitarian in nature.
As we saw above, Pogge presents his account of global distributive justice as a
logical extension of Rawls' conception of domestic justice to the global domain.
He portrays his theory as "leav[ing] intact Rawls's whole argument for the two
principles, directing it however at our entire social world...the world at large"
(1989, 247). Rawls himself, however, resists the extension. Like Nagel, Rawls
argues that the principles of justice that apply within a single society do not apply
at the global level, because those principles are tailored to the special nature of
domestic political relations. In particular, social cooperation, in the special
Rawlsian sense, does not hold at the global level, since it is (under modern
conditions at least) dependent upon the existence of governments and complex
legal systems (see Freeman 2006). In contrast to Nagel, however, Rawls claims
that the relations between distinct societies are nonetheless regulated by other
principles of justice.
society, there ought to be a presumption of equality in the way persons are treated within or by
that system. This presumption should, however, be overridden if inequalities of certain kinds
would render the position of the worst off more acceptable, as compared to the available
alternative schemes.
On the associative approach, if we are to decide which principles of justice hold at
the global level, we need to identify the morally salient form (or forms) of
association that exist at that level. Rawls argues that the relevant global relation
is one not between individual persons, as in the domestic case, but rather
between "peoples". According to the thesis of principle pluralism, the content of
the principles of justice that hold between such peoples is determined by the
moral nature of the relation that those principles regulate. Rawls presents
peoples as having a fundamental interest in political autonomy, and in having
their equal status with other peoples respected. They are assumed to not be
interested in their economic position relative to that of other peoples, and (in the
ideal case, where the material and other conditions necessary for political
autonomy are assured for all peoples) that relative position is assumed to not
impact upon their other interests. In Rawls's view, then, this form of association
does not call for distributive egalitarianism. It does, however call for some degree
of global redistribution. The aim of the Law of Peoples is to bring all peoples into
what Rawls terms "the Society of well-ordered Peoples", the set comprising those
peoples that have either a liberal or a "decent" regime. If this goal is to be
achieved, existing members of such a Society will need to assist "burdened
societies" in realizing and preserving just (or decent) institutions and thereby
assuring the essentials of their political autonomy. This duty of assistance will
very likely involve some degree of resource transfer from existing liberal and
decent peoples.70
3.3 Utilitarianism vs. the competition
The above brief survey has presented us with an array of variants on the
associative theme. Despite their sometimes profound differences on other
matters, each traces the ground of justice to one or more types of human
relationship. This is an attractive idea, with a long and distinguished lineage in
moral and political philosophy.7. What sort of competition does it face? Julius
contrasts the associative conception with another position on the ground of
justice that he terms the "allocative conception". According to the latter,
principles of justice concern the morally appropriate response to "allocation
problems", understood as "situations in which a person can choose among
several allocations of good things" (2005, 176). Such problems arise "whenever
you notice the possibility of adding to or subtracting from people's holdings of
goods" (177). On this conception, in contrast to the associative conception, the
nature of the past and present relationships between individuals makes no
70 "Outlaw" states will also need to be integrated, although this will presumably be done in
another way, if at all. The duty of assistance is not the only principle of global justice posited by
Rawls. Others are listed at 1999, 37, and are similar, as Rawls notes, to the traditional norms of
the law of nations.
71 Kant and Rawls sign on of course, but also, arguably, Hume. See:
Suppose, that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual
convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still grow larger, in proportion to
largeness of men's view, and the force of their mutual connexions (Hume, Enquiry III.
Part 1)
fundamental contribution to the explanation of why and how duties of justice
hold between those individuals.72
Julius presumably regards utilitarianism as the paradigmatic variant of the
allocative conception of justice.73 I find that diagnosis misleading. In order to
show why, I now want to return to my own favored approach to justice, as
outlined in the previous chapters. I will approach it in the same way that I
approached the three competing accounts described above, offering a discussion
of the ground of justice that it selects, and of the broad implications that this
selection has for the possibility of global distributive justice.
3.3.1 The utilitarian ground of distributive justice
As we have seen, "strong" versions of the associative conception construe all
duties of justice as dependent on the presence of associative relations of a certain
kind between individuals. On such accounts, we can be under no duties of justice
towards those with whom we are not associated in the way selected as relevant.
It is hard to see how a utilitarian could be tempted by this view. If we understand
principles of distributive justice as heuristics for the maximization of aggregate
welfare, a restriction of this kind on their ground would need a fairly solid
argument, and it is not clear what could be said from a utilitarian perspective in
support of one.
Its rejection of the strong associative conception does not seem to me to be one of
the famed special quirks of utilitarianism. In fact, I think that many non-
utilitarians should not be tempted by that conception either, at least if they are
out to accommodate the bulk of everyday talk about justice. This is because the
strong associative conception conflicts with what I take to be two commonplace
ideas in the latter. The first is the idea that the question of who is admitted into a
given association is sometimes itself a question of justice. This idea is especially
compelling when inclusion within the association in question is correlated with
access to a range of valuable resources or opportunities that are unavailable to
those excluded. Some concerns about unjust exclusion may arise only in cases
where those excluded nonetheless share some other more encompassing form of
association with those doing the excluding. But this does not seem to always be
72 Julius appears to be drawing here on a passage in A Theory of Justice where Rawls writes:
[A]llocative justice applies when a given collection of goods is to be divided among
definite individuals with known desires and needs. The collection to be allotted is not the
product of these individuals, nor do they stand in any existing cooperative relations.
Since there are no prior claims on the things to be distributed, it is natural to share them
out according to desires and needs, or even to maximize the net balance of satisfaction...
(1971, 77).
73 Julius does not say so explicitly, claiming only that "every familiar view of egalitarian
distributive justice falls under one of these heads" (2005, 2). However utilitarianism is pretty
clearly the prime candidate. Such an interpretation would have a key parallel in Rawls, who
writes, following on from the above passage: "Suitably generalized, the allocative conception leads
to the classical utilitarian view" (1971, 77).
so.74 Second, many people think it not only wrong but also unjust to violate
human rights. Human rights, however, are standardly taken to apply to persons
as persons, independently of any associative relations that their bearers may (or
may not) have entered into with others.75 Neither of these everyday ideas can be
sustained within the framework of the strong associative conception.
In order to accommodate the above points, I suggest that any plausible version of
the associative conception will have to be a "weak" variant. Justice will need to
be understood as partly associative, partly non-associative in nature. Moreover,
as I now want to argue, this weak conception is associated with three features
that a utilitarian theory of justice both can and ought to take on. The first of
these features is the claim that some types of duties of justice can arise only
within an associative context. I argue in Chapter 5 that duties of justice based on
considerations of fairness are of this type. The second feature is the claim that
certain forms of association will generate duties of justice that apply exclusively
amongst participants in the form of association in question. It makes excellent
sense within an indirect version of utilitarianism to posit a set of duties of justice
that are tailored to a specific kind of interaction or set of institutions, and which
do not extend to those who are uninvolved (see 2.4 supra). The third feature is
the idea that questions of justice are often especially salient amongst individuals
who are socially connected in some special way or another.
The utilitarian-friendly nature of the second and third of these features can be
underscored in the following way. Association is reliably correlated with a)
increased vulnerability to the actions of others, and b) increased capacity to
promote the welfare of those others. When, in the course of institutional
interaction or socioeconomic cooperation, we "direct other people to serve [our]
purposes" (Julius 2005), or assume the cooperation of others in the course of
conducting our activities (O'Neill 2000, 192-7), or find ourselves entwined in
"social structural processes" which encompass thousands of other agents (Young
2006), we render ourselves more vulnerable to others, and those others more
vulnerable to us, than we would have if we had kept to ourselves. Fortunately, if
increased associative ties heighten our capacity to harm people, they also
heighten our capacity to assist them, insofar as the strategic constraints on
74 Something like this concern is at work in the following passage in Brian Barry (which he
presents as a criticism of Rawls' Theory):
The notion that claims of justice can arise only among those engaging in a co-operative
enterprise puts things backwards. Before cooperation can occur, distributive questions
must have already been answered about rights over land, resources and other advantages
that would-be cooperators did not themselves create....an answer must be given to these
distributive questions, and that answer will establish a global distribution of some kind
among countries that need have no co-operative relations at all. (1989, 423).
75 Buchanan claims that "we have obligations of justice toward all other persons whether we
interact with them or not" (2004, 96) on these grounds, writing that "the intuition that I ought to
do something to help ensure that your basic human rights are protected [does] not depend upon
any assumption that you and I are interacting cooperatively...It depend[s] only on a proper
recognition of what I owe you as a person" (ibid., 89).
promoting their welfare referred to in Chapter 1 are (at least somewhat)
lessened. The better we know others, the more familiar we are with their
circumstances, and the more we share their interests as a result of cooperative
activity, the less epistemic, practical, social, cultural and motivational barriers
there are to increasing their wellbeing. I suggest that it should hardly be
surprising, given these facts, both that special moral duties should plausibly
arise in the course of associative interaction, and that those duties should seem
especially consequential and salient.
I propose, then, that utilitarians can agree with Julius, contra the allocative
approach, that the "strong and unusual demands of distributive justice" cannot
be accounted for exclusively by means of a general reference to allocation
problems (Julius 2005, 4), and that some distributive justice principles do not
"apply generically to situations in which people can affect the distribution of
goods over groups of people" (Julius 2003, 344). This is both because some
specific kinds of justice require association, and because some forms of
association require specific principles of justice.76
If utilitarians opt for a weak variant of the associative conception, as I think they
should, which sorts of principles of distributive justice might be available to
them in the global domain? Several types of candidate present themselves. One
is a genuinely global distributive principle, premised on the existence of a
justice-generative form of association that encompasses the entire population of
the world. Another is a principle of distributive justice that applies to a smaller
set of people than the global population as a whole. Such a principle would arise
if forms of association that are plausibly justice-generative cross some but not all
borders. Third, there might be duties of global distributive justice that hold in
the absence of any form of associative relation at all between duty-bearer and
claim-bearer. I consider each of these possibilities in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.3.2 A better place to draw a line
The above interpretation of the ground of justice within utilitarianism suggests
that the associative vs. allocative distinction is not as helpful as Julius implies.
No-one that I can think of holds the allocative view: certainly not the most
plausible, indirect version of utilitarianism. Nonetheless, there does seem to be
some significant distinction in the neighborhood between the way in which
utilitarians and the other associative approaches discussed above conceive of
justice. Where is the better place to draw it?
76 It might be objected here that while we may have non-associative duties regarding the
distribution of resources, it is inappropriate to speak of those duties as duties of justice (rather
than, say, "duties of humanity"). I find it natural to think of both non-associative and associative
duties regarding the distribution of resources as duties of distributive justice, but nothing much
hangs on the terminology per se. Others who prefer to make the above distinction are welcome to
it (though see fn 83 infra). What I am more eager to press here is the point that it is within the
power of utilitarians to acknowledge the special significance of association to many questions of
distributive justice.
We can understand the key distinction between the utilitarian and the other
approaches discussed above as reducing to a disagreement not over the ground of
justice - over what it is that puts people into "the justice relation" - but rather
over the source of the moral authority of duties of justice. The utilitarian position
on the latter is distinctive in two ways. One, utilitarians trace the moral authority
of duties of justice to a single fundamental moral duty. And, two, they consider
that single duty to be teleological in nature: it directs us to promote good states of
affairs.77 The competing approaches discussed earlier deny one or both of these
two claims: they derive duties of justice from a moral theory that is
fundamentally pluralistic and/or non-teleological.
On this interpretation, the disagreement between utilitarians and the
competition on matters of justice is located at a further remove than Julius
suggests. That disagreement is no small one. But it takes place at such a deep
level that it should be no surprise that it tends to peter out before we reach (what
are for utilitarians) the higher levels of moral theorizing. While utilitarians and
their opponents may differ on fundamental matters of morality, then, they may
exhibit considerable convergence on matters of justice. The following chapters
will demonstrate some of this convergence in relation to the competing accounts
discussed above. Utilitarians can agree with Nagel, Rawls and Pogge that a) the
extent of duties of distributive justice increases in proportion to the strength of
various connections between individuals; b) that at least some duties of justice
apply exclusively amongst the members of bounded political communities (or
peoples); c) that (Pogge excepted) egalitarianism is often at least more of a
concern within rather than without such communities; and d) that we have
strong duties to halt the suffering and deprivations of the global poor. The key
locus of disagreement concerns not these conclusions but rather the best manner
of reaching them.
3.4. Problems with the competition
It is my view that the utilitarian way of arguing for (among others) the theses
listed just now is more appealing and compelling than the alternatives. Chapters
4 to 6 will attempt to support this view. In the remainder of the current chapter,
I want to prepare the ground for that upcoming task by going on the offensive. In
what follows I provide a brief survey of some of the more serious problems faced
by the competing theories that I have introduced. None of the criticisms that I
will make of those theories constitutes a knockdown argument; something of that
nature would require more discussion of each than I have room for here.
77 An important feature of the utilitarian account of justice is the derivative nature that it
attributes to the latter. While some duties of justice require association, the normative authority
of those duties can be explained on the basis of fundamental principles of morality that make no
essential reference to associative relations. By itself, however, this feature is not enough to
distinguish utilitarianism from the competing approaches discussed above. As I presented
Pogge's view, justice is likewise derivative: it derives from a fundamental moral duty not to cause
harm, applied within an institutional context. Similarly, Kant (to whom both Nagel and Rawls
owe a considerable debt) treats special duties as derivative from a more general moral
requirement.
However, together they do, I think, point to sufficiently serious problems to
render the search for an alternative approach attractive.
3.4.1 Nagel
Nagel argues that the complex relation of co-subjection to and co-authorship of
coercive law is, first, the ground of justice, and, second, holds only within the
setting of the state. In assessing the argument for the first of these claims, it will
help to underscore more explicitly its Kantian motivation. Underlying Nagel's
crucial requirement that all laws be capable of "authorization" by those subject to
and author of them is an ideal of negative autonomy: an ideal of not being forced
to live in ways contrary to one's more important goals and moral commitments.
The law poses a threat to this autonomy, not merely because it is imposed upon
one, but also, and perhaps even more significantly, because it is presented to one
as an obligation: a normative demand to which one is expected to bend one's will.
If a given law is not to violate one's autonomy, it must be shown to have been in
some sense "self-willed". This means that the law in question must be given a
special justification, in the form of the provision of reasons for the imposition of
that law which those obliged to comply with it can reasonably be expected to
accept.
Here is not the place to take on Kantian contractualism in detail. I will simply
register here that I am unmoved both by the problem that Nagel fixes upon and
by egalitarian justice as a solution to it. I am unpersuaded, that is, that coercive
law in which one's "will is implicated" poses a special, unique form ofjustificatory
demand that is absent otherwise. And I am also unpersuaded that our
commitment to egalitarian justice is best accounted for as a response to this
allegedly special problem. In my view, there is both a more straightforward and a
more appealing way of explaining why principles of justice apply within the
context of a political community than by appeal to concerns about negative
autonomy and legitimate governance. Our support for egalitarian public policy
rightly springs not (or at least not exclusively) from worries about the morally
appropriate use of coercion, but rather from considerations concerning the effect
that such policy has on the wellbeing of those whom it affects.78
Because this disagreement runs very deep, however, I will not pursue it here.
Instead I will attempt to cast some doubt on Nagel's claim concerning the
supervenience of justice on the joint fact of co-subjection and co-authorship, by
briefly presenting two domestic cases in which co-authorship is arguably absent,
but in which duties of justice - indeed, of egalitarian justice - nonetheless seem to
apply. The first example is that of non-citizens resident in a state other than their
78 We can in fact go further here. Not only does utilitarianism provide a better argument for
domestic egalitarianism than Nagel's account, but it is doubtful that Nagel's account provides a
robust argument for domestic egalitarianism at all. As James remarks, it is not clear from Nagel's
paper why the legitimation of political authority calls for the full array of egalitarian measures,
rather than purely for "familiar civil and political rights, seen as checks on the institutional abuse
of [power]" (2006, 711).
own.79 If the bounds of co-authorship were coterminous with the bounds of
justice, we would have to say that a South African in Sweden, say, had no moral
right to a fair trial there. We would also have to say that it was perfectly just for a
Swedish employer to discriminate in hiring against that South African on
grounds of his sexual orientation (but only, mind, up until the day on which he
attains Swedish citizenship). The second example is provided by political
communities in which a significant proportion, if not all, of those governed do
not vote. Nagel would seem to have to deny, for instance, that - given that they
were not even putative co-authors of the coercive laws to which they were
subjected - women before the twentieth century, and African Americans in the
antebellum South, were outside the bounds of justice. Nagel's account would also
deprive us of the ability to claim that the act of denying such groups the vote was
in any way itself a grievous injustice. These results are, to say the least, counter-
intuitive.
Nagel would very likely try to deny that such cases are genuine counter-examples
to his view. This is because, at one point at least, he implies that the notion of co-
authorship is much more expansive in nature than those purported counter-
examples suggest. Nagel's discussion of the question of whether or not the
inhabitants of a state ruled by an occupying power can be said to co-author those
laws suggests that all that is required for co-authorship of a law is compliance
with that law, in response to a recognition of an expectation that one so comply.
This seems to me to be stretching the notion of co-authorship to breaking point.
It is certainly a long distance from Nagel's original introduction of the notion,
according to which one co-authors a law if that law is made in one's name, and if
one can be reasonably understood to have accepted the principles or
considerations that underlie it. But, even if we grant Nagel this move, it poses a
problem for his position as a whole, insofar as it opens the floodgates to
diagnoses of co-authorship at the international level. It would seem to follow
from this expansive understanding of co-authorship, for instance, that citizens of
developing countries co-author the structural reforms imposed on their countries
by the IMF as a condition of loans (c.f. Cohen and Sabel 2oo6). This, however,
would contradict Nagel's claim that co-subjection to and co-authorship of
coercive law is an exclusively intra-state phenomenon. Nagel cannot have it both
ways: either his choice of the ground of justice, or his restriction of that ground to
the state, has to go.
A final problem with Nagel's argument concerns not its premises, or the move
from its premises to its conclusion, but rather that conclusion itself. As Cohen
and Sabel emphasize (2006), it is not only the application at the global level of
egalitarian norms, but of any norms above the humanitarian baseline that
Nagel's argument denies. Thus, if, on Nagel's account, requirements of socio-
economic justice fail to apply at the supra-state level, so too do requirements
pertaining to political process, such as those concerning the fairness,
79 Gerald Neuman is acknowledged for drawing attention to this case in Cohen and Sabel 2006, fn
27.
accountability, transparency or inclusiveness of international institutions. These
are very difficult claims to swallow.
3.4.2 Pogge
Although I join Rawls in rejecting Pogge's "relational monism" - his choice of the
single relation of institutional entanglement as the ground of all justice - I will
reserve pressing that point for the following chapters. Instead I will focus here on
three further problems that Pogge's account faces.
1. Harm, what harm? Pogge's argument for widespread duties of justice to aid
the global poor depends on our being able to demonstrate that the average
person, by virtue of her participation in the global basic structure, contributes to
or benefits from burdens suffered by the global poor. This, however, turns out to
be a hard case to make, for two reasons. First, the effects of current global
institutional arrangements are so poorly understood that it is often unclear
whether or not they - on balance, and as a whole - improve or worsen the
situation of the worst off. Second, even if it were clear that worsening had
occurred as a result of the global institutional scheme taken as a whole, the
relationship of the average person to that worsening would be very difficult to
convincingly demonstrate. The global political and economic order is so complex
that it is generally impossible to trace the precise causal connection between one
person's activities within it and the fact of another person's suffering harm.
Together these facts render Pogge's argument that there exist extensive duties of
global distributive justice quite vulnerable.
Those of us who think that we have moral duties to assist the world's destitute are
much more confident of that conclusion than we are of the empirical theses that
Pogge adduces to support it. This makes one suspect that our convictions derive
from a different set of considerations. Note that while it is difficult to
convincingly demonstrate individual responsibility for harming the global poor,
as Pogge hopes to, it is perfectly easy to demonstrate both individual and
collective responsibility for failing to prevent harm to them, and for failing to
benefit them. My view is that duties of justice to assist the global poor can be
argued for both more simply and more persuasively by pointing to the latter types
of wrong. While we might also argue for them on the ground that Pogge
highlights, such an argument should be at best supplementary.so
8so Why does Pogge disagree? He sometimes presents his focus on harm as a strategic move,
deriving from his view that most people consider negative duties to be more compelling than
positive duties. If this is so, an emphasis on the former will be more likely to convince one's
audience of the urgency of alleviating global poverty. I am not persuaded of the merits of this
strategy. This is in part because I suspect that one of the main reasons why many people are
comparatively lukewarm about positive duties is that (rightly or wrongly) they consider those
duties to be more taxing than negative duties, in particular by virtue of calling for resource
outlays. But, in the end, resource outlays are precisely what Pogge's negative duties of global
distributive justice are going to come to.
2. Egalitarianism. Pogge appears to think that, once he has demonstrated that
principles of distributive justice hold at the global level, he has thereby
demonstrated that principles of egalitarian distributive justice hold there.81 This
assumption results in two problems. For one, the inference in question does not
seem well motivated within Pogge's account. As we have seen, that account
presents justice as fundamentally concerned with the prohibition of
institutionally caused harm. But the connection between harming someone and
not treating them equally is surely not tight. The second problem with Pogge's
assumption that all principles of justice are egalitarian in nature is the resulting
stark discontinuity in Pogge's account between the moral principles that apply
within, and those that apply without, institutional schemes. Liam Murphy
writes:
We are to imagine that a remote community not yet involved in any external
trade or otherwise affected by global institutions would make no claims of justice
on us, but that as soon as we begin to trade with them, thus including them in the
world economy, something like the difference principle would suddenly govern
our relations ... I find it incredible that the application of the ground rules of
economic interaction could have this much moral significance (1998, 274)
If Pogge were to countenance principles of global or cross-border justice
intermediate between humanitarianism and full-blown domestic-style
egalitarianism, he would lessen this discontinuity, and with it the resistance that
it invokes.
3. Global-domestic conflict. A third problem with Pogge's account (emphasized
in Freeman 2006) is that it is unclear how the distinct principles of domestic and
global distributive justice that Pogge advocates can both be implemented at once.
Not only do Pogge's global and domestic difference principles aim at the
maximization of different things, but, even more problematically, they compete
to regulate some of the very same sets of institutions. The global institutional
scheme described by Pogge encompasses each of the domestic institutional
schemes. It follows that one cannot work on domestic distributions separately,
and then move on to consider the global distribution - for the latter will already
be substantially fixed by the time the first task is done (and vice versa). This
problem arises because it is in the nature of domestic and global principles of
justice to be aimed, not at distributing a fixed set of goods - a task which would
allow for sequential application of the same or different distributive principles at
inter-nested levels - but rather at setting the terms of basic social, political and
economic institutions. As a result, we can only apply principles of justice "once".
The best way to avoid a problem of this kind is to construct principles concerning
global resource distribution that apply to institutions less capacious in reach than
the global institutional scheme as a whole. The principles of global distributive
justice that I advocate in the following chapters are of this nature. While the
81 The assumption in question is a symptom of "principle monism" about justice, and is shared by
Nagel.
duties deriving from those principles may well come into some practical conflict
with each other, or with duties deriving from principles of domestic justice, they
will not generate the sort of fundamental conflict with the latter principles that
Pogge's sweepingly comprehensive global principles threaten.
3.4.3 Rawls
1. "Peoples". Rawls argues that the morally salient form of association at the
global level is that between "peoples": politically organized communities sharing
"common sympathies" and a reasonably broad conception of justice (1999, 23-5).
This suggestion is problematic for three reasons. The first is that it is not clear
that "peoples", in Rawls' special sense, actually exist. Rawls prefers the notion of
a people to that of a state, because he wants to avoid invoking certain features
commonly taken to be possessed by the latter, such as the right to wage war for
national gain, and a right to unlimited discretion regarding internal affairs (1999,
25). But neither of these features seems essential to the very concept of the state.
Much of what Rawls says about global justice would have made better sense if he
had substituted "states" for "peoples", and simply distanced himself from the
offending features in question (as I did in the previous chapter). The second
problem with Rawls' choice of peoples as the subjects and objects of moral duties
at the global level is its at least surface violation of normative individualism.
Rawls often gives the impression of treating peoples as moral units in their own
right (see Wenar 2002, 76, Nagel 2005, 135). It is doubtful that Rawls does in
fact intend to do this; Freeman suggests, for instance, that Rawls' focus on
peoples "is precisely the result of his concern for the freedom and equality of
individuals, which is in the background throughout in The Law of Peoples"
(2006, 65-6).82 But, whether or not this is so, the focus throughout on peoples
rather than persons obscures rather than illuminates this point. The third
problem with Rawls' exclusive focus on peoples is that it ignores entirely other
morally salient forms of cross-border relation besides those that obtain between
peoples or states (some of which I consider in Chapter 5). Rawls' relational
pluralism suggests that he ought to be open to the existence of a variety of justice-
generative forms of association in the realm of global politics; his failure to
explore the other options is disappointing.
2. The goal of global distributive principles. For Rawls, the fundamental aim of
the Law of Peoples, including the "duty of assistance", is the securing of the equal
political autonomy of all peoples. I consider this approach misguided. Political
autonomy (of individuals, rather than peoples) is properly an important goal of
global distributive justice, but it is not best seen as the most central or the most
fundamental such goal. While the approach to global distributive justice that I
develop below preserves room for a considerable degree of collective self-
determination, it construes the latter as instrumental to the broader and more
basic goal of furthering global welfare.
82 The idea here is that justice among peoples ensures that individuals attain the essentials for
political autonomous citizenship, the latter of which is a condition of personal freedom.
3. Reasons for rejecting global egalitarianism. The foregoing disagreement over
the ultimate goal of global distributive principles translates into a disagreement
over the right reasons for rejecting comprehensive global egalitarian principles. I
join Rawls in being unpersuaded by the positive arguments for global
egalitarianism that are offered by global "luck egalitarians" (e.g. Caney 2005, Tan
2004, Moellendorf 2002), or by cosmopolitan "institutionalists" such as Pogge
and Charles Beitz. We differ, however, on the additional arguments that we take
to tell against those principles. Rawls rejects comprehensive global
egalitarianism primarily because he takes it to conflict with respect for the
political autonomy of peoples (see 1999, 117-8). On my view, any such rejection
will need to be based instead on a broader, welfarist rationale.
3.5 The upcoming terrain
Each of the approaches that I have discussed in this chapter represents a
thoughtful and creative response to some important challenges in the
construction of a theory of global distributive justice. I will suggest in what
follows that my alternative utilitarian approach can capture much of what is
appealing in these diverse accounts, without taking on their disadvantages. I
think that my approach can accommodate the most central of our intuitions
concerning global distributive justice: explaining why it is that our duties towards
others appear to multiply or change in form the more our lives become
intertwined, while nonetheless acknowledging that we have demanding duties -
and duties of justice - towards those with whom we have no contact whatsoever.
And it can do this in a way that is both comprehensive and persuasive.
The best way of showing this is to develop that approach in some detail, and to
see it in action: the task taken on in the following chapters. Those chapters are
organized around a distinction between three goals at which principles of
utilitarian distributive justice might be directed. The first of these is the
attainment by individuals of a minimally decent level of welfare, the second the
treatment of individuals in accordance with norms of fairness, the third the
obtaining of a certain degree of equality across individuals along certain
dimensions (where this is valued for reasons independent of its contribution to
decency or fairness). Chapters 4 and 5 will address each of these three goals in
turn, in relation to the special case of global distributive justice. They will
consider the extent to which there is a utilitarian case for these goals at the global
level, and, if so, the form that the principles and duties arising from them should
take.
Chapter 4. Decency
4.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses that part of global distributive justice that is concerned
with what I will call decency: the attainment by individuals of a minimally decent
level of wellbeing. Although, as the following chapter will show, this goal should
not be taken to cover the full extent of the aims of utilitarian global distributive
justice, it is clearly highly important. Much, if certainly not all, of what really
bothers people, with or without utilitarian instincts, about the sorry state of the
world is the sorry state of the majority of the people who live in it. Any theory of
the ethics of global resource distribution therefore needs to provide a story about
how precisely our global responsibilities in this area are to be understood. In the
present chapter, for analytical purposes, I treat decency as our sole distributive
concern at the global level, and drop that assumption only in the following
chapters.
It is not difficult to show that the global achievement of decency should be a
utilitarian priority. It is less obvious, however, precisely what form that goal
ought to take at the global level, how exactly it is to relate to domestic decency
requirements (such as the "maxificing" principle of domestic distributive justice
argued for in Chapter 1), and how it is to be weighed up against other valuable
utilitarian goals at the global level. Utilitarians, and their welfare
consequentialist cousins, have not addressed such questions in the detail
required if their position on global distributive justice is to be complete and
convincing. My aim here is to fill some of this gap.
I begin by arguing for two distinct goals concerning global decency, which I call
Indirect Global Maxificing and Global Humanitarian Assistance (or Goal 1 and
Goal 2, for short). I then consider two objections to the goals that I advocate:
first, the claim that there is little that states can do to promote them; second, the
claim that promoting them is incompatible with two important values that we
ought to respect. I argue that the first of these objections is, in the light of
current evidence, overly pessimistic. I then argue that, while the second
objection does not cast doubt on Goals 1 and 2 themselves, it does place limits on
the ways in which they can permissibly be pursued. This leads me to go into
some further detail concerning how the global decency goals that I argue for are
to translate into specific duties on the part of individual states.
4.2 The utilitarian case for decency
There is widespread agreement, in both the philosophical literature and general
moral opinion, on two points. First, that the failure of individuals to attain a
minimally decent level of wellbeing, in at least many cases, grounds a moral
responsibility on the part of others to rectify their situation. Second, that this
responsibility holds not only in regard to those individuals with whom one
happens to be connected in some special way, but also in regard to individuals
who are socially or spatially distant from one. There remains significant
disagreement over such issues as: which moral considerations ground the
responsibility in question; which factors (such as the role of individuals in
contributing to their own state) undermine or negate it in a given instance; and
whether or not it is properly considered a duty of justice or instead one of
"humanity".83 But the sense that, in at least many central cases, something must
be done about the circumstances of those who suffer hunger, poverty,
preventable illness and other forms of absolute deprivation is a core and robust
element in our moral thought.
There are a variety of ways of arguing on moral grounds for the securing of a
minimally decent level of wellbeing for individuals. Enlightened libertarians, for
instance, can argue that it is a condition of persons being able to exercise their
basic negative rights that they and others not suffer certain forms of extreme
want or suffering. Kantians can argue that the materially deprived are vulnerable
to coercion or deception, the latter being affronts to one's status as a free rational
agent (O'Neill 2000, 140). But the utilitarian case for a decency goal is especially
strong and clear: utilitarians are on home ground here, if anywhere.84 The basic
utilitarian line regarding decency is the same at the global level as it is at the
domestic level (see 1.3.4. supra). For one, a situation in which many people
experience less than minimally decent levels of welfare will generally be
inefficient from a utilitarian perspective. Most people are capable of attaining
decency, given the right conditions. And it is often not all that expensive to
secure the conditions in question. It is inexpensive in terms of material
resources: people's basic needs can often be fulfilled with minimal amounts of
those. And it is inexpensive in terms of more immaterial goods forgone: given
that a decency goal is concerned with raising persons to only a minimal level of
wellbeing, it does not threaten to undermine their autonomy in the way in which
more generous goals might. Second, when people fail to attain a minimally
decent level of welfare they are apt to reduce the welfare of others with whom
they associate, as well as under-utilize their capacity to improve the welfare of
others more distant in space and time. To put things in coldly calculating terms,
all of this means that the big gains for utility maximization are often to be had
down at the lower reaches of the wellbeing distribution. To put things in more
83 I avoid the use of the term "humanity" here for two reasons. First, duties of humanity are
generally associated in the literature with securing a fairly low level of welfare, such as that
attained when a person possesses the basic biological necessities of life. I think of the level of
decency as being pitched considerably higher, and incorporating a richer variety of concerns, than
this. Second, while duties of humanity are generally understood in the literature to be distinct
from duties of justice, I conceive of duties relating to decency as a subset of the latter. This is both
because principles regarding decency fit the concept of distributive justice that I offered in
Chapter 1, and because opposing duties of humanity or decency to duties of justice tends to give
the impression that the former are morally less stringent than the latter. This impression is
misleading if, as I think, duties of decency are among our most compelling.
84 TO be clear and fair, I should note that the utilitarian headstart in this area derives mainly from
its welfarist component. This means that many other welfarist consequentialists are similarly
advantaged where accommodating decency is concerned.
appealing terms: the elimination of distress and suffering, which is a considerable
portion of the goal of decency, is also intuitively a considerable portion of the
raison d'etre of utilitarianism. We are utilitarians, if we are, in significant part
because we see distress and suffering as of intrinsic disvalue, and morality as, in
significant part, directed at getting rid of them. Indeed, it is the direct and
forceful rationale that utilitarianism provides for moral duties in this area that
affords one of its main attractions.85 By comparison, the moral theories
mentioned earlier are at a disadvantage, insofar as the intuitive force of their
arguments in this domain is less immediate.86
Although there is therefore good reason to think that utilitarians must, somehow,
have this large corner of our global moral concerns nicely covered, its contours
have not been mapped by utilitarians in any great detail. There is a voluminous
literature on what welfare consequentialists should say about the individual
moral duties of the global affluent towards those termed "the distant needy" (see
e.g. Singer 1972, Unger 1992, Mulgan 2002, Murphy 2003). But little of any
great precision has been written on what our collective goals should be in this
area: what our duties as participants in large-scale institutions (especially, states)
are. This - the terrain of global distributive justice - is my focus here.87
4.3 Two goals
I argued in Chapter 2 against the idea that we can capture the "decency aspect" of
global distributive justice by means of a direct transposition to the global level of
the principle that I had earlier argued expresses the decency aspect of domestic
distributive justice. Such transposition, I suggested, would result in the following
principle:
Global Maxificing. The global basic structure ought to be set so as to maximize
over time the number of people who possess an adequate amount of global
standard goods.
To recap, I argued that this principle is unattractive by virtue of the difficulties
involved in identifying an acceptable and workable list of global standard goods,
making precise global interpersonal welfare comparisons on the basis of those
goods, and constructing a satisfying unique schedule for weighing those goods up
against each other, in cases where trade-offs are required. I also pointed to the
85 Although also, admittedly, one of its main problems. The very strength of the utilitarian case
for decency duties renders it prone to charges of excessive demandingness, and of being unable to
accommodate moral concerns of a more refined nature. Section 4.4.2. below and chapters 5 and 6
will try to alleviate some prominent aspects of these worries.
86 The claim that the reason that a person ought to feed me when I am starving is that my
starvation places me in a state of unfreedom, or renders my negative rights insecure, has a
distinct air of contortion. While it is no doubt true that my being half-dead due to
malnourishment reduces my autonomy or liberty, that hardly seems to be the only, or indeed the
most, morally salient fact of the situation.
87 See 1.2.1 supra for the claim that distributive justice is primarily a collective rather than an
individual matter.
difficulty, in regard to this principle, of identifying an agent capable of feasibly
aiming for and securing its fulfillment. I suggested that, in place of Global
Maxificing, utilitarians ought to seek a principle that a) does not depend so
heavily on constructing the list and schedule, or on making the comparisons, in
question, and b) is better attuned to the capacities of real-world agents.
I now want to try to do this, within the terms established by the "global division
of moral labor" between political communities defended in the second part of
Chapter 2. The previous discussion suggests that, in doing this, we should both
see how far we can get by reference solely to domestic rather than global standard
goods, and incorporate explicit reference to political communities into the
proposal. Because it is not immediately clear at the global level what the
subject88 or the agent of distributive justice ought to be, I will also begin by
construing decency in terms of a goal (or goals) rather than a principle. Goals, by
virtue of their outcome orientation, are more capable than principles of standing
alone, without attachment to particular sets of institutions or agents. I will
address the question of how the resulting goals are to translate into principles (in
particular, duties on the part of states) in section 4.5 below.
One possibility is to opt for the following goal:
Universal Domestic Maxificing. A world in which all political communities fulfill
internally the maxificing principle of domestic distributive justice advanced in
chapter one.89
This goal has the advantage, advocated above, of both incorporating explicit
reference to existing political communities, and of providing a clear story about
how domestic decency goals relate to global decency goals. It is, however,
problematic in two respects. The first problem is that, as stated, it is silent on the
issue of the moral propriety of the status quo distribution of resources across
political communities. (This remains a live question, even once we have accepted
the existence of states as morally justified; what is at issue is the way in which
rights to resources are to be distributed across those states). A goal aimed at
universal domestic maxificing needs to specify whether or not the aim is for each
community to maxifice, with the resources, material and otherwise, currently
available to it taken as given (call that the conservative option), or whether
88 I express doubts about the appropriateness of the "global basic structure" as the subject of
global distributive justice at 5.5.1 infira.
89 That principle was:
Maxificing. The basic structure of a society ought to be set so as to maximize over time
the number of that society's members who possess an adequate amount of standard
goods.
where an "adequate amount" is that amount normally necessary in the society in question if an
individual is to attain a minimally decent level of welfare, subject to increase in the case of
individuals with transparent limitations in basic capabilities.
communities are to maxifice, using those resources as well as, in some cases,
some to-be-specified amount of the resources currently held by other
communities (call that the perhaps-radical option). On the conservative option,
any role for outsiders would be restricted at most to helping a foreign community
determine what the various basic structures available to it were, and to assist it in
using its existing resources to institute that which was most likely to result in the
highest satisficing score over time. On the perhaps-radical option, outsiders
might be required to provide some of their resources to the community in
question, prior to or in conjunction with the above advisory tasks.
The second, more serious, problem is that neither of the two options listed just
now seems satisfactory. A difficulty with the conservative option is that a
conception of global distributive justice based upon it will have the result that it is
perfectly just (at least where decency is concerned) if a country such as
Bangladesh continues to have an alarmingly low satisficing score9o, provided that
it is making the best of a bad situation. Another difficulty is that, if we consider
the sort of technical/institutional assistance on the part of outsiders mentioned
just now to itself be a resource, as seems appropriate, it looks like the
conservative option, strictly interpreted, would construe such assistance as
likewise not morally required, and it would be unclear what exactly it was that the
responsibility to promote the above goal implied for outsiders. Intuitively,
however, there is some such responsibility, and it does involve some degree of
positive cross-border aid.
It looks, then, like we should prefer the perhaps-radical option. That would
appear to require a two-step approach. First we would construct a principle
concerning how many, and which, resources ought to be made available to each
country, and then direct countries to maxifice using those resources. I take it that
the first part of this strategy only needs stating for its hopelessness to be
apparent, but it is worth briefly going through the specific reasons why.
1. It would be massively difficult to get the calculations concerning which country
should get what right. We do not know enough about the determinants of
economic growth in general, nor about the particular circumstances of, and
possibilities available to, each country, to work out how many and which
resources ought to be made available to each. We certainly cannot assume that
an equal (per capita) distribution of global standard goods is required, for a
reason akin to Sen's point about the divergent capacities of individuals to convert
resources into welfare, here applied to countries rather than persons (where, in
my view, the point has greater force).
90 For brevity, I will be employing the following terminology from now on: to possess that
amount of standard goods that is generally adequate for a person in one's society to attain
decency is to "satisfice", and the percentage of a given population that satisfices is that
population's "satisficing score".
2. What appeal this strategy has arguably derives from a naive view about the
determinants of economic development. As will be explained below, it is likely
that some of the resources that are best placed to help the poorest performing
countries to increase their satisficing scores are not material goods (like food or
cash), which are relatively amenable to cross-border redistribution, but rather
services, institutions, or norms. The latter are not so easy to transfer in a one-off,
permanent fashion: the first, because services are tied to human beings, whose
overseas transplantation raises both practical and moral difficulties; the second
two because the capacity of foreigners to transfer these at all is in doubt.
3. A massive one-off redistribution of even the relatively easily transferable
material goods is politically unimaginable. The idea of the world's nations
agreeing to it is plainly utopian. And, even if it could be agreed upon as a goal, it
is hard to see how, and by whom, it could realistically be implemented.
4. An immense global reallocation of resources, even if it could be effected in the
face of the above practical difficulties, would be of dubious utilitarian value.
Given the current state of governance and basic infrastucture in many developing
countries, many of the resources in question would simply be wasted, due to
limited "absorption capacity" or corruption. They could even have negative
consequences for the receiving political community, by virtue of displacing local
attempts at economic development with a greater long-term prospect of success,
or by virtue of cementing the power of oppressive local elites (see section 4.4.
infra).
5. The proposal under consideration is a starting-gate approach: we (whoever
"we" refers to: see point 3.) divide up the goods between various countries in
what looks at that point like a utility-maximizing way, and then let them get to it,
accepting whatever results as morally legitimate as far as global distributive
justice is concerned. But this strategy has the usual defect of an ex ante approach
from a consequentialist perspective. A lot can occur between an initial
distribution that is, within a certain limited time-frame, utility-maximizing and
the results further down the line. Countries that started out "equally" (in some
sense) might end up drastically unequal, due to mismanagement, unforeseen
developments, or just plain bad luck.91 If, instead, to alleviate these problems, we
opt for a starting-gate approach subject to periodic adjustments, we invite serious
concerns about collective self-determination, incentives, and a dangerous
concentration of power in whatever body was created to do the adjusting.
For the above reasons, it is misguided to try to work out some utility-maximizing
initial distribution of the world's resources across political communities. But at
the same time, it does not seem that leaving countries to make do with the
91 In some cases a starting-gate approach to distribution might be appropriate from a utilitarian
perspective, in order to preserve autonomy or to encourage individual responsibility. But this
does not seem to be one of those cases - largely, though not only, because too much is at stake.
resources that they happen to have (the conservative option) is a satisfactory
alternative. I suggest the following goal instead:
Goal 1. Indirect Global Maxificing. A world in which all political communities
ensure, sustainably, and in a way not dependent on external aid, that the large
majority of their population satisfices.92
The argument for this goal is straightforward: its achievement is required if the
state system is to carry through effectively on the vision that the global division of
moral labor argued for at 2.3.1 suggests. That vision is a situation in which each
state actually does successfully and sustainably promote the wellbeing of its own
citizens, rather than the present situation, in which numerous states fail
miserably to do so. It is an evident improvement on the two variants of Universal
Domestic Maxificing considered above, insofar as it neither presupposes a
morally dubious and practically impossible massive reallocation of resources, nor
rules out the possibility that significant international redistribution might be
required (so that the complacent attitude to countries such as Bangladesh floated
earlier is avoided).
However this goal shares a problem with the previous goal that I have not yet
mentioned. Indirect Global Maxificing constitutes an ongoing, long-term
project: one that can be attained only by degrees, if at all. If the millions of global
poor are not to be left unassisted in the meantime, it will need to be
supplemented by a second goal. I suggest this:
Goal 2. Global Humanitarian Assistance. Fulfillment on the part of outsiders of
the basic needs of those whose own political community proves unable or
unwilling to assist them (as in the case of natural disasters, civil war, or severe
and systematic poverty).
Goal 2 differs from Goal 1 in two chief respects. First, it is directed solely at
satisfying basic needs, which I here understand as the minimal biologically-
determined requirements of life. The satisfaction of such needs can generally be
secured by means of the same standard goods required to secure decency, but
calls for only a subset of those goods - basic health care, nutrition, clothing and
shelter - in smaller amounts and/or of lower quality. Second, Goal 2 calls for a
direct response on the part of outsiders to the needs of insiders, whereas the
involvement of outsiders is mediated in the case of the first goal, which is aimed
at building the capacity of communities to promote decency within their own
populations. These differences are related. The chief rationale for restricting the
92 1 say "large majority", because the goal that all attain the relevant amount of goods is plausibly
unachievable, due to factors beyond our capacity to address. The rationale for aid-independence
derives from the value of collective self-determination, which I discuss below at 4.4.1.
goal of direct foreign provision to that of the satisfaction of basic needs is that the
latter is much easier to secure from a distance than is full decency.93
These goals need to be treated as a package, not only because each is insufficient
on its own, but also because the single-minded pursuit of one may well subvert
the achievement of the other. Taken together, as that package, I think that they
are an attractive specification at the global level of that part of global distributive
justice that is concerned with the attainment of decency. I also think, on the
basis of the considerations mentioned in 4.2 supra, that utilitarianism provides a
compelling case for the claim that we are morally required to promote them. The
remainder of the chapter will address two important objections to these claims,
the general thrust of which should be familiar from both the academic literature
and general public debate. The first is the objection that outsiders cannot do
much to actively promote Goals 1 and 2; the second is that promoting those goals
will conflict with two important values that utilitarians, as well as others, ought to
be concerned to protect.
4.4. The empirical question: Can outsiders help?
Much of the recent literature in economics and political science has been
characterized by skepticism concerning the extent to which what I have been
calling "global decency" can be effectively promoted by outside agents. If this
skepticism were well founded, advocating those goals might be pointless, or
perhaps even harmful, insofar as it diverted time, effort and material resources
that might be more profitably spent elsewhere. Therefore, although the extent to
which outsiders can promote decency is an empirical question, philosophers need
to, at least in outline, consider it.
Where Goal 1 is concerned, many doubts of the kind just mentioned spring from
a particular view about what it is that determines a country's economic
93 It is tempting to understand these goals in terms of the common distinction between
"development" and "humanitarian" aid to poor countries. The latter distinction is problematic,
both conceptually and pragmatically. As a conceptual matter, it is hard to keep the two categories
distinct, given that development aid can serve to prevent the need for humanitarian assistance in
the future, and humanitarian relief can be provided in a way explicitly designed to promote
development. As a pragmatic matter, appeal to the distinction between development and
humanitarian aid can result in poor decisions concerning resource allocation. Rubenstein (2006)
argues that situations calling for "humanitarian" ("emergency" or "relief) aid tend to be regarded
by both the public and the aid community as generating more morally pressing demands for
assistance than situations calling for development assistance, and that this fact is worrying,
insofar as there is no principled reason to think that either should be given systematic moral
priority over the other. I think that the argument that I am giving here largely sidesteps these
valid concerns. While the distinction between development and humanitarian aid may be fuzzy,
the differences between Goals 1 and 2 themselves (to which aid is a means) are sufficiently clear to
render a distinction between the two goals viable. Where the pragmatic question is concerned, I
can only emphasize that I am making no assumption here that either goal should systematically
take priority over the other (see fn 119 infra).
prosperity. This is the view that Matthias Risse terms Institutions, according to
which:
...Prosperity depends on the quality of institutions, such as stable property rights,
rule of law, bureaucratic capacity, appropriate regulatory structures to curtail at
least the worst forms of fraud, anti-competitive behavior, and graft, quality and
independence of courts, but also cohesiveness of society, existence of trust and
social cooperation, and thus overall quality of civil society (Risse 2003, 11)
This position contrasts with a competing view that Risse terms Geography,
according to which "growth is primarily determined by factors such as location,
climate, endowment of resources (including soils), disease burden, and thus
agricultural productivity, quality of human resources, and transportation costs"
(ibid., o10). These contrasting views have very different implications concerning
the likely effectiveness of international assistance in helping developing countries
to move out of poverty and into sustained economic growth. If Geography is
correct, outsiders may be able to make a considerable impact by providing
material and technical resources - such as irrigation systems, fertilizer, anti-
malaria medication or bed nets, hospitals, roads, educational facilities and
computers - to compensate for poor initial natural endowments in the target
country. A sufficiently large injection of such resources will ensure that the
global poor are able to increase their savings rate, invest in human and economic
capital, and launch themselves on a "take-off' into economic prosperity (Sachs
2005). If Institutions is correct, by contrast, such measures, however helpful they
may be in temporarily relieving distress, will not make a long-term impact on
economic growth. Because growth-promoting institutions must develop
endogenously, in a gradual process of bottom-up evolution that is attuned to the
peculiarities of local circumstances, "often all aid can contribute is analytical
work, identification of and support for an internal champion for reform with a
long-term vision, training of future leaders, bureaucrats, or professionals, and
technical assistance of various sorts" (Risse 2003, 19). Or, if aid can help in a
more substantial way than this, it can do so only if certain hard-won institutions
are already in place. An influential study by Burnside and Dollar suggests that
'aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal,
monetary and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies'
(Burnside and Dollar 2000). In fact, the situation may be even worse that this.
Easterly (2006) argues that overseas financial aid of the kind and scale advocated
by Sachs et al. may serve to actively undermine the stability of nascent or
otherwise delicate institutions in developing countries.94
94 A third view, Integration, has it that growth is primarily determined by integration into world
markets, which generates income, employment and the means for investment by households,
along with the foreign exchange needed to sustain imports. While this view casts similar doubt to
Institutions on the long-term efficacy of global resource transfers, it allows greater room for
positive outside intervention than does the former view. This is because its supporters are both
less likely to construe international interventions as positively harmful, and more likely to be
optimistic about the ability of foreigners to impose internal structural reforms (allegedly
necessary to ensure profitable access to markets) from without.
Doubts of a similarly "institutionalist" character also apply to cases where
economic prosperity per se is not at issue. If Goal 1 is to be achieved, all of the
world's political communities will need to attain not only a certain minimal level
of economic development, but also social and political institutions adequate for
ensuring internal redistribution (so that all of the benefits from growth are not
captured by the affluent), and the political will to use those institutions for that
purpose. Among the most important institutions for promoting poverty
reduction are standard civil and political rights. Freedoms of expression,
political participation and association, and rights to bodily integrity and due
process of law together assist the poor in improving their own situation, help
others to publicize their plight and assist them, and are preconditions for the
sorts of formal political institutions that contribute to poverty reduction over the
long term (Nickel 1996, 180-3). Among the more important "cultural"
preconditions of a high satisficing score, on the other hand, are plausibly a
relatively egalitarian ethos, particularly in regard to gender95, and a lack of
ethnic hostilities or other sectarian conflict within the population. As should be
clear, many of the points made by supporters of Institutions concerning the
difficulty of transplanting institutions and norms from outside apply forcefully
in each of these cases.
Where Goal 2 is concerned, institutionalists charge that the same problems of
weak target-state institutions and informational constraints that hamper many
Western attempts to foster economic growth in foreign countries have the result
that much humanitarian assistance fails to reach its targets.96 Some argue, more
strongly, that aid is not just ineffective but counter-productive, in either the short
or the long-term. It is said to inflict economic damage, by distorting the local
economy (often by undercutting local suppliers), undermining work incentives,
disrupting existing community support systems, and competing for scarce
administrative and infrastructural resources. Expectations of continued aid from
foreign countries are also said to reduce pressure on rulers to make the internal
economic and political reforms necessary for the long-term elimination of
poverty. Aid is often administered in partnership with oppressive local elites,
thereby disguising the responsibility of the latter for the situation prompting the
need for aid, providing opportunities for rule-reinforcing graft, and discouraging
the implementation of democratic reforms that would lead to a more equal
distribution of the bounty.
95 Gender equality would not only improve the situation of women, but also that of children. It is
well documented that redistributing household resources towards women results in improved
child health and education (see Sen 2000).
96 Easterly (2006) claims that these problems have been worsened by faults squarely on the
supply side, including: Western arrogance, which has led officials to continue to implement
policies that the evidence has clearly shown to be ineffective, and to refuse to take account of the
views of those they were allegedly helping; a tendency on the part of aid officials to focus on large-
scale goals that are highly general, unobservable, or impossible (such as the "end of poverty"),
leading to problems of accountability and poor incentives to work efficiently; and the exploitation
of humanitarian projects for self-interested ends.
Call institutionalist skepticism the view that Institutions, and its analogs in
regard to the non-growth-related elements of decency achievement mentioned
above, show that there is very little that outsiders can do to promote Goals 1 and
2. There are two reasons to reject this view. The first is that Institutions itself is
weakly supported by the evidence. The kind of large-scale international cross-
sectional statistical analysis on which much of the research in this area relies is
subject to multiple interpretations, with the results highly dependent on the
specific countries and time periods selected for analysis (see Sen 2006).97
Analogous institutionalist claims concerning the ineffectiveness of humanitarian
assistance are similarly underdetermined by the data. There is no evidence that
either aid interventions taken individually or the aid industry as a whole are by
their very nature obstructive of the widespread achievement of decency.98 The
most that can reasonably be concluded from the evidence to date is not that
outsiders are unable to fulfill the basic needs of those residing in other countries,
but rather that they have so far not gone about it as effectively as they might have
done.
The second reason for rejecting institutionalist skepticism is that, even if
Institutions and its analogs did turn out to be correct, there would surely remain
some significant role for outsiders in promoting decency. Where furthering the
economic prosperity of the developing world is concerned, at least the following
measures are likely to be at least somewhat helpful: sharing of technological
expertise; an effective solution to the third world debt problem; elimination of
developed country protectionism and increased labor migration to the developed
world. In cases where a given country has attained the necessary level of
economic development, but nonetheless fails to reach a high satisficing score, the
international development community can plausibly play an advisory role in
helping developing countries to make the sorts of development decisions that can
be expected to lead to pro-poor growth. Where it is not lack of knowledge, but
rather lack of political will to secure internal redistribution or the protection of
rights that is the problem, various forms of (carefully designed and orchestrated)
97Dezhbakhsh suggests that "the empirical findings in this area resemble the output of a
production process with inadequate input and deficient production technology" (2005, 97), due to
overreliance on insufficient and unreliable data. Worse than this, there is reason to doubt that the
question to which Institutions provides an answer is in fact well posed, insofar as it rests upon
two questionable assumptions. The first assumption is there exists a single answer to the "growth
question" that applies to all countries. It seems just as likely that there are in fact a variety of
routes to successful development, different ones of which might be feasible within different
countries. The second questionable assumption is that only one of the sets of factors highlighted
by Geography or Institutions (or Integration - see fn 94 supra) will be crucially causal in any
given case, rather than a combination of each. For both of these reasons, it is possible that the
project of looking for a grand, sweeping theory of economic growth is quixotic (see Banerjee
2007).
98 C.f. Garrett Cullity, who notes that, for this conclusion to be warranted, it would need to be
shown "not just that...aid, taken as a whole, works to strengthen the causes of poverty and
destitution, but that there is no form or source of...aid that succeeds in being economically and
politically sensitive enough to avoid doing this. The studies of aid effectiveness that have been
done do not seem to bear out that global claim" (2004, 46). To say this is not, of course, to deny
that some particular interventions have been very harmful.
sanctions may be useful.99 Goal 1 can also be promoted by means of international
peacekeeping and conflict resolution operations. This is because internal and
external peace are plausibly necessary conditions of a poor country's both
attaining a satisfactory level of economic development, and of converting that
level of development into a high satisficing score (c.f. Caney 2006).100 Where
Goal 2 is concerned, the developed world can work on ways of getting
humanitarian aid more efficiently to its targets. It is debatable whether or not
what is required to do this is feeding more money into large-scale international
programs (Sachs 2005), or rather the promotion of small-scale local initiatives,
either market-based (Easterly 2006) or "evidence-based" (Banerjee 2006).
When it comes to the real world, philosophers should tread lightly. The above
measures are therefore offered merely as illustrations. However, what the wide
range of possibilities listed does suggest is that institutionalist skepticism, in the
extreme form given earlier, is unwarranted. Institutionalists are right to warn us
against being naive: simply throwing cash at the problem is not likely to further
global decency. But if it is true that institutions matter, it is also true that that
fact cannot plausibly be construed as warrant for the developed world to plead
incapacity as an excuse for inaction.
4.5 The normative question: Should outsiders help?
I will assume from now on that outsiders are capable of effectively pursuing
Goals 1 and 2, one way or another, with the acknowledgment that to what extent
and how remains up for debate. In the remainder of the chapter I return to
some explicitly normative territory. Some reasonable doubts about the
appropriateness of Goals 1 and 2 do not concern their feasibility, but rather their
moral acceptability. In particular, they concern the compatibility of those goals
with two other goals that we should be concerned to promote. One of these
additional goals is the universal achievement of collective self-determination;
another the realization of domestic distributive justice.lol
The question of how to balance global decency (or some close cousin of it)
against these commonly recognized goals is a challenge faced by all theories of
global distributive justice. But it might be felt to be an especially pressing one
99 One option here is to either restrict or eliminate trade with a country that fails to protect certain
minimal rights, or to encourage trade with an internally repressive regime in order to support
internal reform by means of increased contact and influence. Other positive measures include
providing financial or other support to the internal opposition in the target state; other negative
measures include diplomatic sanctions (such as suspension of diplomatic relations); cultural
sanctions (such as sport boycotts or restrictions on academic exchange) or military sanctions
(such as restrictions on the supply of arms).
1oo De Waal argues that famine was intentionally used as a method of warfare in Ethiopia in the
early 1980s (1997, 115-21). The increased military expenditure, destruction of infrastructure and
resources, and diversion of investment overseas that is caused by civil war also harm development
in both the warring state and its neighbors (Collier et al. 2003, 13-32)
10o The additional question of how to balance the goal of global decency against the goal of global
fairness argued for in Chapter 5 will be addressed in Chapter 6.
for utilitarians in particular, insofar as their theory might seem to predispose
them to weigh global decency over heavily in the balance. My twin aims here are
to show, against such doubts, that utilitarians have reason to take seriously
concerns about accommodating collective self-determination and domestic
distributive justice, and to give a general idea of how they might attempt to
address them.
4.5.1 Collective self-determination
I understand "collective self-determination" to refer to the ability of an organized
group of persons to determine, to some substantial extent, i) the terms of its own
internal organization, and ii) the translation of its goals and values into desired
outcomes. In the specific case that we are considering here, an organized
political community enjoys collective self-determination to the extent that it is
able to set its own social, political, economic and cultural agenda without
excessive interference from other parties, and to follow through on that agenda
with some reasonable chance of success. 10 2
A political community might fail to be self-determining in one or more of the
following four ways. As a result of:
i) lacking the material or technical means to attain well-functioning
political or economic institutions
ii) the lack of opportunity for some degree of genuine input into the
formation of collective decisions on the part of a large proportion of the
population
iii) the (coercive or otherwise) co-opting of significant aspects of its policy
agenda by other powerful political or economic actors
iv) the (systematic, and ongoing) failure of other actors to hold it
responsible - within certain limits - for its choices.
It is in regard to the last two of these threats to collective self-determination that
the promotion of global decency is most likely to raise problems. Take iii) first.
Actions aimed at changing the behavior of another political community in order
to promote decency within its population threaten to diminish the extent to
o102 The qualifiers "substantial", "excessive" and "reasonable" in the above characterization are
intended to head off the following two misinterpretations. First, collective self-determination is
not undermined by the failure per se of a given collectivity to succeed in one (or, indeed, many) of
its endeavors; it matters both what the endeavor in question is, and how the failure in question
comes about. Second, collective self-determination does not require complete independence or
isolation from the actions and influence of others. One reason why some acts of external
interference in the affairs of a given collectivity will not reduce the self-determination of the latter
is that a diminishment of political autonomy in one aspect of the collectivity's common life might
be compensated for by an increase of it in some other aspect. Another reason why interference
may have little impact is that it might affect an option (or set of options) that is not considered
especially weighty or valuable by the collectivity in question. For more on these and other issues
concerning the nature of collective self-determination, see Miller 1997.
which that political community has significant control over the development and
execution of its policy agenda. The danger is especially clear in cases where what
is at issue are attempts by outsiders to alter social and political institutions or
cultural norms in a state that has already attained a high level of economic
development. But the point also holds in the case of developing countries, when
the type of development assistance offered by foreigners requires, or is
conditioned upon, extensive interference in the internal affairs of the recipient
state. The IMF's demand for certain fundamental social and economic reforms as
a condition of balance-of-payments assistance has been claimed to reduce the
collective self-determination of developing countries in this way; likewise the use
of sanctions.103 Take next iv). According to what we can call the "liability
condition" on collective self-determination, if a political community is to be self-
determining it must be held responsible for the outcomes of its choices. Having
chosen and set upon a course of action, it must, within limits, be made to
internalize the resulting costs. This condition is plausibly undermined by some
forms of foreign aid. If country A is assured that country B is committed to
promoting decency within A's population, A may fail to take its own choices
concerning promotion of that goal seriously. A's decisions regarding social or
economic policy may cease to be appropriately consequential or meaningful for
its members, because the causal relationship between their choice of policy and
(at least some aspects of) their later circumstances is substantially severed, due to
the reliable expectation of assistance from B.
The above points should only concern utilitarians if their theory provides a case
for caring about collective self-determination. It does. A large part of that case is
similar in form to the arguments standardly given in utilitarian discussions of
individual autonomy, and is closely related to the moral justification for the state
system given earlier. Leaving political communities substantially in charge of
setting and carrying through their own agendas is generally the best way to work
around standard strategic constraints on the promotion of welfare, such as limits
on information and altruistic motivation. Such a strategy also provides greater
incentives for efficiency and productivity than the alternative in which
communities are able to depend upon the efforts of others, and is likely to foster
the sort of global cultural and political diversity that is of general benefit. This
"instrumental" argument for collective self-determination can also be
supplemented by a more direct one. For at least very many people, the ability to
cooperate with the other members of one's political community in determining
the shape and direction that that community will take is an important aspect of a
fully autonomous and dignified life. If autonomy and dignity are central
contributors to human wellbeing, as seems clear, this gives utilitarians reason to
prefer that it be the members of a political community who determine the present
103 The "conditionality principle " was introduced in the IMF in 1952, as a result of US pressure,
against the wishes of other members. Initially applied only to Latin America, in the 1970s and
198os it was extended to all developing countries. Standard conditions have included import
liberalization, financial deregulation, reduced government spending, anti-union policies, and
increased incentives for foreign investment.
terms and future outcomes of their collective life, rather than outsiders.104
Neither of the above arguments can be said to provide a utilitarian case for
respecting all appeals to domestic policy discretion as a matter of unyielding
principle. But, as a moment's reflection reveals, this is not something that we
should want. What the above arguments do plausibly provide, much more
acceptably, is a robust presumption in favor of collective self-determination,
within certain limits.
No problem?
Suppose that one accepts all of the above. Four distinct lines of thought can
nonetheless tempt one to doubt that utilitarians ought to be troubled by the
apparent prospect of conflict between the promotion of global decency and
respect for collective self-determination. The first of these comes in the form of
what we can call the false contrast objection. The achievement of global decency
can be expected to correlate with a massive increase in collective self-
determination on the part of the world's developing nations, by virtue of
eliminating the poverty, suffering, ill-health and lack of education that
undermine robust and fully inclusive participation in collective decision-making.
But if decency is a necessary condition of collective self-determination in the way
that this suggests, no genuine conflict between the two would seem to be in the
offing: efforts to promote the former will simultaneously be efforts to promote
the latter. The problem with this argument is its failure to take account of the
strategic aspects of the situation. While it may be the case that, in the long term,
global decency and collective self-determination are compatible, in the medium
term there is plenty of room for conflict between the two goals (as was suggested
just now). And the solution implied by the objection at issue - that we should
resolve all such conflicts in favor of global decency - is unattractive for two
reasons. Given that the achievement of global decency is a long-term project, this
solution would put collective self-determination seriously at risk for a very
significant period of time, however things turn out in the wash. And, more
worryingly still, the "direct" argument for collective self-determination given
10o4 Sen argues that participation in public decision-making and social choice not only plays
"instrumental" and "direct" roles, of the kind outlined above, but also has a "constructive" aspect,
in the sense that it contributes to the collective conceptualization of needs within a social context
(2000, 148; see also 1.3.2 supra). He suggests that certain kinds of values and priorities cannot
be formed independently of public discussion and debate, and that as a result collective self-
determination is not a dispensable instrument for promoting independently acknowledged social
ends, but rather an essential means of determining what those ends are in the first place. This
sort of argument will only be available to utilitarians if the sense of "determining" social ends that
is at issue is interpreted in epistemic rather than causal terms. Utilitarians can and should agree
that public discussion is a way of finding out how one's own priorities and interests intersect with
those of others (a process that can be expected to result, at least sometimes, in one's own
priorities being altered). Utilitarians are however going to struggle with the independent idea
that public discussion creates fundamental social values that did not preexist the conversation.
On the epistemic reading, Sen's "constructive" argument will be a special case of the instrumental
argument given in the text, which is why I do not list it separately.
earlier suggests that decency itself may not be fully achievable unless it is reached
by a process that allows significant room for political autonomy.10 5
A second attempt to dismiss concerns about the potential for conflict between
collective self-determination and decency comes in the form of what we can call
the relative triviality objection. The benefits of attaining global decency (which
include the elimination of suffering and the preservation of life) are so much
more important from a utilitarian perspective than the value of collective self-
determination, this objection runs, that scruples on grounds of the latter in
promoting the former are misguided. If the arguments for collective self-
determination that I gave above are compelling, it is not in fact clear that the two
goals are as disparate in significance as this objection makes out. But even if we
assume that the achievement of decency is vastly more important than that of
political autonomy, the objection is problematic for two reasons. The first is its
failure to distinguish between moral and strategic priority. Where the
achievement of one goal is morally more valuable than the achievement of
another, it is not always the case that one ought to focus exclusively on achieving
the more valuable goal first. This is because it may be more valuable still to
achieve both goals, and the prior achievement of the first goal may preclude the
(full or partial) achievement of the second goal afterwards. A second problem is
that this objection has not learnt the lesson of the second response to the false
contrast objection given just now. In some cases the more valuable of two goals
itself justifies giving the less valuable goal a certain strategic priority in everyday
decision-making. This is arguably one of those cases, if, as suggested above, the
achievement of global decency is itself conditional on preserving substantial
room for collective self-determination.0o6
The third and fourth attempts to dismiss the decency/collective self-
determination conflict are premised on problems of governance. The first can be
termed the misidentification objection. In many cases where a community fails
to attain a high satisficing score, the government of the community in question
does not have a plausible claim to speak in the name of its population. But if this
is so, external interference aimed at changing that government's behavior in
order to promote decency will run up only against the self-determination of that
government, not that of the community that it governs. The second,
"exploitation", objection claims that the concept of collective self-determination
105 This is a good example, then, of a case where utilitarians need to pay attention not only to, as
Sen puts it, ""culmination outcomes" (that is, only final outcomes without taking any note of the
process of getting there...)" but also to "comprehensive outcomes" (taking note of the processes
through which the culmination outcomes come about)" (Sen 2000, 27).
o106 The general form of this second argument can be understood on the model of indirect
utilitarian defenses of giving procedural priority to certain basic rights over increases in the
general welfare. Certain basic interests of persons are not thrown into the mix along with all
other interests at stake, but are singled out for special treatment, or given "asymmetric
prominence" (Sen 2ooo, 65) by virtue of their special features.
is overly indeterminate and pliable, and that, as a result, appeals to it can
encourage corruption and inefficiency.107
While both objections have some bite to them where the dismissal of particular
appeals to collective self-determination is concerned, they cannot plausibly be
claimed to dismiss, quite generally, the possibility that genuine collective self-
determination and decency will come into conflict. Where the misidentification
objection is concerned, this is because the connection between a low satisficing
score and a government that does not speak in the name (or govern in the
interests) of its population is not tight. Some widespread failures of decency
coincide with the rule of a government that is accorded legitimacy by a large
proportion of the population. A second problem lies with the implication that the
failure of a government to express the collective will of the people extinguishes all
concerns about accommodating that collective will at all. While it will be very
difficult to know what policies a population would set if it were able to, in the
absence of either a government that minimally represents its interests, or any
other organized body that claims collective authority, this does not imply that
foreigners have free moral rein to direct those policies in directions that they
themselves think appropriate. The main lesson of the exploitation objection, on
the other hand, is not that all appeals to collective self-determination ought to
cease, but rather that we need a story about how in practice to distinguish the
spurious and harmful instances from those that deserve our respect.
What to do?
The above discussion shows, in the face of some potential doubts to the contrary,
that utilitarians have reason to take the value of collective self-determination
seriously when advocating global decency promotion. The value of the former
imposes real constraints, here and now, on the pursuit of the latter. What precise
form these constraints take will depend to some extent on the details of the
particular situation. But it would be useful if we could at least devise some
general normative guidelines to aid decisions in this area. Three main strategies
for deriving such guidelines present themselves. First, we might take a "supply-
side" strategy. We could attempt to distinguish between forms of outside
assistance or intervention that are more likely to impede collective self-
determination and those that are less likely to, and then recommend favoring the
latter. Alternatively, we might take a "demand-side" strategy. We could attempt
to distinguish between claims of policy discretion on grounds of collective self-
determination that deserve the respect of outsiders and those that do not, and
then recommend deference only to the former. A third option, distinct from both
107 Thus, in his comments on Banerjee 2006, Mick Moore expresses frustration about the
emphasis on "terms like empowerment, capacity building, participatory development,
strengthening civil society, decentralization, and local ownership" in the international
development community, on the grounds that focus on such "immeasurable" goals diverts
attention from practical projects that can be expected to directly aid the poor. Banerjee himself
emphasizes the way in which "the current fashion for channeling aid into broad budgetary
support (rather than specific projects) in the name of national autonomy" provides opportunities
for graft on the part of corrupt officials.
of these, would be to focus on positive measures to promote the self-
determination of developing countries in the area of global decency promotion,
particularly by strengthening the presence and impact of such countries in the
global institutions that manage poverty reduction.
Each of these strategies has its problems. A difficulty with the supply-side
approach is that the sorts of decency-promoting measures that are least likely to
impact on collective self-determination - such as cash grants, or the sharing of
technological innovations - are also less likely to be successful in promoting
decency than are some more invasive interventions. This presents a danger that
attempts to accommodate collective self-determination will come at too high a
cost for decency. A problem with the demand-side approach is the difficulty of
drawing the distinction that it calls for. One possibility is to claim that appeals to
collective self-determination only deserve respect when the population of the
collective in question has the opportunity for some degree of genuine input into
the formation of public decisions. But the criterion on which this suggestion
relies threatens to be either overly inclusive or overly exclusive, depending on
how it is interpreted. If "opportunity for some degree of genuine input" were
interpreted strictly, it might well rule out most developed countries as
substantially collectively self-determining (counter-intuitively, I take it). If it
were instead interpreted weakly, any government that allowed for elections,
however unfree or unfair, might slip in. Applying the proposal in practice is likely
to embroil us in tortured disputes about whether or not the relevant criterion is
satisfied. A difficulty with the third option is that it is unclear how effective it will
be. While increasing the fairness and representativeness of international
development institutions has many things to recommend it, it is not clear that a
significant increase in the collective self-determination of developing nations in
the face of attempts to promote decency is among them.
There is, then, no quick fix in this area. Some specific measures, however, do
seem promising. One is a decrease in the use and scope of conditionality within
the IMF, so that the latter reapproaches its original narrow mandate of
stabilization and surveillance, combined with the creation of alternative sources
of finance, so as to reduce the reliance of countries upon the Fund (Patomaki &
Teivainen 2002, 65-7). Another is to increase accountability mechanisms in the
operation of international development assistance and humanitarian aid.
Holding governments to specific and measurable targets of their own devising
can be expected to reduce the opportunities for corruption and waste while
preserving space for political autonomy. Finally, where the demand-side strategy
is concerned, it is probably advisable to focus attention not on the general
representative credentials of the government in question, but rather, on a more
piecemeal basis, on the content of the particular appeals to discretion on grounds
of collective self-determination that that government makes. Resistance to
implementing a proposed reform on the (plausible) grounds that it is culturally
inappropriate, for instance, deserves a more sympathetic hearing than does a
bald assertion that any such reform is strictly the government's business.
4.4.2 Domestic distributive justice
A second way to object to Goals 1 and 2 on normative grounds is to claim that
their pursuit is incompatible with the concurrent pursuit of domestic distributive
justice. Under the terms of the global division of moral labor argued for in
Chapter 2, the chief focus of each state is to be the promotion of the wellbeing of
its own members, in accordance with something like the principles of domestic
distributive justice argued for in Chapter 1. But if we take this strategy to the
limit, it does not seem to leave much room for states to promote decency globally.
Attempts to further Goals 1 and 2 threaten to undermine the specialized focus on
sub-sets of the world's population that constitutes the core of that strategy.
There are two main ways to try to wriggle out of this problem. One might
attempt to dissolve the conflict in question by suggesting that a policy whereby
states focus exclusively on promoting the welfare of their own population is itself
the surest path to global decency over the long term. On this suggestion, the state
system can be expected to function like the market in the minds of some
economists: allowing the pursuit of domestic self-interest to maximize the global
good, with minimal need for constraint or adjustment. But this would surely be
overly optimistic. Not only are some specific ways of pursuing domestic
distributive justice apt to exert negative effects on the welfare of other
populations, perhaps working against the achievement of Goals 1 and 2, but an
exclusive focus on domestic distributive justice would presumably fail to promote
those goals, even if it did not actively undermine them. A second way to attempt
to eliminate the problem would be to claim that, in light of the genuine practical
conflict between global decency and domestic distributive justice, the former goal
ought to be rescinded. Our duties to promote justice in our own populations
show that an alleged responsibility to further the attainment of a minimally
decent life by people in other political communities is in fact unacceptable, even
if the result is a world in which billions of people continue to experience terrible
lives. It is difficult to see how utilitarianism could support such a position, given
the strong utilitarian argument for global decency given in 4.2 supra. The
suggestion is also hard to square with the strong pre-theoretical conviction that at
least many of us have that the failure of foreigners to attain a minimally decent
level of wellbeing generates moral demands on us.
Despite, then, the ultimate utilitarian reduction of both domestic and global
justice to a single concern, there is a practical conflict between the two goals that
allows for no easy escape. This conflict derives from the fact that the "global
division of moral labor" strategy pulls states in two directions. As Ellis explains,
"on the one hand, [states] have a derivative duty to their own citizens; on the
other hand, their fundamental duty is to the world at large. And...there may be
circumstances in which promoting the good of their own citizens is not
compatible with pursuing the more general goal" (1992, 173). In light of this
problem, a full defense of Goals 1 and 2 needs to show that they can be furthered
in a way that does not overly compromise our legitimate concerns with domestic
welfare promotion.l o8 Utilitarians need to furnish at least some general advice on
how to deal with the conflicts that will inevitably arise in the course of the joint
pursuit of both sets of goals.109 To illustrate the sort of guidance we need,
consider the following situations, in which a government must choose:
i. whether or not to implement a trade policy that would result in a
significant boost to domestic growth, but which would impose extreme
hardship on the worst-off lo% in a foreign country
ii. whether to use part of a budget surplus to fund special educational
programs for disadvantaged children domestically, or to instead
transfer it to an overseas development fund.
The first of these questions suggests a need to develop some "negative" duties
specifying certain things that societies ought not to do to other societies (or
certain outcomes for other societies that they ought to avoid) in their pursuit of
domestic distributive justice. The second suggests the need for some clarification
on how societies ought to balance their "positive" duties to promote domestic
goals against their positive duties to promote global goals. The following
discussion will be organized along these lines.11o
Negative duties
Our first task is to determine which decency-related constraints states should
recognize as limiting their pursuit of domestic distributive justice, or of domestic
welfare more generally. To do this, we need to answer two questions. First,
which broad types of harm to, or interference with, other states are states likely to
be led to in the course of domestic welfare promotion? Second, which of these
types of harm or interference should utilitarians be concerned to prohibit (with
or without the sanction of international law), given the goal of global decency?
108 If this seems to prejudice the issue in one direction, it should be pressed that the same applies
vice versa.
1o9 Utilitarians have not been very good at facing this problem head on. Goodin spends no time at
all on it in his 1995 paper. And Bentham gives a quick and unsatisfying solution to it the
introductory essay of his Principles of International Law (1789). We are told that, whereas "the
end of the conduct which a sovereign ought to observe relative to his own subjects" is "the greatest
happiness of the society concerned", "the end of the conduct he ought to observe towards other
men" is "the general end - the most extended welfare of all the nations on the earth." Perhaps in
Bentham's time it was slightly more plausible to suggest that conduct relative to one's co-
nationals could be distinguished from conduct relative to other people in this crisp fashion. But,
given the extensive interconnections between contemporary states, and their immense power to
effect both good and evil on others, the attempt is now hopeless.
110 I understand negative duties here in the usual way: as duties that prohibit certain specific kinds
of actions towards others - paradigmatically, forms of interference or aggression. Positive duties,
in contrast, are those that require actions to aid others: either in the form of the prevention of
harm or the provision of benefits. There is room for doubt about how sharply this distinction can
be drawn in practice. I will be focusing here on the clearer cases, so will not need to get into the
messier metaphysical details.
The instances of harm that spring most immediately to mind are of the
intentional kind: seizure or destruction of foreign resources, including land; the
enslavement or murder of foreign populations; and the erection of barriers to the
movement of goods or people across borders. But negative cross-border
externalities can also occur as the unintentional effect of economic or social
interaction. The global spread of diseases such as HIV-Aids or influenza presents
one example. Similarly, international trade in goods, services and capital has the
potential for significant negative effects on the satisficing scores of trading
partners, in particular by virtue of the increased vulnerability that it can generate
for the poor. Negative spillovers from the economic activity of states can also
extend to countries that are not themselves major trading partners, due to the
fact that the value of the resources that one party holds is in some cases partly
dependent on the amount of resources that others hold. Thus, as Robert Goodin
notes, (at least ceteris paribus) "for any commodity for which there is a
worldwide market, like oil, the more cash the rich peoples of the world have to
pay for it, the less of it the poor peoples of the world can afford to buy" (2002, 8).
The one area of genuine novelty in this familiar story of domestic welfare
promotion at foreign expense is arguably severe environmental harm, such as
global climate change, declining biodiversity and the depletion of energy sources.
Such harms result from domestic policy decisions whose effects are not - often
cannot - be contained within the borders of the country where they originate,
and have major economic and political implications in addition to their direct
environmental impact.111
Given the possibility of negative cross-border spillover effects such as the above,
what limits should utilitarians advocate on the ways in which states may pursue
domestic welfare, in light of the goal of global decency? Some of these limits are
relatively easy to discern: military aggression and territorial invasion, purely for
national gain, as well as violations of the basic rights of foreigners, are pretty
clearly ruled out. Recognition of negative duties of this kind is embodied in a
range of international treaty regimes that have evident utilitarian support.
However, the cases of economic and environmental externalities are more
difficult to deal with, in large part due to problems of information. The causes of
such externalities are harder to trace, making the actions that lead to them more
difficult to prohibit, and it is harder to know what the range of available
alternative policies is, making it unclear which within that range should be
preferred. Even when our focus is strictly on a domestic jurisdiction, and despite
decades of macroeconomic theory, we often do not know beforehand what the
effects of a given economic policy (say, an increase in the interest rate) will be,
nor, if we do foresee certain undesirable events (e.g. rising inflation), how best to
avoid them. These difficulties are magnified when our focus of concern includes
the economies of multiple other countries.
m11 The news is not all bad where cross-border externalities are concerned. As Goodin notes, some
such externalities may be positive - where justice in one jurisdiction "prove[s] "catching"
worldwide" - or neutral - where "the benefits to the cause of justice (at home and abroad) more
than [offset] harms" (2002, 7). But these happier cases are not our topic here, and are in any
case likely to be less common.
In the face of such difficulties, we will not be able to identify a comprehensive list
of specific types of domestic economic or environmental policy that should be
prohibited or constrained on grounds of global decency. At the same time,
however, given these same informational problems, it is not helpful to resort to
such generalities as the claim that "every proceeding---every arrangement, by
which the given nation should do more evil to foreign nations taken together,
whose interests must be affected, than it should do good to itself" should be
regarded as a "positive crime" (Bentham, 1789). This suggestion is quite
unworkable as the basis for political action, given that we are very rarely going to
have the kind of information available to determine whether or not the condition
that it specifies is satisfied. What we need is a principle, or principles, of an
intermediate nature: general enough to accommodate the fact of our limited
knowledge in this area, but also specific enough to furnish some genuine
guidance. I suggest the following:
Reasonable Care.
i. In promoting domestic welfare, a political community A ought to take
reasonable care to avoid a foreseeable reduction, as a result of its
activities, in the satisficing scores of other political communities.
ii. Where A's activities would result in a significant increase in A's satisficing
score that could not be obtained otherwise, and where some foreseeable
reduction of a foreign political community B's satisficing score as a result
of those activities is unavoidable, A ought to take reasonable care to
ensure that the reduction in B's score is as small as possible.
iii. Where, despite satisfaction of i) and ii), a significant reduction in B's
satisficing score does occur as a result of A's activities, and where A has a
significantly higher satisficing score than B, A ought to provide
compensation to B for that reduction.12
If this principle (or set of principles) is to be rendered fully precise, more will
need to be said about what "reasonable care" involves in clauses i) and ii); what
"significant increase", "significant reduction" and "significantly higher" involve in
clauses ii) and iii); and about the type and degree of compensation required in
iii). Something will also have to be said to ease reasonable doubts about the
possibility of determining in practice a) what a political community's satisficing
score is, and b) whether the cause of any reduction in that score is genuinely or
primarily the activity of another political community. In many cases, reductions
might be traced instead to the policies of the community itself, to the activities of
other political communities, to luck, or, perhaps most frequently, to some
combination of all of the above.
112 This principle takes off in part from the principles of "due care" advocated independently by
Henry Shue (1997) and Aaron James (2005, 1o).
These are not just details. If these matters cannot be sufficiently nailed down, the
principle will be indeterminate and open to manipulation.ll13 Although there is a
limit to how much precision it is sensible to aim for here, I think that it would be
both possible and helpful to establish some outer bounds in each of these areas.
In the meantime, however, my view is that the above principle does already, as it
stands, allow for some determinate and intuitively appealing conclusions about
acceptable and unacceptable cross-border externalities. We now, for instance,
can explain in some more detail what exactly is wrong, from the perspective of a
concern with global decency, with military aggression, territorial invasion, or
violations of the basic rights of foreigners, purely for national gain. Such activities
are very likely to reduce the satisficing scores of the foreign communities
affected; what increase they do afford in the aggressing community's satisficing
score (often not much) could very likely be obtained otherwise, with less negative
external impact; and the prospect of compensation after the event is generally
very far from the agenda. Moreover, beyond these antecedently clearer examples,
Reasonable Care also provides us with resources to decide less obvious cases.
To see this, take the example with which we started, in which a government must
decide whether or not to implement a trade policy that would result in a
significant boost to domestic growth in its country, C, but which would impose
extreme hardship on the worst-off lo% in a foreign country, D. Assume that the
hardship in question either cannot or will not be compensated for. Reasonable
Care prompts us to ask a number of questions. First, is there any alternative
growth-promoting policy available to C that would forseeably not have such a
devastating effect on D? Second, would the boost to C's domestic growth from
the proposed policy translate into a significant increase in C's satisficing score?
Third, does C have a significantly higher satisficing score than D?114 If the answer
to the first of these questions is affirmative, Reasonable Care would cast doubt
on the propriety of the policy. If the answer is instead negative, the second and
third questions come into play. The possible answer combinations are as follows,
with Y standing for "yes", N standing for "no", and the answers given in the order
of the questions above: a) NN; b) NY; c) YY; d) YN. If the answers are as given in
a), b) and c), the policy looks impermissible under Reasonable Care. If the
answers are instead as given in d), the policy might be permitted. No doubt there
will be many instances where the precise implications depend more delicately on
the details of the case. What Reasonable Care does provide us with in such cases
is a way of organizing those details in a way that makes them more amenable to
moral reflection.
113 Sykes raises concerns of this kind in his 2003, in regard to the GAIT "escape clause" (Article
XIX), which permits countries to impose temporary trade barriers in order to protect industries
that suffer "serious injury" or the threat of it due to "increased quantities" of imports. Sykes
claims that effective application of this clause has proven impossible in practice due to a failure to
settle such interpretive issues as the baseline against which increased quantities of imports are to
be measured, the nature of "serious injury", and the criteria for determining whether or not
increased imports cause such injury, or the threat thereof.
114 Some of these questions are going to be very difficult to answer. It therefore pays to reiterate
the emphasis on forseeability and the taking of reasonable care.
Positive duties
I argued in the previous sub-section that political communities should be trying
not to reduce other political communities' satisficing scores, or, if they must
reduce them, to reduce them by as little as possible and, in some cases, to provide
compensation where the reduction is significant. I think that this sums up well
the decency-related negative constraints on domestic welfare promotion that
political communities ought to recognize. But respect for these requirements
alone, while important, will not suffice to exhaust the duties of political
communities where the promotion of global decency is concerned. Our goal is
not merely to avoid making the global satisficing score worse than it already is:
we also want to improve it. On the face of it, this would seem to require positive
assistance from some political communities to others.
How far should positive duties of assistance extend? An acceptable answer to this
question needs to steer between two extremes: it must not undermine the
specialized focus on sub-sets of the world's population that constitutes the core of
the global division of moral labor, but nor must it fail to give the demands of
global decency their due. A satisfactory answer also needs to be sensitive to the
fact that countries plausibly vary in the degree to which they are morally required
to positively further the satisficing scores of other countries. This is so for the
following reasons: i) some countries are incapable of doing anything in that
regard, ii) some countries are capable of doing something, but only at cost to
their own satisficing score, and iii) some countries are much less capable of doing
something than others, or only at much greater cost. Points i) and ii) suggest that
we need to specify a certain threshold of capacity beyond which these duties kick
in. Point iii) suggests that when these duties do kick in, the extent of their
demands should vary, at least to some extent, according to capacity.
We can think about the preceding desiderata in terms of two questions. Which
countries are in the game of positively promoting the satisficing scores of other
countries? And how much, or what kind of, discretionary space for the pursuit of
domestic welfare do those in the game need if the global division of moral labor is
to be preserved? The first of these questions can be swiftly answered. Countries
with a very low satisficing score are not themselves under any positive
requirement to increase the satisficing scores of other countries: either because
they are incapable of doing so, or because their doing so would be so costly for
them as to result in little or no overall gain in global decency. (A plausible way to
render this suggestion more specific would be to claim that positive decency
duties kick in when a country's per capita income, PPP adjusted, is roughly at or
above the level of the OECD countries). The second question requires lengthier
treatment.
The following are what I take to be the two main strategies available for
determining what limits political communities ought to recognize on the positive
demands of global decency promotion, so as to preserve the global division of
moral labor:
Other-centered. Specify certain kinds of decency-related interest in the
members of foreign populations that ground a demand on other political
communities to positively further those interests, and certain kinds of
decency-related interest that do not.
Agent-centered. Either specify a degree of sacrifice on the part of a
political community beyond which that community is not required to go in
positively furthering global decency beyond its borders, or specify a certain
weight to be given to the interests of that community as against the value
of promoting global decency internationally.
Elfstrom's proposal regarding cross-border positive duties is of the other-
centered variety. He writes:
When leaders face conflicts between meeting the basic wants of their own
constituents and those of aliens, they are justified in placing their own nations
first. However, they are not entitled to place the lesser concerns of their own
citizens ahead of the vital concerns of others in cases where these clash. (199o,
27)
Elfstrom defines basic wants as the "biologically-determined necessities of life",
i.e. as that subset of decency interests that I referred to in Goal 2 as "basic needs".
The restriction of positive global decency duties to the promotion of basic needs
certainly places some brakes on the extent to which the former will detract from
domestic welfare promotion. But it has three defects. The first is the weakness of
the rationale for giving the biologically-determined wants of foreigners strict
priority over the non-biologically-determined wants of compatriots. I suggested
in chapter 1 that such goods as food, shelter and health care are only a subset of
the goods necessary for a minimally decent life. But if this is so, it is not at all
obvious that aliens' needs for, say, food should take systematic priority over
constituents' needs for, say, education. The second problem with Elfstrom's
proposal is that it appears to take the promotion of the more ambitious aspects of
Goal 1 - which incorporates satisfaction of the non-biologically-determined
wants just mentioned - entirely off the menu. Given that political communities
are the agents most capable by far of promoting Goal 1, this strategy would
effectively equate to denying the importance of that goal, something that I do not
think that utilitarians can reasonably do. The third defect is that, even given the
basic needs restriction, this strategy looks likely to imperil the global division of
moral labor. Presumably a developed country such as Australia, whose score on
basic needs satisfaction is already high, would be required on this proposal to
devote almost all of its attention to ensuring that the basic needs of the
inhabitants of the developing world were satisfied.11s I am inclined to think that,
115 This suggestion in fact looks worrisome even purely from the perspective of global decency,
given that the persistence of countries the great majority of whose members flourish well beyond
the attainment of decency is plausibly an important contributor to the eventual attainment of
decency worldwide. Insofar as it is developed countries that will provide the mix of markets,
technology, knowledge, employment and aid resources that are needed to raise the majority of the
at least given the current state of the world, this third problem undermines not
only Elfstrom's particular variant of the other-centered approach, but that
approach in general.
That leaves us with the agent-centered strategy. A simple suggestion is to specify
the relevant sacrifice in terms of a fixed percentage of GDP. This suggestion is
unpromising for two reasons: first, the monetary focus reveals a naive
understanding of what the promotion of Goals 1 and 2 requires in terms of
foreign assistance, and second, the selection of a fixed percentage is not well
placed to accommodate changes in global satisficing scores over time. The
amount of sacrifice that might be appropriate now may be either too small if
global deprivation worsens in coming decades, or too large if it improves. A more
sophisticated proposal involves specifying a certain constant weight W to be
given to the value of domestic welfare promotion as against that of global decency
when making resource allocations. This proposal is flexible enough to
accommodate changes in the situation of the global poor over time. But it may be
too flexible. If some set of new (expensive) technologies suddenly massively
increased our ability to further global decency, this approach might whittle down
to an unacceptable level the amount of discretionary space permitted to affluent
countries.
Mulgan's work on the cognate issue of the beneficence duties of individualsl 6"
suggests the following as a promising alternative. Perhaps instead of setting W at
a constant value, we should allow it to vary, non-proportionately, with the
amount of global decency achievement at stake (2002, 267 ff.). In other words,
the amount of extra weight that a political community would be permitted to give
to the promotion of domestic welfare over the promotion of global decency would
increase with the amount of global decency achievement at stake, although the
former not as sharply as the latter. Whatever one thinks of this idea as part of an
account of the primary demands of morality (where, as will come as no surprise, I
do not sign on), it has several promising features when construed as an account
of the secondary demands of global distributive justice. It is better placed than
the other-centered strategy to preserve the global division of moral labor, insofar
as it incorporates a presumption in favor of at least some degree of co-citizen
priority. But it is also well placed to respond to the demands of global decency.
Not only the basic needs of foreigners, but decency taken more generously, are
understood as placing competing demands on political communities, demands
which, while they may lessen in extent, do not go away as the cost of fulfilling
them in a given instance increases. Moreover, given that the sacrifice in question
is construed not in absolute terms, but rather in terms of cost to the assisting
world's population out of poverty, an immense decline in the standard of living of existing
developed countries would be counter-productive (c.f. 6.3.3 infira).
n6 This question, while distinct from the one that we are interested in, is nonetheless clearly
isomorphic to it, in the following sense. It concerns the extent to which morality requires positive
furthering of the interests of the world's population, given the assumption that a certain degree of
partiality towards a subset of that population (in the individual case, oneself and one's near and
dear) is morally justified.
community, this strategy is able to accommodate differences in capacity to
promote decency across political communities.
Nonetheless, the proposal as sketched above suffers from one rather serious
defect from an indirect utilitarian perspective: it is unclear how it is supposed to
guide us in making policy decisions. Consider the question with which we began:
that of whether a government ought to use part of a budget surplus to fund
special educational programs for disadvantaged children domestically, or instead
to transfer it to an overseas development fund. On the approach under
consideration, the answer to this question will depend on a) the cost to domestic
welfare of foregoing the educational programs, b) the contribution to global
decency that would be produced by the development fund with the resources in
question, and c) the value of the variable W, taking into account both of these
things. Saying this does not seem to take us very far in the direction of an
answer, primarily (though not solely) because we so far have no idea of how to
determine what W ought to be. This is unsatisfying, and - to end with a whimper
- I am not sure what to do about it. While I do think that the agent-centered
approach briefly outlined here is the most promising of those available to
utilitarians, this may not be saying all that much. The good news for utilitarians is
that it is not clear that anyone else has a better idea.117
4-5 Conclusion
There are several remaining questions regarding global decency that I have not
had the space to address here. One issue concerns matters of fairness in the
distribution across developed countries of responsibility to promote Goals 1 and
2.18 This question divides into two. What initial distribution of responsibility
would be fair? And how does a political community's responsibility to do its fair
share respond to the failure of other communities to do theirs? (Is that
community required to do less, more, or the same as what it would have been
required to do under full compliance?) Another important issue is that of
whether or not failures of domestic distributive justice alter the global decency
duties of foreign communities. (If a country such as Brazil avoidably fails to
secure domestic distributive justice, does the developed world continue to have
17 Perhaps the situation is slightly better than presented. After unearthing some similar
difficulties in formulating a principle of individual beneficence, Murphy writes that "we have not
found a plausible principle of beneficence, but rather only the form of one" (2000, 71, italics in
original). He then claims that this allows us to at least "know what we are trying to guess at, and
this opens the space for good-faith argument about what kind of life would satisfy the principle in
practice". Maybe something similar can be said here.
118 Murphy calls this a "second-level" moral question, and distinguishes it from the sort of first-
level questions of fairness that I discuss in the following chapter:
Once we have specified an aim that all people are plausibly thought to be responsible for,
we can ask the question of how collective responsibility for the aim devolves into the
responsibilities of individuals. It is at this stage that what we could call a second-level
moral thought arises: responsibility should be allocated such that compliance effects are
fairly distributed (2000, 105).
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an (undiminished) positive duty to promote decency in the Brazilian population?)
A further set of issues concerns how the assistance provided by affluent political
communities ought to be allocated across communities in need (including the
question of how aid resources ought to be allocated between Goals 1 and 2).119
Finally, there are questions about the decency-related duties of collective agents
other than states, such as corporations or international institutions.
Although there remains plenty to be said, then, I think that this chapter has
provided a helpful background against which to address these and other
remaining questions. I have explained why we should care about the attainment
by individuals of a minimally decent level of wellbeing; argued for a specific
interpretation of what we should be aiming for at the global level where that ideal
is concerned, in terms of two relatively precise goals; defended those goals
against the potential charge that states can do little to further them; and provided
some suggestions concerning how any conflicts that might arise between global
decency and the goals of collective self-determination and domestic welfare
promotion are to be negotiated. I think that the resulting proposal, if incomplete,
is one well placed to appeal to a range of non-utilitarians, while nonetheless
retaining strong utilitarian support.
119 See Rubenstein 2oo6, pp. 29-32, for five reasons why utilitarians should not necessarily favor
"development aid" over "humanitarian aid".
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Chapter 5. Fairness and Equality
5.1. Beyond decency
This chapter concerns what utilitarians ought to say about goals of global
distributive justice other than the attainment by individuals of a minimally
decent level of wellbeing. The few utilitarian theorists of global distributive
justice who we find in print either deny that such goals exist, or postpone
indefinitely addressing them in any detail. Instead they restrict themselves to the
question of how to further global decency (or something like it), treating it, for all
intents and purposes, as our sole distributive concern at the global level.'20 Two
features of utilitarianism arguably make a minimalist approach of this kind
attractive. One is that, as mentioned at the beginning of the previous chapter,
utilitarians find themselves squarely within their comfort zone when addressing
matters of decency. The relationship of the goals that I discuss in this chapter to
welfare maximization is less immediately apparent. The second feature is the
central role assigned within utilitarianism to strategic constraints, such as limits
on information, motivation and coordination. The fact that such constraints are
intensified at the global level might be felt to call for scaled-back ambitions once
utilitarians move beyond the bounds of the state.121
I find this minimalist strategy unattractive, for the following reasons. For one, a
theory of global distributive justice that fails to address issues other than
decency will be unable to help us to compare, on grounds of justice, institutional
arrangements with different distributional implications in the supra-decent
domain. Questions of this kind are not only apparently well formed; they are
also pressing. We do not think that justice permits global institutions or agents
whose practices or decisions have highly significant distributive consequences to
do just anything they please, merely because the consequences in question do
not implicate the basic wellbeing of those they affect. Second, there are some
commonly raised moral reasons for and against particular policies or
institutions, especially within the context of collective activity, that an exclusive
concern with the attainment of decent levels of wellbeing does not allow us to
accommodate. Perhaps these reasons are in the end uncompelling, but
utilitarians ought to at least have something to say about them, even if they
120 Elfstrom, for instance, writes: "In general terms the position of this work is that all have a
strong obligation to work to satisfy basic wants wherever they are found, but a much weaker
obligation to look after the secondary wants of each and every human being (199o, 15) - and then
spends no time at all on the second kind of obligation. Similarly, Goodin (1985) confines his
global concerns to "protecting the vulnerable", where the latter are presented as those persons
whose basic welfare interests are at risk. Goodin, to be fair, explicitly presents the principle of
protecting the vulnerable as a "partial principle of morality" making "no claim to order the entire
moral universe" (1985, 117); nonetheless, it is all that he offers.
121 Thus, Elfstrom justifies his focus at the global level on "basic wants" by means of the claim that
"for the most part they are easily measured and relatively easily met", whereas 'secondary wants'
"vary widely and often unpredictably" and their satisfaction "depend[s] on the working of a social
context, something not easily supplied by outsiders" (1990, 16o).
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finally reject them. Third, there is a concern about inconsistency. If there are no
concerns beyond decency at the global level, but there are such concerns at the
domestic level, as most utilitarians want to say, we need to be given an argument
explaining what makes for the difference. If this argument is not convincingly
made, concerns beyond decency at the domestic level may themselves begin to
look suspect. Finally, there are substantive utilitarian reasons for thinking that
adherence to principles of global distributive justice focused exclusively on
decency would not serve to maximize aggregate utility. Some of the same
utilitarian reasons for supporting supra-humanitarian norms of justice within
the state plausibly extend to global politics - although, as I will argue below,
both the arguments and the resulting principles are likely to be different in
nature.
One commonly expressed distributive concern beyond, or other than, decency is
the treatment of individuals in accordance with principles of fairness. Another is
the obtaining of a certain degree of equality across those individuals along certain
dimensions. Neither of these concerns wears its friendliness to utilitarianism on
its face: appeals to fairness have a distinctly deontological air, and an interest in
equality may seem to sit poorly with the ultimate focus of utilitarianism on the
sum total of welfare. This chapter attempts to go beyond these initial
appearances, to consider the question of whether or not there is, after all, an
indirect utilitarian case for fairness and equality, in the domain of global politics
in particular. The verdict is a mixed one. I argue in the first part of the chapter
that a concern for distributive fairness can and should be incorporated into the
framework of utilitarianism, and then draw out the implications of that idea
within a range of contexts of international association. In the second part of the
chapter I turn to the question of whether or not considerations of equality ought
to play a normative role in global politics, independently of their connection to
decency or fairness. I argue that, in this second case, the skeptics are correct, and
that, at least for now, the utilitarian case for global equality, unlike like that for
global fairness, is a difficult one to make.
5.2 Fairness and distributive justice
Before turning to the questions of why utilitarians ought to care about fairness,
and of how it might apply to matters of global distribution, I need to say
something about how I will be understanding the idea of fairness in the
discussion to follow. Rather than attempt to provide a full analysis of the
concept, I will simply appeal to two norms that I take to be central elements or
instances of it. The first of these is the norm of non-discrimination, which
requires that if a given practice results in an unequal distribution of benefits
across individuals (net, i.e. taking into account burdens also imposed), this
departure from equality must be given a special, non-arbitrary justification. The
second norm is that of reciprocity, or fair return, which requires that, "if others
have incurred costs in order to produce benefits for you...you should be prepared
to incur similar costs in order to produce similar benefits" for those others
(Goodin 1992, 23). In many cases an ideal of reciprocity mandates return not of a
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good, but rather of an act: adherence to a set of rules (ibid., 26). When, for
instance, you benefit from the sacrifices made by others in complying with the
rules of the market, reciprocity requires that you similarly comply. I think that
most canonical instances of fairness or unfairness can be understood in relation
to these two norms.
Fairness, in both its non-discrimination and reciprocity variants, applies in many
settings and to many things. My concern with it here is restricted in two ways.
First, I am exclusively concerned with what I will call structural fairness. As I
understand it here, structural fairness applies exclusively to social institutions,
structures or practices (henceforth "structures") that satisfy the following five
conditions. First, the collective behavior that goes to constitute the structure
must exhibit a certain degree of regularity: it must be relatively stable, patterned
and predictable. Second, the behavior in question must be intentional: the result
of the purposeful aims of a set of agents. Third, that behavior must be
normatively guided: sustained by adherence to a system of rules or norms, of
varying degrees of formality or explicitness, compliance with which is expected of
participants. Fourth, the structure in question must have determinate and
reasonably significant effects on the interests of those who are associated with it.
Fifth, there must exist feasible alternatives to some aspects of the structure that
would have different effects. We can call these conditions, respectively,
regularity, intentionality, normativity, significance and alterability. In what
follows I will term "contexts of governance" those structures that satisfy these five
conditions, and the view that structural fairness applies exclusively to those
contexts the "governance conception" of structural fairness.122 The second way
in which my focus here is restricted is that I will be concerned only with one
particular kind of structural fairness, viz. the distributive rather than the
procedural variety. I am interested here, that is, in fairness regarding the
distribution of benefits and burdens across individuals rather than such
procedural requirements as transparency, absence of bias, and consistent
adherence to established rules in the making of public decisions.
My view is that distributive structural fairness is the type of fairness with which
distributive justice is primarily concerned.123 It is also, I suggest, something that
we are all familiar with. In particular we are familiar with it as applied to one
particular salient structure: the domestic basic structure. However, it is
important to keep in mind that it is only one variety of fairness, if a particularly
122 This approach loosely follows James (following Rawls), who advocates what he terms a
governance conception of justice (2005, 3), of which fairness is seen as a part (perhaps the whole
part).
As I understand it, structural fairness applies only to structures that are already in place. This
means that the fact that some structure or other does not exist cannot itself be regarded as
structurally unfair. In investigating the fairness of some structure, we first identify some form of
treatment within that structure, and then ask whether or not it is equitable. We do not identify
some form of desirable treatment and then ask how it might be extended to those currently
excluded from it.
123 This would explain why many of us feel it inappropriate to speak of fairness in cake-cutting, or
in other kinds of small-scale interpersonal relations, as a matter of distributive justice per se.
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significant one. Although from now on, for economy, I will be referring to
distributive, structural fairness as "fairness" simpliciter, what I say both about
what it involves, and about how it is justified, may or may not extend to other
cases, and should be taken with that caveat.124
I want to note, before moving on, one final point that will be important in the
ensuing discussion. This is the fact that the distributive outcomes that are
implied by the norms of reciprocity and non-discrimination are apt to vary,
according to the particular context of governance at issue. Three of the more
prominent possibilities are the following:
i. Equality. Sometimes, if a given context of governance is to satisfy the norms
of reciprocity and/or non-discrimination, it must ensure a degree of equality in
certain goods across individuals. Many arguments for material egalitarianism
within the state are based on arguments from fairness of this kind. The standard
non-discrimination variant goes as follows. There exists a range of alternative
ways in which basic social and economic institutions might be arranged, each of
which will have different implications for the distribution of standard goods
across the population. There is no reason to think that any individual has a prior
claim to an index of standard goods that is greater than that of any other
individual. Therefore, if we are to ensure that our society does not discriminate,
in its basic structure, against some of its members, we ought to aim for an
egalitarian distribution. One version of the reciprocity variant, on the other
hand, goes thus. In complying with the laws of their state, those at the lower end
of the distribution of standard goods often suffer significant burdens, which
redound to the benefit of those who are much better off.125 If the better off are
not to free-ride on the sacrifices of the worst-off, they ought to be prepared to
make sacrifices of their own. One attractive way to do this is to arrange the basic
structure of society so as to ensure that the index of standard goods held by the
worst off is, even if lower than that of others, at least as acceptable to the worst-
off as it possibly can be (Rawls 1971). Again, this argument gets us to a degree of
material egalitarianism.
ii. Specific goods. Fairness might require, in some contexts, the guarantee of
certain specific goods. One situation in which such requirements are plausible is
where the provision of a specific good or set of goods is a condition of full and
effective participation in some cooperative practice. To take the domestic
example again, if a society is to be fair in its basic structure, its members will at
the very least require access to some basic necessities in order to avoid being
taken advantage of by their better-off fellow members. If this is so, there will be
124 I should mention that I will here also be exclusively considering "first-order" rather than
"second-order" questions of fairness. Murphy uses this terminology to distinguish between "a
concern with a fair distribution as in itself a moral aim, and a concern with a fair distribution as a
(moral) condition on a group's pursuit of some other aim" (2000, 105) (see fn 118 supra).
125 One benefits from not having one's car stolen, of course. But, as van Parijs (1995) has
emphasized, one also benefits from the fact that other people fill undesirable positions in the
labor market - including, in a less than full-employment economy, that of no labor at all - that
one might otherwise have had to fill oneself.
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an additional fairness case, beyond that founded on decency, for the prevention
of absolute deprivation and some specific forms of disadvantage.126
iii. Something in between. In some cases fairness might require not the
guarantee of a specific good or set of goods, nor the securing of a significant
degree of equality in goods across individuals, but rather something
intermediate between the two. Cohen and Sabel (2006) claim that, within
certain associative contexts, a norm of what they term "inclusion" imposes
distributive requirements that go beyond the satisfaction of basic human needs,
while nonetheless stopping short of the demands of egalitarianism. This norm of
inclusion requires that people be treated "as members, whose good counts for
something", and is violated when people are left out: "treated by consequential
rule-making processes as if-beyond the humanitarian minimum owed even in
the absence of any cooperation-they count for nothing". Where distribution is
concerned, we are told, inclusion requires that people get "an acceptable share,
decent opportunities or reasonable improvements". While this will presumably
result in a distribution of goods that is more equal than that which obtains
where the requirement is not satisfied, the increase in equality is a side effect
rather than the goal. We can point to two main reasons why fairness might
require such intermediate distributive requirements within some contexts of
governance. First, it may be that substantive egalitarianism is not in fact an
accessible institutional option in the context at issue. Second, an equal
distribution in the case at hand might in fact violate the norms of non-
discrimination or reciprocity.127 Distributive equality will be required by the
norm of non-discrimination only when the claims of individuals to a given set of
standard goods are in fact equal. In some contexts, this will not be the case:
perhaps because some have been more closely associated with the production of
the goods at issue than have others, or because a morally acceptable system of
legal rights has assigned prior entitlements to those goods that ought to be
respected. Similarly, if some contribute more to a cooperative venture than do
others, reciprocity may require that the former also gain more: that the
inequality of the contribution be reflected in the inequality of the goods
distribution.
5.3 Why fairness matters
126 In saying this, however, we need to keep in mind the scope restriction on structural fairness
(see fn 122 supra). This additional fairness reason will apply only to individuals who are already
at least partly "in the game". What is unfair in such cases is that some people who are
participating do not have enough resources to avoid being taken advantage of, not that some are
not participating at all.
127 This is not the line that Cohen and Sabel themselves have in mind. They explicitly deny that
the norm of inclusion is derivative from the idea of non-discrimination, writing that "the concern
expressed is not with a failure to treat [the worst-off] as equals, owed equal concern, status, and
opportunity", and that no "assumption that all inequality requires an especially compelling
justification" is at work. Nor is reciprocity explicitly at issue (or even fairness, for that matter). I
am not sure what is to be gained from treating inclusion as an independent norm in this way,
once we divorce distributive equality (in outcome) from equal consideration, as I am doing in this
section.
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The preceding discussion has presented an account of the nature of structural
fairness, and a suggestion of the range of distributive outcomes that it might
imply. Utilitarians, as much as anyone else, are able to accept such an account,
and to point to institutions and practices as unfair on its basis. Where
utilitarians are sometimes thought to come into difficulties is in regard to the
moral import of a diagnosis of unfairness, once established. It is hard for some
to accept that appeals to fairness can matter to a utilitarian. Part of the reason
for this is that norms of fairness seem to have the wrong form for that purpose.
Fairness differs from decency in three respects that make it seem much less
amenable to utilitarian co-option than the latter goal. Fairness, first, makes no
explicit reference to welfare, employing instead the distinct, and not especially
welfarist, notions of benefit and burden. Second, unlike decency, fairness is
essentially comparative: it is the relation between the treatment received by two
or more individuals that determines whether or not they are being fairly treated.
Third, again unlike decency, non-discrimination and reciprocity do not directly
call for any specific distributive outcome: they look more like a formal constraint
on the way in which goals might be pursued than themselves a state of affairs at
which we might aim.
I think that we should not be misled by the surface structure of norms of fairness
into assuming that the latter are incapable of being incorporated into the
repertoire of utilitarianism. The way forward here involves thinking of fairness
not as a set of abstract principles, but rather as a kind of social practice. Reasons
to be fair, for a utilitarian, will spring from reasons to promote that kind of
practice. From a consequentialist perspective, these reasons will reduce to the
valuable outcomes that such a practice generates, and/or the disvaluable
outcomes that it prevents.
I think that we can connect fair treatment to two distinct sorts of outcome that
utilitarians should value. The first of these is the promotion of socially
beneficial cooperation. A (confirmed) expectation of fair treatment tends to
encourage sustained participation in cooperative projects. When people get a
fair share of the gains of collective activity, they are much more likely to willingly
participate and reciprocate than to defect or become hostile. In explaining this
tendency, we can point to a plausible fact about motivation. It is hard to sustain
commitment to a collective activity when there is not much in it for you.
Fairness gets around this problem by usually ensuring that there is at least
something "in it" for everyone involved. Its non-discrimination element ensures
that, except in special cases, a minority will not take all of the gains or avoid all
of the costs, and its reciprocity element ensures that, on balance, those who give
will also get. The increased cooperation that is thereby promoted is plausibly of
significant utilitarian value. Some welfare-enhancing activities cannot be done
at all in the absence of cooperation; many others can be done faster, more
effectively, more easily and/or more enjoyably in its presence.
This argument might be rejected in one (or both) of two ways. One could deny
the empirical claim that fair practices promote cooperation, or one could deny
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that this fact, even if true, properly accounts for our commitment to fairness.
Although the empirical claim seems very plausible to me, I acknowledge both
that it is controversial and that more evidence than I can muster here would be
required to fully back it up. Two things, however, can be said in its defense. The
first is that some empirical research does suggest a correlation between
cooperation and increased likelihood of fair treatment, or between unfair
treatment and reduced cooperation. One finding is that people appear more
likely to act fairly towards others in laboratory contexts when their partner is
given a role as an active participant or cooperator rather than as a passive
recipient.128 Another suggestive, real world, example is provided by a study of
industrial relations at Firestone tire plants in the mid-199o's (Krueger and Mas
2004). A 1994 proposal to deviate from a longstanding industry-wide bargain
with labor unions in a way detrimental to workers, even while the company was
enjoying a profit increase, resulted in labor strife at an Illinois plant, followed by
a marked increase in consumer reports of defective tires from that plant, in
comparison with other similar plants where labor strife was absent. The second,
more backhand, defense of an appeal to the connection between fairness and
cooperation points to the fact that at least some non-utilitarians (in particular,
social contract theorists) help themselves to the same idea in the course of
constructing their theories of justice.
Although I think that the cooperation-fostering argument does provide an
important part of the utilitarian case for fair practices, it cannot provide the
whole story. This is because, even if fairness sometimes promotes cooperation,
it clearly is not always necessary for that end. Often we can get people to
cooperate purely by either coercing them, or by appealing directly to their self-
interest. Therefore, if the argument currently under view were the only one
available, utilitarianism would only support practices of fairness in some
contexts - and perhaps not even some of the ones we most care about.
(Structural unfairness in domestic politics, for instance, does not in many cases
stop people cooperating with the state). Especially in cases where participation
is non-voluntary, then, utilitarians who want to co-opt fairness need to
supplement the foregoing argument with some other reason for caring about fair
outcomes. That second, supplementary, reason, I now want to suggest, is the
128 The most well known laboratory experiment in this area is the "Ultimatum Game", in which
one player suggests a one-off division of a sum of money between him/herself and another player
that the latter is free to either accept or reject. Pure self-interest suggests that the proposer ought
to suggest the smallest possible amount, given that identities are hidden and no repeat round is in
the offing. However:
....Time and again, across hundreds of experiments in highly heterogeneous cultural
circumstances and with amounts ranging from one hour's to one week's local wages,
observed offers are substantially higher and, even so, rejections are often observed. In
many experiments the modal (most frequent) offer is actually at 50%. (World Bank 2005,
80, citing Henrich et al., 2004).
The interesting fact that I refer to in the text is that in the "Dictator Game" variant, when the
receiver has no power to reject the offer, positive offers are both rarer and smaller.
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fact that fairness, in at least many core cases, has broadly egalitarian
implications. As we have seen, a tendency towards equality is built into the
underlying notions of reciprocity and non-discrimination when they are applied
to some salient contexts of collective activity. Sometimes those norms require
significant equality in outcome; often they place limits on the more significant
departures from it. If this is so, in many cases we will be able to employ the
desirability of equality (or the undesirability of extreme inequality) as an
argument for fairness.
This move of course shifts the burden of argument to that of showing why
utilitarians - welfare consequentialism's committed sum-rankers - should care
about equality. The answer is that, in some cases, inequalities in resources,
broadly construed, inhibit welfare maximization. This point was pressed in
regard to the case of domestic politics in Chapter 1. There I suggested that
considerations relating to the diminishing marginal utility of resources, the
dynamics of social-political relations, and (perhaps) the determinants of
economic growth together provide a utilitarian case for limits on inequality of
resources. If this claim is correct, it suggests that appeals to principles of
fairness in domestic politics (of the kind mentioned in the previous section) have
utilitarian support. Can we extrapolate from this case in order to generate a
quite general utilitarian argument for fairness on the basis of considerations of
equality? Although it might make the project of defending utilitarianism easier if
we could generate such an argument, I think that a simple extrapolation would
be too hasty. This is because the egalitarian arguments given in the domestic
case are predicated on some fairly specific features of the domestic context.
Some of those arguments depend on the presence of a particular set of social-
political relations, others depend on factors of practical feasibility and
institutional capacity that may be absent elsewhere. If we are to employ the fact
of diminishing marginal utility or the possible equality-growth connection to
egalitarian effect, for instance, we need to be able to show that the act of
redistribution will not itself, through administrative inefficiencies or incentive
effects, soak up all of the potential gains. In the domestic context this seems
possible at least up to a certain extent; in other contexts it may not be.
The moral here is that utilitarians should admit that not all cases in which the
norms of non-discrimination and reciprocity apply, as a conceptual matter, are
necessarily going to get utilitarian approval. Utilitarians cannot give those
norms a blanket endorsement, but need to examine their attractiveness on a
more piecemeal basis, as applied to specific associative contexts. They need to
ask of each such context not only "does fairness apply here?", but also, if it does,
"is this the sort of fairness that utilitarians should care about?129 The lesson of
the preceding discussion is that the utilitarian case for caring about distributive
129 It is important to emphasize that this question is being proposed as a justificatory test, not as a
decision procedure. Utilitarians should not, that is, advocate that we consider, when faced with
the option of performing a particular act of fairness, whether or not acting fairly in that particular
instance would promote socially beneficial cooperation and/or a desirable form of equality. Such
a suggestion would forcefully raise a variant of the "instability" objection mentioned below.
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fairness is going to be stronger in contexts of governance where a) participation
is voluntary, and/or b) equality of the distribuand at issue is both desirable and
feasible.13o
To sum up, I have argued that utilitarians have reason to endorse fairness
insofar as it promotes socially beneficial cooperation, and/or results in a
tendency towards equality (in standard goods, or in some other distribuand)
that has an independent utilitarian rationale. I find this argument for fairness
satisfying, but non-utilitarians are likely to raise against it variants of the three
standard forms of objection to indirect utilitarianism that I listed at 1.2 supra.
They will claim, first, that the argument is a case of wishful thinking, given that
fairness does not necessarily or even usually serve utility. They will claim,
second, that it offers us the wrong reasons for caring about fair treatment: that
fairness is not fairness at all if it is but the servant of utility. And they will claim,
third, that this account renders the case for being fair in any given instance
overly unstable. The presumption that fairness will contribute to utility is
defeasible: when acting fairly conflicts with maximizing utility, utilitarians will
have to let their commitment to fairness slide.
I have taken some of the wind out of the first of these objections, by admitting
that fairness should only be endorsed by utilitarians in some associative
contexts. The second objection, in my view, borders on begging the question. It
is certainly debatable that common sense reflection shows a utilitarian
justification of fairness to be inadequate. While utility maximization is far from
at the forefront of everyday talk about fairness, many deliverances of moral
intuition are best interpreted as operating on the surface of things rather than as
weighing in on the ultimate authority of moral reasons (c.f. 1.2 supra). Although
the instability objection might seem initially more troubling than the preceding
two, I think that it can be successfully answered in two stages. First, one bites
the bullet. Yes, sometimes it is going to be right, on a utilitarian view, to act
unfairly. But this result is not all that troubling. Many non-utilitarians agree
that reasons of fairness are not always decisive in determining how one ought to
act. Second, one claims that, in contexts where fairness is morally useful, the
bullet will only very rarely need to be bitten. This is because the longer-term
results of a permission to act unfairly whenever the immediate utility
130o Given the significant role played by the desirability of equality in this argument, it might be
wondered why utilitarians should make this shuffle through fairness, rather than directly
constructing principles of equality instead. The answer is that a commitment to fair treatment
has proven a potent tool, across both centuries and continents, for generating outcomes that
utilitarians should care about, and utilitarians ought to take this fact into account when
constructing their secondary principles. Compare Sidgwick:
[The utilitarian] will naturally contemplate [the established morality] with reverence and
wonder, as a marvelous product of nature, the result of long centuries of growth, showing
in many parts the same fine adaptation of means to complex exigencies as the most
elaborate structures of physical organisms exhibit: he will handle it with respectful
delicacy as a mechanism, constructed of the fluid element of opinions and dispositions,
by the indispensable aid of which the actual quantum of human happiness is continually
being produced... (1907, 476)
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calculations (appeared to) so direct would undermine the practice of fairness,
and with it the benefits in the form of social-cooperation-with-an-egalitarian-
slant that I have been underscoring. If utilitarians want those benefits, it would
be very unwise for them to be half-hearted about the importance of fair
treatment in associative contexts where such treatment matters.131
5.4 Is global politics "fairness-apt"?
I will assume from now on that fairness ought to matter to utilitarians, in at least
some contexts of governance. The question that I am interested in now is
whether it ought to matter in the area of global politics in particular, and, if so,
what it implies there. I will begin, in this section, by discussing some common,
quite general, reasons for denying that global politics is "fairness-apt", and move
on in the next section to an examination of specific global or international
contexts of governance in which fairness claims might arise.
There is resistance in some influential quarters to the claim that structural
fairness applies in the international or global context. Most theorists who evince
this resistance agree that fairness applies to domestic politics. They are
therefore obliged to claim that there is something distinctive about global
politics that prevents the application of fairness there: they need to provide, as
Caney puts it, a "disanalogy argument": indicating "a morally significant
property that exists at the domestic level (and hence accounts for the
applicability of a moral principle there) but which is absent at the global level
(and hence accounts for the inapplicability of the same moral principle there)"
(2005, 270). And they need to show this property to be absent in each context of
governance that we find at the global or international level. If we are to argue
instead that fairness does apply to global politics, we need to either deny that the
domestic-global disanalogy exists, or rather deny that the property selected is a
necessary condition for the application of fairness. In what follows I will call
these denials of the "disanalogy claim" and denials of the "relevance claim",
respectively.
The following are three of the more common disanalogy properties highlighted
in the philosophical literature, as well as in common discourse on the ethics of
global distribution:
131 A helpful way of understanding the utilitarian position on compliance with constraints such as
fairness or rights even in cases where such compliance seems to conflict with local utility
maximization is in terms of what Parfit calls "rational irrationality". As Sumner explains, this is:
...conduct which, though on this particular occasion it frustrates your basic goal, is none
the less part of the best long-range strategy available for achieving that goal...if you
choose to act in a way which disserves your basic goal you have a good reason for doing
so. And that is all that is necessary for you to treat the existence of rights [or fairness] as
independent reasons for action. (1987, 197)
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a. Absence or weakness of institutions and governing agents. Some claim that
global politics differs from domestic politics in a way relevant to fairness insofar
as the former lacks an all-encompassing regulatory structure, and an agent to
reliably enforce compliance with the rules governing that structure. Thus Miller
writes, in concluding his case against distributive justice at the global level:
"above all there is no common institutional structure that would justify us in
describing unequal outcomes as forms of unequal treatment" (1999, 190).
This argument relies upon a variant of the governance conception of structural
fairness advocated earlier. If we accept that conception, as we ought to, the
relevance of the disanalogy property that the argument selects is not in doubt.
But if the relevance claim goes through here, the disanalogy claim does not. For,
contra Miller, there are common institutional structures in global politics, and
increasingly many of them. Among the more prominent instances are: i) a
multilateral trading system, incorporating a set of rules regarding permissible
tariffs, subsidies, quotas and agreements, and a body for resolving disputes over
the implementation of those rules; ii) an international banking and financial
structure, incorporating a set of rules regarding the global exchange of capital,
and a body for ensuring currency stabilization; and iii) a range of decentralized
forms of international regulatory structures (sites of rule-making and
governance) directed at specific issue areas other than the preceding.
Certainly, these structures are significantly different from the forms of
regulatory institution with which we are familiar in domestic politics. Two of the
more striking differences are the following. The form of governance that we see
at work in these structures is not governance of the centralized, hierarchical,
command-and-control type familiar from the state. Instead it is both
cooperative and reflexive in nature. "Regulators and the regulated exist on the
same plane" (Cassese 2005, 669), in the sense that parties collectively decide to
submit to a common framework of rules, and extend invitations to cooperate to
others in order to extend the scope of the framework. Second, international
regulatory systems demonstrate, in both their formation and operation, a
significant degree of dynamism and fluidity. Different types of international
regime are often formally intertwined in a network structure, or rely on informal
interconnections: sometimes "standards established by one organization become
binding rules by virtue of the force given to them by another
organization....[and] some regimes "lend" their institutions to others for the
resolutions of disputes" (Cassese 2005, 675). Such interconnections tend to
develop spontaneously and incrementally, again in the absence of centralized
control.
But to say that these institutions are different in important ways from the state,
is not to say that they are not fairness-apt. People who make the disanalogy
argument at issue are afflicted by a peculiar fixation on the state: an assumption
that governance does not count as governance unless it exhibits the centralized,
hierarchical and fixed structure that is characteristically associated with that
particular institutional form. But this assumption is unwarranted. The same
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goes for the claim that global regulatory structures necessarily lack a means of
effective enforcement. Pressure to comply with the rules embodied in the
regulatory structures referred to above is in many cases quite impressive.132
b. Voluntariness. It is sometimes claimed that fairness does not apply to global
politics because participation in the latter is voluntary, in a way in which
participation in domestic politics is not. As Risse puts a variant of this claim:
"[W]hile there undoubtedly is...a global order, it is unclear whether such
reasoning shows that this order provides an appropriate background for
redistributive claims among societies. Many of these [global] relationships are
economic, and to the extent that they are political, they have been (more or less)
voluntarily accepted by the respective states" (200oo6, ref).
Again, a denial of the disanalogy claim is appropriate here. Non-voluntary
institutional structures do exist at the global level. Perhaps the most significant
example is the state system, a form of global organization that was initially
imposed by the West on the rest of the world, and is now not open to serious
challenge by anyone. The claim of involuntariness is admittedly more debatable
in the case of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization.
Wenar writes: "The WTO presents itself as an international "fair and stable trade
club", accepting applications from anyone who agrees to the club rules. To
assent that there is coercion here, one should want to be precise about who is
threatening whom and why these are threats and not offers" (Wenar 2001, 79).
However, some make the claim of involuntariness in this case also, given that, as
Beitz notes, "participation on the only terms available may be practically
inescapable" for poorer countries (1999, 279).
In any case, I do not consider it especially important for present purposes to
settle the question of whether or not participation in a given regulatory structure
at the global level is voluntary or coercive. This is because we should deny the
relevance claim on which the disanalogy argument at issue is based. The fact
that participation in some context of governance is voluntary does not render
fairness inapplicable to it. We think, for instance, that members of the Loretta
Lynn Fan Club ought to be treated fairly by their executive, whether or not they
are free to leave at will. What involuntariness does plausibly do is render any
unfairness present morally more troubling. Where unfairness taints a voluntary
relation we have two options open to us: we can terminate the unfairness or
terminate the relation. Where unfairness taints an involuntary relation, on the
other hand, we have only the first of these options. While this fact may explain
why the elimination of the unfairness appears more pressing in the second case,
however, it does not show that the fact of involuntariness is relevant to the
unfairness itself.
132 One significant development here is the increase in global administrative courts (often called
'panels'), designed to settle disputes in an independent fashion via adversarial procedures
(Cassesse 2005, 692).
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c. Absence of motivation to act fairly. It is sometimes suggested that the
motivations supporting fair behavior at the level of domestic politics are much
weaker, or even lacking, in global politics. In a variant of this argument, Goodin
notes that one central motivation for acting fairly derives from the uncertainty
that we all experience regarding our future social or economic position (1992,
45). Practices of reciprocity are based on the idea that sacrifices made by some
now will be compensated for by return sacrifices made by others in the future. If
one had the secure expectation of being comfortably well off for the indefinite
future, it would be hard to see why (as a matter of self-interest) one would feel
moved to make the initial sacrifice needed to get such practices going. It is the
fact that the majority of us do not have this secure confidence that makes us
willing to undergo costs favoring compatriots now, as a form of diffuse insurance
against the future. Goodin suggests, however, that it is harder to extend this
uncertainty model of moral motivation to the international setting (1992, 61).
Since, for most of us in the developed world, the idea that we might one day be
reduced to the state of a destitute Ethiopian is simply not credible, one standard
motivation for making the initial sacrifice in the domestic case is not present.
The relevance claim should be resisted here, for three reasons. First, note that
the above argument implicitly assumes that it is up to the advantaged to make
the first move where the initiation of a reciprocal obligation is concerned. But in
some cases it is in fact the less advantaged who do so, by making sacrifices or
undergoing costs (voluntarily or not) that benefit the advantaged. Thus, even if
we think that the less advantaged will make no sacrifices for us in the future, it
might nonetheless be the case that they already have made such sacrifices, and
are hence owed something in return. The motivation to carry through on this
obligation will not be one of uncertainty regarding one's future position,
certainly. But that is not a problem (this is the second point), since there is
plausibly another source of motivation to draw upon here. This is the basic,
more clearly moral, desire not to exploit those who are dependent on, or
vulnerable to one.'33 Most of us find this sort of relationship at least
uncomfortable, and are inclined to act to ameliorate it. A third reason why the
above argument fails the relevance requirement is its assumption that fairness is
exclusively concerned with reciprocity, rather than also with non-discrimination.
The latter norm lacks the emphasis on mutual advantage integral to the
reciprocity variant, and as such is not as vulnerable to any failure of Goodin's
"uncertainty model" at the international level.
We do not, then, need to rely on the fact of uncertainty about the future position
of the global advantaged in order to identify claims of fairness internationally.
But even if we did, the disanalogy claim would fail, as is apparent when we shift
133 This is something that Goodin himself goes on to mention, although he again has doubts about
how far it can be extended internationally (see 1992, 77). I am a little more optimistic. Another
source of motivation for fair behavior that is arguably strongly at work at the domestic level,
although clearly is weaker at the international level, is a sense of solidarity with others, where this
involves both a sense of similarity of some kind, and a sense of being co-involved in a form of
shared endeavor.
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our focus not to interactions between the global affluent and the global "radically
poor", but to interactions between parties less divergent in advantage. There are
now plenty of opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation at the
international level, where uncertainty about the future needs of each of the
parties involved often will have motivational force.
I cannot here cover every source of general doubt concerning the application of
fairness internationally. But if your own source remains untouched, consider
the following facts about the conditions of contemporary global politics. The
global political economy is shaped and sustained by a huge number of rules a)
on an extensive and diverse range of subjects, b) made, elaborated and applied
by a network of established global and international institutions, c) in a process
of extensive cross-border cooperation d) aimed at shared purposes, e) resulting
in relations of dense interdependence between distinct political communities, f)
with significant consequences for the welfare and freedom of action of the
world's population, g) consequences that would have been significantly different
if other available rules had been applied instead. In other words, global politics
satisfies the conditions of regularity, intentionality, normativity, significance and
alterability earlier argued to be necessary and sufficient for the application of
structural fairness. I think, on the basis of these facts, that there is reason to
take claims of fairness in the arena of global politics very seriously.
5-5 Fairness in global politics
I suspect that much of the resistance that we find to the idea that norms of
fairness might apply to global politics derives not from arguments of the kind
canvassed above, but rather from resistance to certain claims about what
fairness would require in global politics, especially in regard to distributive
outcomes. Some of this resistance, in turn, can arguably be traced to the
dubious assumption that what fairness requires distributively in one context of
governance it also requires in all others. Say, for instance, that you think, by
extension from the case of domestic politics, that fairness always requires some
quite extensive form of material egalitarianism. And say that you also think that
a quite extensive form of material egalitarianism is not called for at the global or
international level. You may then find yourself inclined to deny that claims of
fairness are apt at all in regard to global politics. If we are to fully alleviate
doubts of this kind, we need to move on, finally, to the center of the action: the
question of what distributive fairness substantively requires in the various
arenas of global governance.
Since I cannot consider every potential site of global distributive fairness here,
my strategy will instead be to discuss a few of the more prominent candidates.
Hopefully this approach will offer some pointers in the direction of how the
remaining cases might be addressed. For each institution or practice discussed, I
will ask the following set of questions. Is the governance condition satisfied by
the structure selected (is that structure "fairness-apt")? If so, how do the norms
of reciprocity and non-discrimination apply to that structure? (Which goods do
they apply to, and which distributive outcomes do they require?) And, finally -
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to return to the conclusion of 5.3 supra - is the form of fairness at issue of the
sort that utilitarians should care about?
5.5.1 The "Global institutional scheme"
Some theorists have claimed that we ought to consider the global order, taken as
a whole, as a single subject of fairness. This is the route taken by "cosmopolitan
egalitarians" such as Beitz (1979) and Pogge (1989) (see 3.2.2 supra). Both take
the existence of a single, all-encompassing global institutional scheme to
generate fairness-related requirements of global resource distribution. In
particular, they hold that fairness requires that that scheme satisfy the Rawlsian
difference principle.
Many of us do not think that the global order taken as a whole does have these
strong egalitarian implications deriving from considerations of fairness. This
might be because we do not consider the global order to be fairness-apt (perhaps
for the general reasons given earlier); because we are dubious of the idea that the
domestic and global contexts are sufficiently similar to merit the same
distributive principle (Rawls 1999); or because we cannot see how such a
principle would leave room for domestic principles of distributive justice
(Freeman 2006). My own chief reason for resistance differs from all of these
and can be briefly stated. I am unconvinced that there exists a single global
institutional scheme in the sense that Pogge has is mind: viz., a "comprehensive
and reasonably self-contained system of social interaction" (1989, 21) with a
basic structure "distribut[ing] fundamental rights and duties and determin[ing]
the division of advantages from social cooperation" (Rawls 1971, 6). While there
is certainly much interaction, cooperation and distributively consequential
regulation going on on the international plane, the spheres in which such
activities occur are insufficiently integrated (taken altogether) for claims about a
single, all-encompassing, governed global system to be anything other than loose
talk. And if we cannot identify a single global context of governance, we cannot
identify a norm of fairness to apply within that context.134 The governance
condition fails at the fully global level, and therefore fairness does also: there is
nothing at that level for the norms of reciprocity or non-discrimination to apply
to.
5.5.2 The Global Property Regime: Natural Resources
If what I have just argued is correct, any claims of fairness that arise at the global
level will have to arise not out of the "global basic structure", but rather out of
contexts of governance more limited in scope and purpose. One set of
candidates for the latter role are property regimes, of which there now exist two
at the global level. One (which I discuss at 6.2.1) is the system of intellectual
property rights being developed under the WTO's TRIPS agreement. The other,
134 As noted at fn 56 supra, this point clearly provides a further reason for denying that direct
transposition of principles of justice from the domestic to the "global" basic structure is a
promising strategy.
116
and the one on which I will focus here, is the system of rights over land and
other natural resources (such as oil, timber, air and water) that is incorporated
in the modem state system. This latter regime (henceforth the "global property
regime", or GPR) involves a parceling up of the world's surface amongst distinct
groups of people, and a collection of norms concerning rights to the resources
found within (including below and above) those parcels. The regime is sustained
and enforced by states, collectively, by means of compliance with and appeal to
international law, as well as the maintenance of extensive operations of border
protection.
Is the GPR a plausible subject of norms of fairness? It certainly involves regular,
intentional, normatively guided and consequential collective behavior. But
doubts might arise in regard to the remaining condition that I earlier claimed to
be necessary for the application of structural fairness: the availability of feasible
alternatives. Given that there is at this point no agent realistically capable of
dividing up the world's territory as a whole anew (i.e. as opposed to making
some more limited, local adjustments), it might be claimed that any reasons to
object to the current division cannot be reasons of fairness.
This doubt can be eased by reference to a distinction between "control rights"
and "benefit rights" to natural resources. On the modern conception of
property, which we owe to the legal realists, ownership is not a unitary notion,
but rather a "bundle" of rights: a collection of diverse legal entitlements each
covering distinct aspects of the owner's relationship to the object owned.
Conceiving of property in this way allows us to distinguish between (among
other things) rights to control or use natural resources, and rights to benefit or
profit from them.135 And this distinction allows us to see that the GPR does in
fact satisfy the alterability condition on structural fairness. It is true that the
basic distribution of control rights over the world's territory and other natural
resources is by now so deeply entrenched as to be exceedingly difficult to alter.
But it does not follow from this that the current distribution of benefit rights
over that territory admits of no feasible alternatives. To see this, note that,
under the current regime, each state has full benefit rights with respect to the
natural resources found within its territory (and, consequently, no benefit rights
to the natural resources found within the territory of any other state). This
arrangement contrasts with, among other options, an alternative arrangement
proposed by Pogge that incorporates a "global resources dividend" or "GRD"
(Pogge 2002). On the latter proposal, countries would retain eminent domain
over their allotment of the world's limited natural resources - so that foreigners
would not have any control rights to determine how those resources were used -
but some small portion of the economic value derived from them would be taxed
and used to help improve the situation of the global poor. If, as seems plausible,
such a measure is a practical possibility, it shows that the current GPR is
135 These rights can themselves be broken down. One might, for instance, introduce a temporal
dimension into control rights (as when one leases an object for a limited period of time), or
distinguish different aspects of control; or one might distinguish different forms or extents of
benefit. For discussion, see Grey 1980.
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maintained in the presence of feasible alternatives, and that the alterability
condition on structural fairness is satisfied.
I conclude from the preceding that the GPR in natural resources is fairness-apt.
Our question, then, is what precisely fairness in that regime would come to. A
direct application of the norm of non-discrimination requires that if the GPR
results in an unequal distribution of benefits across individuals (net, i.e. taking
into account burdens also imposed), this departure from equality must be given
a special, non-arbitrary justification. A direct application of the norm of
reciprocity requires that if, while participating within the GPR, some incur costs
in order to produce benefits for others, the latter ought to be prepared to incur
similar costs in order to produce similar benefits in return. What do these norms
require, in terms of substantive distributive outcomes?
They do not, I think require that the benefits derived from natural resources be
distributed equally across the world's individuals. This is so for two reasons.
First, the norm of non-discrimination is concerned only with benefits that are
created by the GPR. But only a portion of the economic value that a given
country derives from the natural resources found within (and around) its
territory is attributable to that regime. This is because much of the benefit
derived from natural resources is so derived only in the presence of contributing
factors such as labor and well-functioning domestic political and economic
institutions: factors not produced or regulated by the global property regime per
se..136 Second, if a substantially egalitarian global property regime is to be
required by fairness, that regime must be a genuinely feasible option. But, given
the state of global governance, it quite clearly is not: there is no sufficiently
powerful (and accountable) institutional agent at the level of the globe whom we
might call upon to implement it.137
Since it is difficult to know how exactly to quantify the benefits at issue, we
cannot be too precise here. I think, however, that the above considerations
suggest that there is something to be said for a focus on minima. I propose,
then, the following principle:
136 We can see this from the fact that the economic prosperity of a population is very poorly
correlated with the amount and quality of natural resources that it controls. Several countries
(including the Congo, Nigeria, Venezuela, Brazil, Myanmar, Iraq and the Philippines) are both
resource-rich and poverty-stricken.
137 A distinct argument against a fully egalitarian GPR concerns its undesirability. Land and other
natural resources differ from other sorts of property, such as artifacts or ideas, in a highly
significant way, by virtue of their intimate connection to the modern conception of political rule.
It is a distinctive feature of that modern conception that public authority tracks territoriality: the
scope of the former is defined by relation to a discrete, generally spatially contiguous, portion of
the earth's surface. (This system of rule contrasts with that employed in medieval Europe, which
"was structured by a non-exclusive form of territoriality, in which authority was both personalized
and parcelised within and across territorial formations" (Ruggie, 1993)). This means that the
question of who is to control and benefit from the land in which a political community is located
runs up directly against issues of sovereignty and collective self-determination. The prospect of a
fully egalitarian global property regime in natural resources looks highly undesirable on grounds
of the latter, in a way in which the alternative proposal that I offer below does not.
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Fair Exclusion. The global property regime in natural resources will be fair only
on the condition that persons do not fail to attain decency by virtue of being
excluded from access to the natural resources of states other than their own.138
Once we take into account the points made above against a fully egalitarian
global regime in benefit rights to natural resources, Fair Exclusion looks
compatible with the norm of non-discrimination. We can also understand it as
an application of the norm of reciprocity. Consider that a highly exclusive global
regime of benefit rights to natural resources imposes significant burdens on
those whose own nations provide them with insecure access to an adequate level
of standard goods. This is because deprivation of access to the benefits that can
be derived from foreign resources blocks off one of the few chances that such
people have of attaining decency. Reciprocity requires that those who adhere, at
significant cost, to the basic set of rules embodied in the global property regime
(viz, the global poor) are owed a corresponding sacrifice on the part of those for
whom general adherence to those same rules presents a considerable benefit
(viz, the global affluent). One attractive interpretation of the requisite sacrifice
has the global affluent ensuring that the global poor obtain access to the level of
standard goods required for a minimally decent life.
If Fair Exclusion is to generate substantive requirements in our world, it will
need to be shown that failure to attain decency is (at least partly) caused by
exclusion from the natural resources of foreign states. If that can be shown, the
fact that the entire population of the world is implicated in a fairness-apt global
property regime will provide an additional, fairness-based reason for honoring
the decency duties advocated in Chapter 4. And (to return to the lesson of 5.3
supra), given that the utilitarian argument for those duties is strong, the form of
fairness at issue here is quite clearly of the sort that utilitarians should endorse.
5.5.3 The Multilateral trading system
International trade today takes place within a multilateral regime, incorporating
i) a set of rules, policies, agreements and standing expectations regarding tariffs,
subsidies, quotas and other types of trade-related action, ii) an ongoing schedule
of structured negotiations over the development and elaboration of those rules
(etc.), and iii) a body for resolving any related disputes and encouraging
compliance. The system as we know it today arose out of more general post-war
developments in international organization aimed at fostering global peace and
prosperity, and is now centered in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
138 I take the title of this principle from Aaron James. His own variant runs: "the state system can
only reasonably deprive people of access to basic resources if it also provides adequate means to
enjoy the significant benefits of that access" (200oo6, 712). It is unclear what this principle means.
We can assume that by "basic" resources James has in mind natural resources, of the kind that I
am concerned with here (although that is not entirely obvious). But the phrase "significant
benefits" is obscure. The choice of minima is suggested by James' later emphasis on the
unjustifiabilty of "significant or severe" deprivation of access to basic resources. But this
impression is undermined by James' later claim that "as far as the consequences of exclusion are
concerned, the issue of equitable treatment...rises, quite aside from whether the deprivation
leaves people badly off, in absolute terms" (2oo6, 713).
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general purpose of the regime is to promote liberalization in the cross-border
market exchange of goods, capital and (more recently) services.
Doubts about the appropriateness of applying the idea of structural fairness to
global politics are perhaps stronger in regard to trade than in regard to any other
aspect of international association. Many think that we can ensure fairness in
international trade by attending solely to the fairness of individual transactions:
where this reduces to such matters as fair pricing, competitive markets, truth in
advertising, and absence of desperation bargaining. If all transactions are fair
judged against such criteria, such persons think, the fairness of the structure will
take care of itself: structural fairness supervenes on transactional fairness.
Many of the theorists who make this argument do not take a similar line in
regard to domestic markets. In the latter case there is majority
acknowledgment that structural unfairness can persist even in the face of perfect
transactional fairness (so that, for instance, contra Nozick 1974, Wilt
Chamberlain is not morally entitled to all of his match earnings, despite their
origins in a free and fair transfer from their prior owners). Why, then, should
the contrary line be tempting at the international level?
The rationale seems to be the idea that at the international level trade does not
take place within the context of an all-encompassing basic structure of the kind
that we see at the level of the state.139 That is true enough. But this fact will only
be relevant to the question under consideration if there do not exist other kinds
of structures to which requirements of structural fairness might apply. I suggest
that the multilateral trading system as described above is one such structure. It
involves regular, norm-governed, coordinated behavior aimed at a common goal
(that of mutual economic gain). As such, it is not merely a sequence of isolated
transactions, but an ongoing, organized practice, which directs and constrains
the actions and expectations of its participants over time. This means that, even
if each individual transaction taken within that practice satisfied criteria of
transactional fairness, it would remain an open question whether or not the
aggregate effects of the practice as a whole were fair. And because the remaining
conditions for the application of fairness advocated earlier are clearly satisfied in
the case of the global trade regime, this question would not only be open, but
also important. The rules, policies and expectations that go to make up the
multilateral trading regime are chosen against a backdrop of feasible
alternatives. And the choice of those rules, policies and expectations is
consequential: the alternatives would result in distinct patterns of burdens and
benefits across individuals both within and across borders.
139 This is a variant of the argument from institutional lack considered in section 5.3 supra. The
following passage in Nagel suggests it:
Within our respective societies the contracts and laws on which [a trade] relation depends
are subject to standards of social justice. Insofar as they transcend societal boundaries,
however, the requirements of background justice are filtered out and commercial
relations become instead something much thinner: instruments for the common pursuit
of self-interest (2005, 141-2)
120
I will now argue that reflection on the way in which the structure of the
multilateral trading system as a whole distributes advantages supports three
distinct principles of fairness for international trade, which I will term Fair
Benefit and Burden, Fair Inclusion and Fair Return.
Fair Benefit and Burden.
Fair Benefit and Burden. The benefits and burdens created by the multilateral
trading system ought to be distributed equally amongst participants, unless
special justification can be given for unequal treatment.140
This first principle is a direct application of the norm of non-discrimination to
the system of international trade. It requires, in practice, two things: that
unjustified unequal gains be redistributed across participants, and that
unjustified unequal burdens be either prevented or compensated for.
Determining whether or not the multilateral trading system is fair, judged
against this principle, requires settling two issues. One is that of precisely which
consequences of trade are to count as benefits and burdens for purposes of
fairness. Are we to consider solely changes to GDP, or also the further economic
or non-economic effects of international trade? A second issue to settle is that of
which differences across countries in the consequences thus selected are unfair.
Suppose we decide that only changes in GDP are to count. There are three
reasons why differential changes in GDP after the commencement of the
multilateral trading regime might not be unfair. First, some changes might have
arisen entirely independently of participation in international trade. Second,
some changes, while directly related to participation in international trade, will
derive in part from factors (such as a country's economic system, population size
or natural resource holdings) that would have produced inequalities even in the
absence of the multilateral trading system. Given that Fair Benefit and Burden
applies only to benefits and burdens created by the global trading regime itself,
such gains are not to enter into the distribuand. Third, Fair Benefit and Burden
leaves open the possibility that some forms of regime-produced inequalities in
GDP gain might have "special justification".
The above questions are difficult to answer, which suggests that the precise
distributive implications of Fair Benefit and Burden will often be unclear.141 It
140 This principle is similar to that advocated by James in his 2004: "a given, governable practice
is to be organized so that those who do their part receive an equal or otherwise acceptable share of
its benefits, and no more than an equal or otherwise acceptable share of the burdens that make
those benefits possible" (lo).
141 Sykes points to some broadly similar difficulties in interpreting the WTO's "safeguard
measures" clause in his 2003 (see fn 113 supra). A further difficulty in applying Fair Benefit and
Burden in practice derives from the fact that different liberalization measures will have distinct
distributional impacts on different countries, and on different groups within those countries.
(Andersson and Martin (2004) claim, for instance, that while the elimination of OECD
agricultural subsidies would benefit net food-producing countries and their farmers, it would hurt
countries currently given special preferences, such as the Philippines, as well as net food-
importing least developed countries, such as those in North Africa and the Middle East). In
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is not unlikely, however, that that principle has been violated. Developed
countries have plausibly derived unjustified gains from their extensive farm
subsidy programs and recourse to anti-dumping duties: measures that benefit
rich farmers in affluent countries while preventing poor farmers in developing
countries from benefiting from their comparative advantage in agriculture. And
trade liberalization has plausibly imposed more severe burdens on developing
than on developed countries, in particular by virtue of its disruptive impact on
the lives of the global poor. If the multilateral trading regime is not to continue
to violate Fair Benefit and Burden, developed countries arguably ought to i)
cease their agricultural protectionism, and ii) collectively subsidize transitional
protections (e.g. social security measures and labor market adjustment
programs) for the poor in developing countries - or, if such measures prove
infeasible, consider certain forms of trade protection in those countries non-
actionable (c.f. James 2006, 718).
While these examples involve duties to people who are badly off in absolute
terms, it is worth emphasizing that Fair Benefit and Burden does not cease to
apply when participants exceed the threshold of decency. Some forms of
unequal gain or burden will be unfair under that principle even when they do
not result in, or coincide with, hardship in those affected.142
Fair Inclusion
Fair Inclusion. "People affected by trade are to be provided with the material
basis for market access to be of real benefit" (James 2006, 711).
James has recently proposed the above as a principle of structural fairness for
international trade. He suggests that, when applied to the contemporary global
economy, it provides a fairness-based argument for permitting infant industry
evaluating a given rule or policy, then, we need to decide which of it and the available alternatives
is most likely, on balance, to satisfy Fair Benefit and Burden. This will often be a complex
calculation.
142 The use of food safety regulations in international trade provides a good example. Many
developed countries now require as a condition of access to their markets that foreign exporters
comply with the food safety regulations elaborated by the International Organization for
Standardization. In addition, the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
requires that members establish equivalence in regulations and regulatory processes between
importing and exporting nations. Such requirements impose significant costs on exporters, in
terms of the employment of consultants and additional personnel, training and record-keeping.
And, importantly, these costs are much greater for exporters in developing countries than for
their counterparts in the developed world. (UNDP 2006, 69-71). While many exporting countries
lack national food safety standards and therefore need to develop new infrastructure, developed
importing nations have that infrastructure already in place, and employ standards on which the
IOS standards themselves are closely modeled. A rule that advantages consumers in the
developed world by providing them with cheaper and more diverse foodstuffs at the sanitary
levels they have come to expect, while imposing uncompensated burdens on producers in the
developing world for whom equivalent such standards are much more costly, looks unfair.
Whether or not the standards themselves are justified (on health grounds, or as a permissible
expression of political autonomy), Fair Benefit and Burden plausibly requires that the developed
world assist developing countries in carrying the burden of meeting them.
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protection in developing countries, and for positive measures of what has come
to be known as "trade-related technical assistance" on the part of the developed
world. Proposals for the latter currently come in two varieties. The modest form
involves financial and technical support aimed at helping representatives of
developing countries to understand the principles of international trade and the
workings of the multilateral trading regime, and to participate more effectively
in negotiations.143 The more ambitious form involves assisting developing
countries more directly in improving their capacity to compete in global
markets. It is this more ambitious form that James advocates. Although he
focuses on the need for improved transportation and communications
infrastructure, plausibly what is also required for capacity improvement are
increases in human capital (especially via improved health and education), more
robust legal and regulatory frameworks, dispersion of technology, and a
financial sector that can provide capital to the poor at reasonable interest rates.
While, as Chapter 4 suggested, it is not clear exactly how, or how much, the
developed world can promote such things in developing countries, it is highly
likely that it can at least do something.
Two distinct fairness-based arguments can be given for Fair Inclusion, both of
which draw their force from the independent argument given above for Fair
Benefit and Burden. According to the first, forward-looking argument, what is
troubling on fairness grounds about the fact that some participants in the
multilateral trading regime lack the resources to derive real benefit from access
to global markets is that this, in practice, leaves them vulnerable to the sort of
treatment that undermines the satisfaction of Fair Benefit and Burden.
Developing countries do not currently have access to the information, skills and
material muscle needed to defend their legitimate entitlements against stronger
negotiating partners. This means that they are often pressured or tricked into
unreciprocated concessions, and do not consider it worth their while to bring
legitimate complaints before the WTO's Dispute Settlement Board. The
satisfaction of Fair Inclusion, via the measures of trade-related assistance
mentioned above, would help to prevent such unfair agreements or failures to
redress injustice from occurring.144 The second argument for Fair Inclusion
looks to the present and past rather than the future. On this second line, the
143 Currently, many Least Developed Countries cannot afford to maintain delegations in Geneva;
when delegations can be maintained, they are chronically understaffed in comparison to those of
OECD countries. Developing countries are also often too poorly resourced to prepare for and
argue cases at the WTO's Dispute Settlement Board with the thoroughness and expertise of OECD
countries. The Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least Developed
Countries, launched in 1997, has so far had little impact, largely due to inadequate funding
(UNDP 2006, 138).
144 We can think of this as an instance of the type of case, mentioned in section 5.2.2 supra, in
which the securing of certain goods is a precondition of effective participation in a context of
governance. Although this argument is most naturally applied to the modest form of trade
related technical assistance, it can also be extended to the more ambitious form, given that even a
country that maintains a well-functioning delegation in Geneva and has the resources and
expertise to pursue disputes at the DSB may find itself pressured into unfair concessions, merely
because its trading partners are a great deal better off.
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problem with the lack on the part of developing countries of the material
resources needed for beneficial access to world markets is not that it tends to
lead to unfairness. Instead it is itself unfair, insofar as it represents a violation
of Fair Benefit and Burden. The fact that some participants in the international
trading regime are not yet in a position to genuinely benefit from that regime,
whereas others certainly are, suggests that the benefits and burdens of that
regime have been unfairly distributed. Trade-related assistance is, on this line, a
means not to prevent unfairness, but rather, more directly, to redress it.145
While I think that each of these arguments provides a prima facie case for Fair
Inclusion, if that case is to be made airtight a number of things will need to be
shown. Where the first, forward-looking, argument is concerned, it will need to
be demonstrated that there are not better ways of securing the desired outcome
than equalizing power imbalances by material means. In at least some cases
the risk of unfairness at issue ought to be able to be reduced not by trade-related
technical assistance, but instead by the strengthening of procedural safeguards
and/or a commitment on the part of the better off to stop driving the vulnerable
to the wall. Where the second argument is concerned, it will need to be shown
that Fair Benefit and Burden has indeed been violated: that the worse-off
participants in the multilateral trading regime have in fact been taken advantage
of, or discriminated against. As suggested in the previous section, this will
involve, among other things, showing that the inability of Least Developed
Countries to genuinely benefit from market access does not derive from factors
that are independent of the multilateral trading system itself, or does not have
some form of non-arbitrary justification.
Fair Return
Fair Benefit and Burden and Fair Inclusion are both, I have suggested, best
understood in relation to the norm of non-discrimination, the first as a direct
application, the second as a derivation from the first. But several complaints of
unfairness in relation to the global trading regime are more naturally
understood in terms of the norm of reciprocity. As we have seen, reciprocity
requires that if some incur costs in order to produce benefits for others, the
latter ought to be prepared to incur similar costs in order to produce similar
benefits in return. For many people, the most immediate problem from the
perspective of fairness with OECD farm subsidies and the misuse of anti-
dumping duties is their violation of this norm. In reducing trade barriers, the
developing world provides the significant benefits of market access to the
developed world. It ought to be able to count on similar or substitute benefits
from the developed world in return. But the E.U., U.S. and Japan are in effect
withholding those benefits, via retention of their own distortionary trade
145 James himself seems to have this second argument in mind, as indicated when he writes: "If
less economically developed countries are indeed supposed to have a chance to benefit from
access to the global markets that already affect them, trading nations bear responsibility for the
roads, communications and other infrastructure needed to make that chance real" (2006, 717,
italics mine). The italicized phrase could, however, merely indicate that the principle applies only
to current participants in the regime.
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policies. They are unwilling to accept the short-term economic losses and
vulnerability that come with trade liberalization, but more than willing to accept
the benefits that accrue to them as a result of the developing world accepting
those same losses and vulnerability. A similar violation of reciprocity is
apparent in relation to the rules for accession to the WTO. Incumbent members
exploit the vagueness in the current rules in order to place stricter and more
demanding requirements on Least Developed Countries eager to join than those
that they themselves are under.146 This equates to the developed world
demanding sacrifices in its favor that it has no intention of reciprocating.
I suggest that the wrong in such cases can be captured by the following principle:
Fair Return. Trade-related concessions made by one country to another ought
to be returned by the latter in the form of trade-related concessions conferring a
similar benefit.
We should take care to include among the trade-related concessions covered by
this principle the quite general concession involved in the act of sustained
adherence to a mutually agreed upon common set of rules. Such adherence will
be a concession in cases where failure to adhere in a given instance would result
in benefits to the violator.147 It is worth emphasizing that a requirement of
universal adherence to a "common" set of rules should not be taken to preclude
measures of "Special and Differential Treatment" for developing countries,
especially LDCs. The necessity for such measures is due to the fact that in cases
where parties are of radically different advantage or capacity, adherence to a
single rule, narrowly interpreted, may impose radically different burdens.
Provided that the exemptions in question are understood to apply to any country
at an early stage of development (and, thus, to previous time-slices of more
developed countries), allowing them is not unfair.148
146 Such 'WTO-plus' and 'WTO-minus' conditions have included the imposition of stricter
requirements on binding tariffs, the removal or phasing out of the "other duties and charges"
loophole, denial of 'special and differential treatment' rights, elimination of export duties or
classing of them as binding at a certain level, much more extensive liberalization of service
sectors, and pressure to move towards a market economy and privatize the public sector. (UNDP
2006, 131-3).
147 The basic fairness-related principle of "one rule for all" is flagrantly violated by the current
regime. The UNDP notes that "the rules in the Uruguay Round's Agreement on Agriculture are so
skewed that although they prevent middle-income developing countries from using subsidies,
they have enabled the EU to continue giving such support and the US to increase it" (2006, 55).
Such policies effectively amount to dumping: export prices for white sugar in the EU were only a
quarter of production costs in 2002, and, because of the immense scale of production, effectively
set world prices at that level (Oxfam 2002, 114). Hence the special irony of the OECD's spurious
charges of the developing world with "dumping" artificially cheap goods.
148 A need for special and differential treatment of developing countries has long been recognized
in the global trading regime, but has been poorly implemented. What fairness plausibly requires
in this area is some middle path between a complete exemption from reciprocity (the option
adopted in the GATT) and merely minor exemptions (such as delayed implementation, the only
special treatment allowed in most WTO agreements).
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I think that the principle of Fair Return is attractive and important. However it
is not well understood as a principle of structural fairness. This is because it is
concerned both with bilateral rather than multilateral relations, and with the
nature of individual agreements (or series of agreements) rather than with the
aggregate effects of the international trading regime as a whole. It departs, then,
from my main concerns here, and may be a borderline case of a principle of
distributive justice (see 5.2 supra). Nonetheless, because Fair Return arguably
captures a number of the concerns that people have about the current state of
international trade, it is worth highlighting, and also worth briefly canvassing its
relationship to the principles already discussed.
The relationship of Fair Return to Fair Benefit and Burden is plausibly
instrumental. Compliance with the former over the long term can be expected to
contribute to the equalization of benefits and burdens across WTO member
states. Fair Return may also provide an additional argument for Fair Inclusion.
Developing countries have made concessions in opening up their markets to the
developed world, and, according to Fair Return, are due concessions conferring
a similar benefit. But the benefit in question cannot be fully returned - any
superficially reciprocal concessions will be relatively toothless - if developing
countries do not have the capacity to make use of it. Hence the Fair Inclusion
requirement. It is worth noting, however, that the case for Fair Inclusion on this
line is a limited one. Developing countries will be owed the material basis for
market access to be of real benefit only if they have themselves benefited others,
and the extent of "real benefit" to which they are owed access will need to
correlate with the extent of the benefit that they have conveyed. This point puts
some brakes on the redistributive implications of Fair Inclusion, if the latter is
derived exclusively from Fair Return. Some developing countries, particularly
those dependent on primary commodities, currently do not have a great deal to
offer the world, economically speaking. But if this is so, it may not be troubling
on reciprocity grounds if they do not get a great deal back.149 This suggests that
if any major redistributive implications follow from Fair Inclusion, they are
more likely to be derived via Fair Benefit and Burden rather than from Fair
Return.
The preceding discussion can be summarized as follows. Where the multilateral
trading system is concerned, the norm of non-discrimination applies in the form
of Fair Benefit and Burden, the latter of which arguably implies the distinct
principle of Fair Inclusion. The norm of reciprocity, on the other hand, applies
most naturally in the form of the non-structural principle of Fair Return. While
the difficulties in working out what precisely these principles require in practice
are significant, each suggests that the current regime of international trade is
unfair.
149 This claim might be rejected on the grounds that the fact that LDCs have little to offer the rest
of the world is partly caused by the multilateral trading system itself (especially, by subsidized
exports from the developed world). But, while this is so, the "partly" is relevant. Adverse price
trends and the low value-added nature of primary commodities also have a significant role to
play, and cannot be blamed squarely on developed nations.
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Is this the sort of unfairness that should trouble utilitarians? The discussion at
5.3 supra suggested that fairness within a given context of governance is
recommended by utilitarianism in cases where it promotes socially beneficial
cooperation and/or contributes to the sorts of egalitarian outcome that are of
utilitarian value. There is reason to think that both of these conditions are
satisfied in the case of the multilateral trading regime. Consider, first, the
cooperation argument. Utilitarians have strong reason to support the
multilateral trading regime, as part of a broader agenda of international
development. Trade theory demonstrates that free trade between countries is of
general economic benefit, by virtue of allowing each country to fully exploit its
comparative advantage in production. Gains from trade include the benefits of
specialization (economies of scale), access to larger markets, foreign ideas and
technology, and cheaper or otherwise inaccessible goods. These economic
benefits can be expected to translate into increased national welfare - at least up
to a certain level of GDP, and provided that certain domestic distributive
constraints are satisfied.15o Admittedly, the way in which international trade
liberalization has been pursued to date has been highly problematic, not only
due to the forms of unfairness canvassed above, but also due to a failure to take
seriously legitimate concerns about the effects of liberalization on domestic
distributive justice, national security, culture and other shared values not
directly related to economic growth. But, provided that these concerns are
addressed, the continuation of the regime itself is something that utilitarians
should support. Moreover, importantly for the present argument, fairness within
that regime is plausibly a necessary condition of its longer-term success.
Fairness would, first, eliminate some of the distortions that prevent the
multilateral trading regime from operating to its full potential. And, second, it
would arguably bolster political support for that regime. Many feel that a sense
that the WTO process is skewed in favor of the developed world has reduced
popular support for trade liberalization in many countries of the developing
world (and in some sectors of the developed world also), thereby hampering
further progress.1ls
This cooperation-fostering argument can also be supplemented by a distinct
argument relating to the egalitarian implications of fairness in trade. The
satisfaction of Fair Benefit and Burden, Fair Inclusion (and Fair Return) would
plausibly render the results of the multilateral trading regime considerably more
egalitarian than they are at present. And the type of egalitarianism at issue looks
both a) desirable (at least in our world of great deprivation, and perhaps beyond
15o Held (2004) notes that "abolishing all trade barriers could boost global income by $2.8 trillion
and lift 320 million people out of poverty by 2015. In principle, this could cut global poverty by a
quarter". Oxfam claims that "If Africa increased its share of world exports by just one per cent, it
would generate $7obn - a sum that dwarfs the $14.6bn provided through debt relief and aid
combined" (2002, 50).
151 Concerns about fairness in international trade extend from the general public to officials
negotiating trade agreements. Albin argues that, although national delegates often claim to be
uncomfortable with speaking of fairness in regard to trade liberalization, considerations of
(perceived) unfairness in fact played a significant role in deliberations influencing the
development and outcomes of the Uruguay round of the GATT (2001, Chapter 4).
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it), and, b) feasible. To see the latter, consider some of the measures most likely
to be required by the principles that I have advocated. These arguably include,
predominantly, the provision to low-income countries of unrestricted quota-free
and duty-free access to developed country markets; a ban on direct support to
developed country agricultural producers; the elimination of export dumping to
developing countries and of anti-dumping actions against low-income countries;
the cessation of tariff escalation on products in which developing countries
specialize; permission for infant industry protection in the developing world;
and a sincere and effective commitment to trade-related technical assistance.
Note that execution of these measures requires neither an immense and
unwieldy institutional apparatus, nor a single all-powerful global agent, of the
kind that renders the possibility of a fully egalitarian global property regime in
natural resources unattractive (5.2 supra). Instead it can be achieved by means
of agents and institutions that already exist and function quite well at the
international level: viz., the WTO and its member states. The WTO system has
already proven a powerful locus of global cooperation, and its core institution is
possessed of some of the more impressive regulatory and adjudicative powers
that we see at the supranational level. It is capable of becoming fair in a
utilitarian-friendly way.
Or, it is so capable, provided that a further issue that I have not yet highlighted
can be resolved. The pursuit of structural fairness at the international level, like
that of global decency, can be expected to conflict in some contexts with respect
for the collective self-determination of political communities. The suggestion
that Fair Inclusion may require the developed world to subsidize market access
infrastructure in developed countries may have raised this concern; likewise the
suggestion that Fair Benefit and Burden may require the developed world to
finance transitional social protections for developing world citizens displaced by
trade liberalization.152 The WTO system, as it operates today, is already
frequently charged with undermining legitimate expressions of political
autonomy; the thought here is that attempting to make that system fairer might
contribute to, rather than ease, those concerns. One hopes that there are ways of
accommodating both fairness and collective self-determination in the global
regimes of international trade and property; if not, limits may be placed on the
utilitarian desirability of some specific ways of implementing the principles
argued for here.
5.6 Global Equality?
This chapter has so far argued that, contrary to initial appearances, utilitarians
have reason to call for a fair world along with a decent one. Do they also have
reason to call for an equal world - or at least for one more equal than the one we
see at present? Some of the sense of scandal that people express regarding the
immense gap in standard of living that obtains between people in the developed
152 A similar concern may also apply to the principle of Fair Exclusion that I advocated in 5.5.2,
due to the ways, discussed in Chapter 4, in which the promotion of decency runs up against that
of collective self-determination.
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and the developing world might be adequately explained by reference to a
concern for decency or fairness. It might be thought (rightly or wrongly) that
the coincidence of extreme affluence and extreme poverty shows the latter to be
avoidable, and yet avoided it is not. Or perhaps we interpret inequality as the
result of unfairness, of either the institutional or the cosmic variety: either
mankind or the universe, we feel, is giving the global poor a very bad deal. At
least some of the concern that is expressed about global inequality, however, is
not explicitly attached to either of these concerns; some of us seem to think that
global inequality is, in itself, an outrage. This last section of the chapter
addresses the question of whether or not utilitarianism can accommodate a
concern of this latter, independent, sort. Whether or not it can remains an open
question, despite the sum-ranking component of utilitarianism, because (as I
have emphasized a number of times - 1.3.4; 5-3) utilitarians might have reason
to be concerned with equality of resources at the global level even if equality of
welfare, per se, leaves them cold. This is because equality of resources, broadly
construed, is in some contexts plausibly instrumental to welfare maximization.
Equality at the global level can be conceived of in a variety of ways. Which
conception of inequality it is that one selects will affect one's assessment of how
much inequality there exists at the global level, and of whether or not inequality
has been increasing or decreasing over time. There may also be different
normative reasons to be concerned about inequality, depending on which
conception one selects. Somewhat arbitrarily, I will concentrate here on what
the World Bank terms "intercountry inequality" (2005, 57).153 I think that what
I have to say about it will, in this case, extend equally to the other versions.
My interest here, then, is in whether or not there exists a (decency-and-fairness-
independent) utilitarian case for the following principle:
Global resource Egalitarianism (GRE). Global distributive justice requires that,
for any political communities x and y, the average amount of global standard
goods that individuals in x possess over their life-time be roughly equal to the
average amount of global standard goods that individuals in y possess over their
life-time.t4
153 The World Bank distinguishes between global, intercountry and international inequality in
incomes (2005, 57), drawing on a distinction made in Milanovic (2005). Global inequality takes
into account the real (PPP-adjusted) incomes of all of the world's individuals, whereas
international and intercountry inequality focus instead on the mean incomes of countries.
International inequality includes information about the number of people that each country
contains (including all individuals in inequality calculations, as in global inequality, but assigning
to each person her or his country's mean income), whereas intercountry inequality filters out that
information, comparing the mean incomes of countries without paying attention to the number of
people included within each country.
154 See chapter 2, section 2.2, for an explanation of the nature of global standard goods, and the
rationale for selecting them as the distribuand here. The principle given above can be understood
as a slightly more precise version of the following principle, considered in Chapter 2:
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In order to be sure of narrowing in on the question, imagine that all contexts of
governance satisfy principles of fairness, and that all countries have excellent
satisficing scores. (Say that half of the world has a standard of living comparable
to that of contemporary Ireland, and the other half one comparable to that of
contemporary Portugal.155) Such a world, while a great deal preferable to ours,
would remain far from satisfying GRE. Should utilitarians be concerned?
Two arguments for taking the affirmative line, familiar from the discussion of
egalitarianism in Chapter 1, point to the fact of the diminishing marginal utility
of resources, and the possible connection between equality and economic
growth. Some of the resources held by the global better-off, it might be
suggested, would produce more utility, or conduce to greater global economic
productivity, in the hands of the global worse-off. These arguments, however,
are much weaker at the global than at the domestic level. I noted at 5.3 supra
that if we are to employ the fact of diminishing marginal utility or the equality-
growth connection to egalitarian effect, we need to be able to show that the act of
redistribution will not itself absorb all of the potential gains, through
administrative inefficiencies or incentive effects. These concerns appear
pressing at the global level, due to problems of scale as well as limits on
international solidarity. Additionally, there are serious worries about how
policies directed at GRE would interfere with collective self-determination.
Such concerns might be outweighed if we were strongly convinced of the merits
of redistribution. But the diminishing marginal utility argument for equality is
in fact controversial in cases where all parties have attained decency, and the
evidence on the relationship between inequality and growth remains
inconclusive.
Perhaps, it might be suggested, a more secure case for GRE can be derived from
global versions of the social/political arguments for material egalitarianism that
I earlier suggested have force within the state (1.3.4 supra). Some of these
arguments are not easily extended to the global arena. The danger that inter-
country inequality in income and wealth will undermine egalitarian
interpersonal relations, social solidarity, self-respect, equal social status or
individuals' satisfaction with their social position relative to that of others does
Global resource egalitarianism. The global basic structure ought to be set so as to
eliminate large inequalities in possession of global standard goods across all people over
the lifespan.
(with the reference to the global basic structure removed for the reasons given in 5.5.1 supra).
Section 2.2.1 has already cast some doubt this principle, on the twin grounds, roughly, that is both
too blunt a utilitarian instrument and not a feasible aim for any existing agent. I find these
concerns persuasive, but they might not have been felt to clinch the deal. Perhaps utilitarians
should see GRE as desirable, however blunt, or as a work in progress: something that we should
attempt to create an agent to implement. The present discussion should be taken to supplement
and complete the earlier discussion, by highlighting some additional considerations that I
consider to nail the coffin.
155 Portugal had a per capita GDP (PPP) of $19,8oo in 2006 (see CIA 2007), and was ranked 2 011
in The Economist's Quality-of-life Survey that same year; the equivalent figures for Ireland were
$44,500 and 1st.
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not appear pressing in the international context. By their very nature,
oppressive or dominating interpersonal relationships only rarely extend across
borders. And material inequality is much more likely to lead to status
differences, feelings of inferiority, and dissatisfaction when the parties involved
share a relatively circumscribed social or cultural environment, in which
differences in asset endowments are more psychologically salient.156 While with
greater global integration this description may become true of the world as a
whole, it is very doubtful that we have reached that point yet (c.f. Scanlon 2004,
14-15).
Some of the other arguments for material egalitarianism on social or political
grounds look more applicable to global politics, in particular those based on
concerns about the effects of material inequality on autonomy and the fairness
of political and economic institutions. Even in a world of universal decency, the
citizens of wealthier countries can be expected to have greater ability to push
their agendas through shared institutions. This may result both in violations of
substantive or procedural justice, and threats to collective self-determination.157
Note, however, that arguments of this kind do not provide the sort of
independent argument for global egalitarianism that we are looking for here.
This is because, although couched in the language of non-domination and
political autonomy, they essentially reduce to the thesis that inequality produces
unfairness.
The independent case for GRE, then, I suggest, is currently weak. Moreover, I
now want to add, even if the state of affairs at which GRE aims were attractive
on utilitarian grounds, for the above or other reasons, it would remain debatable
whether or not it ought to be a utilitarian goal, in the sense of an object of active
pursuit. Some development economists are of the view that the world's
countries are on a route to convergence in per capita income in the long term.158
If this is correct, global egalitarianism might be but a waiting game, and it might
well be better to let that game run its course rather than make active attempts at
equalization. Whether or not this is so is currently unclear: the convergence
156 Research suggests that the effects of inequality on subjective happiness are at their strongest
when the parties involved are at socially close quarters. Layard cites studies suggesting, for
instance, that one's dissatisfaction with one's own job is inversely related to the amount one's
spouse earns, and that a woman whose sister's husband earns more than her own is more likely to
seek work (44-5). He claims that these tendencies derive from the fact that one interprets the
successes of people within one's close peer group as something that one might have achieved
oneself (44). This particular thought is much less likely to arise when making comparisons
internationally.
157 C.f. Satz: "Even though each country requires a certain threshold of resources, it also requires
relative equality (along certain dimensions) with other nations if it is to remain democratic and
not be dominated by the unaccountable actions of others" (1999, 81); Tan: "[d]ifferences in power
relations between nations, which economic inequality engenders and sustains, obstruct the right
to self-determination of the least advantaged... allow[ing] some nations to more easily exploit
others" (2004, 117).
s 58This is the thesis known as "unconditional convergence". It also comes in a weaker version,
"conditional convergence", according to which poor countries initially grow faster than rich
countries, controlling for differences in such things as rates of savings. See Ray 1998, 74-90.
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hypothesis depends on quite special assumptions, and the tendency to which it
refers is not currently borne out by the data (see Ray 1998, 74-90).
The above discussion suggests that at least the following empirical questions
need to be answered if we are to decide whether or not aiming for greater global
egalitarianism is a sensible utilitarian course. To what extent do resources
continue to produce greater marginal utility in the hands of the worse off than in
those of the better off when the former enjoy levels of wellbeing at or above the
decency threshold? Would international redistribution of resources increase
economic growth? What costs for global welfare would efforts to produce
greater global egalitarianism cause? Will national economies converge in per
capita income (and other global standard goods) on their own steam over the
long run? I suggest that the extreme difficulty of answering each of these
questions, given the current state of our knowledge, makes it much harder to
make the case for an independent principle of resource egalitarianism at the
global level than it is at the domestic level. In the context of domestic politics it
is both much clearer than it is in global politics that inequality in standard goods
poses threats to wellbeing, and much easier to see how it can be addressed - for
instance, via progressive taxation and other familiar redistributive actions on the
part of the state. I am inclined to think, as a result, that utilitarians should be
wary at present of recommending global equality as an independent goal of
global distributive justice, and confine themselves instead to the global decency
goals and principles of fairness argued for earlier.
5.6.1 Global equality through the back door?
I will close by briefly considering the possibility that, even if global resource
egalitarianism is not in itself a desirable goal of global distributive justice (at
least given the current state of our knowledge and capacity) the other goals of
global distributive justice that I have recommended will get us a considerable
way towards it. On the face of it, this may not seem especially likely. If the
developed world continues to proceed up the development ladder, and if the
developing world proceeds more slowly, movements in the direction of global
decency might well coincide with no change, or even an increase, in differences
in access to global standard goods across countries. And, given that I have
rejected the idea that there is a single, all-encompassing global institutional
scheme to which a comprehensive principle of resource egalitarianism might
apply on grounds of fairness, there are limits on the scope of global resource
equalization that fairness might require. However, a certain available move
might serve to amp up the action. It might be claimed that the achievement of
structural fairness in global politics, and/or the attainment of global decency (in
particular, Goal 1) is conditional, as an empirical matter, on a certain degree of
global egalitarianism. Wealthier nations, this argument would go, by virtue of
their superior bargaining power in international negotiations, or by virtue of
their superior purchasing power in international marketsl59, either prevent
159 I noted in Chapter 4 (4.4.2) that it is possible for a country to reduce the satisficing score of
another country quite unintentionally simply by virtue of being economically better off than the
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economic growth in developing countries, or permanently entrench unfair global
terms of association.
While this thesis might be true, the following are some reasons to not leap too
quickly to endorse it. First, the thesis as stated is very strong. There are two
ways in which one might take on board some of it, while holding back from full
support. One might agree that in some cases, inequality in bargaining or
purchasing power between two or more countries obstructs improvements in
satisficing scores or leads to unfairness, while denying that it does so as a quite
general matter. Or, one might agree that inequality in bargaining and
purchasing power temporarily obstructs the achievement of decency or fairness,
while nonetheless denying that it will over the longer term. A second reason for
caution, in the case of decency in particular, is that it is unclear how the implied
alternative - much greater global egalitarianism - would itself stack up where
the promotion of decency is concerned. It is possible that a massively more
equal world would pose significant risks for the achievement of the latter goal,
largely because of the type of global governance that might be required to secure
it. Finally, where the case of fairness is concerned, it can be claimed that while
equalizing power may be one way of preventing unfair bargains from being
struck, it is not clear that it is the only, or the best, way (cf. p. 124 supra).
These points together suggest to me that we should not assume, in advance of
clear evidence to that effect, that fairness and decency require extensive resource
egalitarianism for their achievement.
5.7 Conclusion
The skeptics are correct, then, that utilitarianism, at least for the moment,
provides at best a weak case for equality per se at the global level. The utilitarian
case for fairness, however, wears a different aspect. In spelling out that case, this
chapter has taken issue with a range of theorists on a range of questions. On the
ground of fairness, it has rejected the claim, made by some "cosmopolitans" that
the demands of distributive justice derive from (as Nagel puts it) "a duty of
fairness that we owe in principle to all our fellow human beings" (2005, 119). On
the governance conception of structural fairness such a duty can exist not in
principle, but only in the presence of an appropriately global context of
governance. But this chapter has also rejected Nagel's implication that the only
alternative is to posit a duty of fairness that applies solely between co-citizens.
Such a suggestion rests on an unwarrantedly restricted conception of fairness-
apt governance. On the scope of fairness, relatedly, this chapter has rejected
both the claim that duties of fairness connect us all one to one, while also
rejecting the claim that such duties do not cross the borders of the nation or
polity. On the distributive content of fairness, this chapter has rejected a fully
global form of resource egalitarianism, while also rejecting the claim that
latter. This is due to the fact that the value of one party's resource holdings is in some cases partly
dependent on the amount of resources that other parties hold. If cross-border negative
externalities of this kind are sufficiently severe, they might work against the achievement of Goal
1.
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fairness has no distributive consequences whatsoever internationally. Instead, I
have advocated an intermediate position on each of these questions, one that I
think reflects our considered moral intuitions in response to the distinctive
circumstances of contemporary global politics.
The conception of global distributive fairness argued for in this chapter is also, I
hope to have shown, entirely compatible with utilitarianism (if certainly not
uniquely sanctioned by it). Distributive fairness matters for human wellbeing.
To the extent that principles of the kind that I have endorsed above provide
people with a stake in the continuation of what are on balance generally
beneficial structures of socioeconomic cooperation, have a broadly egalitarian
upshot, and reinforce requirements of decency, as I have argued they do, they
are principles that utilitarians can and should support. Utilitarian theorists of
global distributive justice who suggest otherwise are selling their theory short.
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Chapter 6. The Combined Approach
6.1 Introduction
This chapter draws together the results of Chapters 4 and 5, in order to address
the question of how the distinct goals and principles argued for in the
dissertation are to be jointly pursued. I begin by discussing that question at a
general level, and then present an illustrative application of the combined
account to the specific case of immigration policy. By the end of the chapter I
hope to have shown that the approach to global distributive justice that I have
developed in the preceding chapters is not only appealing at the theoretical level,
but also provides a sensible and useful way of framing and addressing some
pressing substantive issues in contemporary global politics.
6.2 Pluralism and the priority problem
In this dissertation I have advocated a pluralist account of utilitarian global
distributive justice: one which construes global decency and fairness as two
distinct and important aspects of the utilitarian moral project. The pluralistic
nature of this account raises the possibility that the distinct goals and principles
that it posits will in practice come into conflict with each other. Although all
moral reasons for action can, on a utilitarian view, ultimately be traced back to a
single reason, at the secondary level - the level at which principles of
distributive justice operate - they are likely to compete for our attention and
resources. How should any conflicts between the demands of decency and
fairness in global politics be settled?
In discussing this question, it will be useful to have in mind a specific case, or set
of cases, in which conflicts of the kind at issue might arise. The case of
international trade will serve this purpose well. International trade, as
previous chapters have shown, is an area in which decency and fairness are both
strongly engaged. This is because cross-border trade not only has the potential
to significantly affect the satisficing scores of political communities (for better or
for worse), but also takes place within a fairness-apt context of association:
involving regular, intentional, normatively-guided, alterable and distributively
consequential collective behavior.
6.2.1 Case study: International Trade
The first thing to note is that, in regard to many aspects of the multilateral
trading regime, considerations of decency and fairness point in much the same
direction. As a specific example, take the recent developments concerning trade
in ideas and services encapsulated in the WTO's TRIPS and GATS agreements.
TRIPS (Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property) introduces a single global
blueprint for the protection of intellectual property rights, involving the
extension across all WTO member countries of minimal regulations concerning
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patents, copyrights, geographical indicators, and industrial designs. GATS (The
General Agreement on Trade in Services) promotes the extensive liberalization
of trade in a wide range of services, including insurance, banking, tourism, and
electricity and water provision. This involves the removal of restrictions on
foreign investment, the nature of service suppliers and the quality of service
output.
TRIPS and GATS are commonly criticized on grounds of both decency and
fairness. Take first decency. Many have claimed that TRIPS poses important
threats to economic development, public health and food security in developing
countries. Although in developed countries patent protection provides an
important impetus to technological innovation, it can have quite the opposite
effect in countries at an earlier stage of development, given that it restricts the
capacity of the latter to imitate technologies created by the former. In the health
sector, TRIPS delays the entry of generic medicines into the market, keeping
prices high and out of the reach of the global poor. In the agricultural sector it
threatens the rights of poor farmers to save, exchange and sell seeds, thereby
rendering access to vital foodstuffs insecure (Oxfam 2002, 213-220). GATS, it is
argued, poses similarly serious threats in the area of public service provision.
The annexing of utilities (and perhaps, in the future, health care and education)
by foreign companies threatens to compound the problems - such as
unaccountability, fragmentation of services, and limited provision in marginal
areas - that domestic privatization can cause, with serious welfare implications
for the poor (Oxfam 2002, 227-9). Water, electricity, health and plant genetic
material are vital public goods, essential to the basic wellbeing of all citizens.
Decency requires that they be protected, and, if the empirical claims made above
are correct, that TRIPs and GATS therefore be reformed.16 0
But other common criticisms of TRIPS and GATS go beyond these decency-
related concerns, to question, on equity grounds, the way in which each
agreement distributes benefits and burdens across countries. These additional
concerns, I suggest, are well captured by the principles of fairness that I
advocated in Chapter 5. I argued there that, if it is to be fair, the multilateral
trading regime must satisfy the following three principles:
Fair Benefit and Burden. The benefits and burdens created by the multilateral
trading system ought to be distributed equally amongst participants, unless
special justification can be given for unequal treatment.
Fair Inclusion. People affected by trade are to be provided with the material
basis for market access to be of real benefit.
16o This claim is expressed cautiously, because there exists controversy over the merits of both
agreements, in terms of development and the interests of the poor. The World Bank reports that
the distributional effects of infrastructure privatization in Latin America have been a "mixed bag"
(2005, 171), sometimes resulting in improved access for the poor. And some argue that the
incentive effects of international patent protection will benefit developing countries in the long
run (though see fn 162 infra).
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Fair Return. Trade-related concessions made by one country to another ought
to be returned by the latter in the form of trade-related concessions conferring a
similar benefit.
Insofar as TRIPS and GATS pose barriers to development of the kind just
discussed, they threaten to work against the satisfaction of Fair Inclusion. They
also undermine the satisfaction of Fair Benefit and Burden, given that both
agreements are significantly more beneficial to citizens of the developed world
than they are to those of the developing world. The huge majority of the
intellectual property rendered eligible for international patent protection under
TRIPS derives from industrialized countries. This means that the agreement
will result in a significant transfer of resources from the developing to the
developed world. 161 Similarly, it is foreign service providers from the developed
world who will derive by far the greatest advantage from GATS, and the poor of
the developing world who will absorb by far the greatest risks. There seems no
moral justification available for this extremely differential impact, given that
alternative policies are available that would preserve some of the mutually
beneficial aspects of these agreements, while tempering their more harmful
aspects.162 Finally, both TRIPS and GATS arguably represent a failure of the
norm of reciprocity encapsulated in Fair Return. Universal adherence to a single
set of regulations concerning trade in services and ideas may appear to satisfy
the reciprocity-related principle of "one rule for all". But in fact the concessions
made by developing countries in complying with the regulations in question are
much more burdensome than those made by developed countries, by virtue of
their distinct position on the development trajectory.163 Once this inequality of
impact is recognized, allowing exemptions for developing countries does not
look like a failure of reciprocal adherence to a universal rule, but rather the
application of a single, more sophisticated, rule to parties who differ in relevant
respects. A further, more overt, violation of Fair Return is apparent in the fact
that developing countries were pressured into signing TRIPs and GATS in
exchange for promised increases in market access that have largely failed to
materialize.
Where TRIPs and GATS are concerned, then, as with many other aspects of the
multilateral trading regime, decency and fairness are both engaged, and may
well converge, broadly, on both common criticisms and common policy
161 Chaudhuri, Goldberg and Jia (2004) suggest that foreign producers would gain something like
$53 million per year if India satisfied international patent protection standards - while the Indian
economy would lose $450 million, $400 million of which would have gone to consumers.
162 Where pharmaceutical patents are concerned, the World Bank claims that, in cases where "rich
country markets already support the cost of research, poor countries could be allowed to produce
or import cheaper generic substitutes, at no significant cost to either rich countries or the firms
that carry out research", resulting in "more equitable provision without undermining efficiency"
(2005, 214). In support of this suggestion, the Bank cites research that estimates that extending
patent protection to developing countries to 20 yrs would be equivalent, for firm profits, to
extending patents in developed countries by two weeks (Lanjouw and Jack 2004).
163 The World Bank reports that "[c]ountries adopting patent protection today are doing so at
levels of GDP between $500 and $8,000 per capita, while OECD countries did so when their GDP
per capita was around $20,000 in 1995 prices" (2005, 214).
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recommendations.164 The obvious reason for such convergence is that the worst
off participants in the multilateral trading system are very badly off in absolute
terms. Insofar as they are likely to either worsen the situation of the worst off,
or to obstruct potential improvements in that situation, unequal burdens from
trade, insufficient inclusion and unreciprocated concessions, besides being
unfair, are also very likely to reduce or stagnate satisficing scores globally. This
means that, in our world, an equitable system of international trade is very
plausibly a necessary condition of the achievement of global decency over the
long term.
This last claim is so plausible that it is apt to obscure the fact that the potential
nonetheless exists for conflicts, in the shorter term, between the goals of decency
and fair treatment in regard to international trade. In order to understand how
such conflicts might arise, note the following two features of the global decency
goals for which I have argued. First, they are capable (we can assume) of being
achieved by means of targeted action. We can in principle work towards global
decency by focusing our attention on any subset of the world's population that
we choose, as long as we get to them all in the end. Second, the global decency
goals contain no in-built, principled tendency towards equality. Fairness differs
in both of these respects. First, the treatment that fairness calls for is universal
in nature: it must be metered out to all participants in the relevant context of
governance, not only to some of them. Targeted fairness is not fairness at all.
Second, although fairness does not always require substantively egalitarian
outcomes, it does in many contexts provide a reliable push in the direction of
equality.
These contrasting features result in the potential for two distinct kinds of
conflict between global decency and fairness. The first derives from the fact that
decency might sometimes best be promoted by means of "targeted" actions that
are incompatible with fairness, by virtue of the latter's commitment to universal
forms of treatment. As an example, take the following case mentioned by James,
again relating to international trade:
[S]uppose that, because India and China combined contain much of the world's
population, and much of the world's poor, the WTO could maximize poverty
reduction globally by allowing trade only with these countries. Perhaps each
country is to erect high trade barriers against the rest of the developing and less
developed world. We would not call this fairness in trade...the poor of Latin
America and Sub-Saharan Africa are supposed to have a chance to benefit from
access to global markets, even if that chance costs the poor elsewhere. (200oo6,
716)
164 If the empirical claims referred to above are correct (and that is open to debate), the following
measures would arguably be recommended. Where TRIPS is concerned, permissions for more
flexible, short-term and narrowly-scoped patent protections in developing countries, and a
strengthening of the overly weak public health and food security safeguards included in article 8;
where GATS is concerned, minimally, an exclusion of public services from liberalization
requirements.
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This conclusion can be interpreted as a minimal implication of Fair Inclusion - it
being a necessary condition of people affected by trade having genuinely
beneficial market access that those people have market access to begin with.
Another case in which a conflict between Fair Inclusion and decency might
arise, this time more directly, is the following. Say we have limited resources to
devote to trade-related technical assistance. We could either give all LDCs a
little infrastructural support (enough to make a genuine difference, although
only a small one), or we could give one country a great deal, thereby (we can
optimistically assume) propelling it into a course of sustained pro-poor
development. Again, this would seem to be a defeat for fairness at the same time
as being a victory for decency.
The second kind of potential conflict between decency and fairness derives from
the fact that the state of affairs at which decency aims might sometimes best be
promoted by means of unequal distributions of benefits and burdens that
fairness, by virtue of its egalitarian tendency, rules out in that particular
instance. Say that we could modify the multilateral trading regime so that some
or all developing countries were given privileges far in excess of the "special and
differential treatment" to which they are entitled on grounds of fairness,
including no requirement to reciprocate trade concessions made by developed
countries, even in cases where such concessions would not be especially
burdensome. Such inegalitarianism, while violating Fair Benefit and Burden
and Fair Return, might, under certain conditions, be maximally conducive to
global decency. A failure to institute a reform of this kind under those
conditions would represent a commitment, at least in the short term, to fairness
over decency.
6.2.2 Options
How should such conflicts be resolved? Should any fairness concerns raised by
the multilateral trading regime, or other international contexts of governance, be
traded off against potential improvements in the satisficing scores of developing
countries? If so, to what extent? And how?
Strict lexical priority
One simple way to resolve conflicts between competing goals or principles is to
opt for a system of strict lexical priority, according to which, in any situation in
which the requirements of one goal or principle conflict with those of another,
one of the two is allowed systematically to prevail. This is not an attractive
option in the case at hand, in either of its variants. Consider, first, the "fairness
before decency" option. Many moral theorists are of the view that duties of
fairness do, as a quite general matter, take priority over duties to promote
wellbeing. But a claim of this sort is in fact very difficult to sustain. For it is not
only easy to think of duties of decency that are exceedingly urgent (for instance,
that of providing the starving with food), but it is likewise easy to think of duties
of fairness that do not seem very urgent at all (such as sharing the fondue fairly
with one's spouse). I suggest that very few people, besides those hardy souls
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who deny that we are under any moral obligation to assist needy others in cases
where they are nearby and we can do so at little cost, would claim that if I am
faced with the options of giving the second half of the fondue to a nearby person
who would otherwise starve, or saving it for my spouse, my duty to do the latter
is more urgent than my duty to do the former. Cases such as these suggest that,
as far as urgency is concerned, decency taken quite generally is, at the very least,
morally on a par with fairness.16 5 If this is so, utilitarians should agree with
Risse that, in at least some cases, "[t]ransitory unfairness might be the price to
pay for developing countries to beat poverty and eventually to reach a stage
where such concerns can be taken more seriously...disregarding fairness
concerns (perhaps temporarily) is warranted if sufficiently good and likely
consequences outweigh them" (2006).
Perhaps, it might be suggested, we should go further than this, and endorse the
alternative lexical ordering, according to which duties of decency systematically
prevail over duties of fairness. This move might be expected to be especially
attractive to a utilitarian, given the strength, underscored at the beginning of
Chapter 4, of the utilitarian argument for decency. The "decency before
fairness" option, however, looks similarly unsatisfactory, for the following
reason. The global decency goals argued for in Chapter 4 are likely to take quite
some time to secure. If we were to claim that decency always took priority over
fairness, this fact would mean that, for some significant period of time into the
future, reasons of fairness would be constantly at risk of being trumped by
reasons of decency. But this possibility is worrying. Practices of fairness, to an
extent greater than practices of decency, are dependent for their long-term
viability on sustained compliance. They are not the sorts of things that can be
repeatedly violated and nonetheless sustain themselves over the long term. But
the maintenance of practices of fairness over the long term is, as I earlier argued,
something that utilitarians, as much as anyone else, should want. The utilitarian
value of fair relations is too important for a quite general presumption in favor
of decency to be justified.
Intuitionistic balancing
The implication of the above is that no quite general lexical priority rule will
serve our purposes here. One route to take in response is to deny that there is
any general answer to the question to be had. Perhaps utilitarians ought to
advocate an account of global distributive justice that resembles the
"intuitionistic" "mixed conceptions" of domestic distributive justice that Rawls
describes in A Theory of Justice (1971, 107). Such conceptions "direct us to
165 Why, despite the plausibility of this claim, are duties of fairness (often equated with justice)
frequently claimed to be especially urgent, compared to duties of other kinds? Campbell suggests
that "the idea that justice must be overriding attaches to the rather vague use of 'justice', in which
it is equivalent to 'rightness'"(1974, 1, 4). Campbell claims that when we remind ourselves that
justice is not best seen as "a synonym for rightness, even rightness in distribution, but as having
to do with a specialized range of right-making characteristics, then it is perfectly in order to
regard humanity as, in certain cases, overriding justice. Sometimes it is more important to relieve
distress than to be fair" (1974, 14).
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follow a plurality of ends" (279), but provide no priority rule for determining the
balancing of those ends against each other (1971, 32). On such an approach,
conflicts or trade-offs between the goals or principles selected are to be decided
on a case-by-case basis in accordance with what seems on reflection to be
appropriate.
Rawls appears to have three distinct concerns regarding intuitionistic mixed
conceptions of justice. The first is that such conceptions, in lacking
"constructive and recognizably ethical criteria" (1971, 36) for solving "the
priority problem", lack something that is necessary if a conception of justice is to
provide a theory of justice, rather than merely a kind of optimistic stab in the
moral dark. How to weigh the importance of various social goals against each
other, or how to settle conflicts that arise in their pursuit, is a large part of what
a conception of justice is for.166 The second concern is that intuitionistic mixed
conceptions, in lacking the relevant priority rules, fail to provide sufficient
guidance for policy-making. They only give unequivocal advice when all of their
distinct goals or principles point in the same direction, but such happy
coincidences may be rare. The third concern, suggested in other parts of
Theory, and in Rawls' later work, is that resort to intuitionistic balancing
undermines satisfaction of the "publicity condition" on an acceptable conception
of social justice. This condition is satisfied when "everyone accepts, and knows
that everyone else accepts, the very same principles of justice" and the basic
structure "is publicly known, or with good reason believed, to satisfy these
principles" (1993, 35).167 Appeals to intuition in the weighing of priorities can be
expected to violate this condition, given that their necessarily private nature
disqualifies them as a fully public criterion for decision-making.
I submit that the first of these concerns is at least less worrying in the case of an
indirect utilitarian account of justice of the kind offered here than in the case of
the specific mixed conceptions that Rawls has in mind. This is because the
indeterminacy that concerns Rawls in the first criticism would not go all the way
down on an indirect utilitarian view. The utilitarian, unlike the intuitionist with
whom Rawls is concerned, does at least have a (highly) general answer to the
question of which principle or goal ought to prevail over the others in any
specific situation. That policy should be chosen which, of the available
166 See Rawls 1971, 279:
It must be recognized that a fairly detailed weighing of aims is implicit in a reasonably
complete conception of justice. In everyday life we often content ourselves with
enumerating common sense precepts and objectives of policy, adding that on particular
questions we have to balance them in the light of the general facts of the situation. While
this is sound practical advice, it does not express an articulated conception of justice.
167 At 1993, 68, Rawls emphasizes the importance of the publicity condition for ensuring that
citizens are not mistaken or deceived about the workings of the basic structure, and the way in
which it shapes their self-conception and personal aims. He claims that this is necessary if
citizens are to be "fully autonomous, politically speaking". Satisfaction of the publicity condition
is also arguably necessary as insurance against the abuse of public power.
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alternatives, maximizes aggregate wellbeing over the long run. Moreover, we
can derive from that general answer an explanation for why a more specific
answer to the priority problem is very difficult to give. Whether it is the
decency-promoting or the fairness-respecting policy that maximizes utility in a
given case of conflict will depend on contingent facts about how the world is at
the time at which the decision is made. Any attempt to settle the issue in a
determinate way in advance of looking at those facts is therefore almost bound
to result in implausible implications in regard to some cases.
If this response at least partly lessens the force of Rawls' first concern about
intuitionistic balancing, however, it leaves the second and third concerns quite
intact. For, although the indirect utilitarian has something general to say about
the specific answer that is called for in a specific situation, until she has said
something about how the distinct elements of her view are to be balanced
against each other in cases of conflict, she is not guaranteed to have that specific
answer itself. Still less is she guaranteed to have an answer that the public will
be sure to recognize as legitimate. Certainly, the utilitarian who resorts to
intuitionistic balancing is not completely at sea in the face of such conflicts. It is
pretty clear, for instance, that which of decency or fairness should take priority
in a given instance of conflict will depend in part on the size of the hit that each
would take if the other prevailed. But in the end, the line will have to be, we
simply have to resort to debate and judgment concerning how best to weigh the
conflicting considerations against each other.
How worrying ought this to be? The answer, I suggest, is "not very". It would
certainly be excellent if our theory of justice were to provide us with a set of rules
that allowed us to be sure of always making the right decision when conflicts
between decency and fairness arose. But if no such set of rules is available, it
will be the theory that claims to provide it that is the proper object of criticism,
rather than the theory that makes no such pretension. Given, then, that their
underlying theory casts strong doubt on the possibility of the set of rules in
question, I suggest that utilitarians should be wary of offering a determinate,
specific answer to the priority problem in this case. It is worth emphasizing that
a utilitarian theory of global distributive justice retains considerable practical
usefulness, even in the absence of such an answer. Perhaps the most important
role that it can play is to "single out the criteria which are significant, the
apparent axes, so to speak, of our considered judgments of social justice" (Rawls
1971, 34), thereby making clear what exactly is at stake in a given context of
political decision, and why we should care about it. This is no small thing, and
leaves a utilitarian ample room for normative analysis and guidance in many
situations.
Perhaps the best way to show this, and thereby to defend the pluralist account of
global distributive justice advocated here against the charge of indeterminacy, is
to present that account in action. The remainder of this chapter takes on that
task, in the form of an application of the combined approach to the issue of
immigration. The ethics of immigration is not only a topic of great practical
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urgency, but also one that is thought by some to pose pressing challenges to
traditional approaches to distributive justice. If I can show that the utilitarian
account advocated here provides a sensible and useful way of understanding and
addressing the various moral questions raised by immigration policy, that will be
a significant point in favor of my approach more generally.
6.3 Application: Decency, Fairness and Immigration
I will here be using the term "immigration" broadly, to cover each of the various
ways in which foreigners can be admitted on a non-tourist basis into a country:
as guest workers on temporary visas, as permanent residents, or as new citizens.
My focus is not on the question of how precisely the policies of a single state are
to be set on these matters, but rather on the question of what moral constraints
states in general face when setting controls on immigration into their territories.
This question can be restated in one of two ways, depending on where one takes
the burden of justification to lie. One can ask which conditions render it morally
legitimate for a state to restrict the entry of immigrants. Or one can ask which
conditions render demands on the part of individuals to enter a state morally
compelling. These questions are not only moral questions, but also, more
specifically, questions of distributive justice, of both the domestic and global
kinds. The immigration policies of the world's states have massive distributive
consequences, both within those individual states, and globally. As a result,
immigration controls call into play not only matters of both decency and
fairness, but also many of the other issues discussed in earlier chapters of this
dissertation, including the moral justification for the state system, the value of
collective self-determination, and the proper balance between the duties of
states to promote national and global welfare.
The aims of the discussion are limited in two ways. First, I make no attempt to
provide a complete treatment of the issues involved. Any discussion of the ethics
of immigration needs to take account not only of the differing political and
economic circumstances that obtain in different countries, but also of the fact
that potential immigrants fall into distinct categories, each of which gives rise to
distinct moral reasons for admission or exclusion.'68 In what follows I will
largely be eliding these differences; a fuller treatment would need to pay explicit
attention to them. Second, although I will rely on empirical claims at some
points, the value of the discussion should not be taken to rest too heavily on the
truth of those claims. This is because my goal here is to not to establish the
relevant facts, but to demonstrate how those facts, whatever they turn out to be,
ought to feed into normative theorizing about immigration policy. Hopefully
such a demonstration is capable of surviving a revelation that the empirical
situation is different than I assume.
168 For instance, some potential immigrants are fleeing political persecution, war, natural disaster
or famine, others attempting to improve their economic prospects or take advantage of non-
economic opportunities unavailable in their own country, others joining relations already
overseas.
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In what follows I will be working on the assumption that at least some
restrictions on immigration are morally justified. I will begin with a brief
defense of this assumption, against two influential arguments to the contrary.
The first of these arguments, advocated by Joseph Carens (1992, inter alia),
presents (nearly) open borders as a basic implication of liberal egalitarianism.
Carens' argument goes, in summary, as follows:
1. Liberal egalitarians are committed to the moral equality of all persons.
2. Treating all persons as moral equals requires not using morally arbitrary facts
about those persons (such as their race, gender, or sexual orientation) to justify
inequalities in their treatment.
3. All facts about a person over which that person had no choice are morally
arbitrary.
4. The two grounds used for allocating citizenship in the modern world - the
country in which one is born, or the nationality of one's parents -- are unchosen.
5. Immigration restrictions involve the granting of unequal rights on the basis of
citizenship.
6. Immigration restrictions are inconsistent with a commitment to moral
equality.
7. Immigration restrictions are inconsistent with liberal egalitarianism.
Carens interprets this argument as showing that global freedom of movement is
a basic human right.
Carens' position is open to three lines of criticism. First, the conclusion that
global freedom of movement is a basic human right is, on its face, implausible.
Human rights are generally understood both to be universal and to imply duties
the violation of which is a severe moral wrong. But a putative right to immigrate
lacks both of these features. While some people may have very compelling
claims to move to other countries, others do not. A refusal to allow an affluent
American to move to the U.K., for instance, does not look obviously
impermissible. Nor is such a refusal plausibly in the same category as an act of
torture or arbitrary imprisonment, as far as moral gravity is concerned. Second,
the claim that free movement is a human right is difficult to reconcile with the
exceptions to that freedom that Carens himself recognizes. Carens allows that if
waves of immigration, by virtue of sheer numbers, pose a genuine threat to
public order or to a nation's distinctive cultural identity or way of life, this will be
grounds for legitimate exclusion (1992, 28). Duties to respect human rights,
however, are generally thought to be the sorts of things to which exceptions are
only very rarely, if ever, permitted. Third, and most importantly, Carens'
argument for his conclusion is flawed. The problem lies with premise 3, as given
above. The mere fact that a person has not chosen one of her attributes does not
render that attribute morally arbitrary, and hence does not render that attribute
144
an impermissible justification for unequal treatment. Although I did not choose
to be very poor at basketball, for instance, denying me admission to the NBA on
that basis is not morally wrong. Note that if we reject premise 3, as we should,
space is opened up for the claim that citizenship is a morally legitimate basis for
differentiating between the rights of distinct individuals. From a utilitarian
perspective, the extent to which this is so will properly depend, not, contra
Carens, on a matter of basic principle, but instead on facts about the
consequences for global welfare of different systems of immigration regulation.
The second main argument given for open borders takes a route of this latter
kind. Economists from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman have argued that, by
creating massive differences in returns to labor in distinct parts of the world,
constraints on the movement of people across national borders obstruct the free
and efficient operation of the market, thereby decreasing global welfare. While
this argument for open borders is more likely to appeal to a utilitarian than the
preceding one, it is nonetheless vulnerable to two pressing objections. First, it
does not take sufficient account of some of the more negative economic effects
that are likely to arise from allowing unrestricted immigration. An open borders
policy would probably be economically catastrophic for developed countries, due
to the sudden and massive influx of people from the developing world that it
would doubtless produce. Given that the developed world generates by far the
lion's share of the world's economic goods, this result would very likely cancel
out any beneficial effects of global labor market deregulation. Similar economic
concerns are raised by Barry's suggestion that open borders would result in the
extinction of liberal democracy worldwide, and a massive reduction in the
world's capacity to deal with pressing environmental challenges (1992, 282).169
But, second, even if it could be shown, against these points, that an open borders
policy would result in a more productive global economy, this would be
insufficient to close the deal in favor of it. What needs to be shown for that
purpose is that the more productive global economy that is envisaged would
coincide with greater global wellbeing. This latter claim is far from obvious.
Among the more important non-economic benefits that are provided by a
system of relatively self-contained states of the kind we see today are political
stability, social solidarity, substantively democratic politics, and the
maintenance of a relatively stable and flourishing culture (see section 2.3.1
supra). Unrestricted immigration would plausibly drastically undermine these
goods for those in the developed world who currently enjoy them. And, in so
doing, it would be highly likely to undermine the possibility of those goods also
being extended, eventually, to the remainder of the world's population.
I think that the foregoing discussion provides a strong justification for the
placing of at least some restrictions on immigration. The question we should be
interested in, then, is that of how far those restrictions ought to extend. The
169 "Faltering as the response of the industrial countries to 'green' issues has been, they are the
only ones with the money and technology to act effectively, and will have to bankroll the rest of
the world to do what has to be done. In the dystopia of open borders, there would be no countries
with the capacity to act" (Barry 1992, 282).
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conception of distributive justice that I have been advocating in this dissertation
suggests that we should approach this question in the following way. Faced with
a range of relatively more liberal and relatively less liberal immigration controls,
we should first consider which spot on the relevant spectrum would be most
conducive to a) the achievement of global decency, and b) the satisfaction of any
relevant principles of global or international fairness. Second, we should
consider whether or not the position that is recommended by the foregoing
considerations is appropriately responsive to c) the rights of states to promote
domestic welfare, within the limits imposed by their negative and positive duties
of global distributive justice. Third, if conflicts between these various
considerations are evident, we should consider what balance between them
seems most likely to promote maximal global wellbeing over the long run. The
following discussion will be structured along these lines.
6.3.1 Decency and immigration
I argued in Chapter 4 that our secondary duty to ensure that as many individuals
as possible attain at least a minimally decent level of wellbeing is best expressed,
at the global level, in the form of these two goals:
Goal 1. Indirect Global Maxificing. A world in which all political communities
ensure, sustainably, and in a way not dependent on external aid, that the large
majority of their population satisfices
Goal 2. Global Humanitarian Assistance. Fulfillment on the part of outsiders of
the basic needs of those whose own political community proves unable or
unwilling to assist them (as in the case of natural emergencies, civil war, or
severe and systematic poverty).
An increase in immigration from its current levels can be expected to further
both of these goals. As far as Goal 2 is concerned, a relaxation of restrictions on
either permanent or temporary migration would allow those fleeing from
humanitarian disasters to move more easily than at present to places of refuge.
And Goal 1 is highly likely to be promoted by increases in temporary labor
migration to industrialized countries, which can be expected to have a number of
very positive effects on third world development.
The most direct of these benefits derive from remittances (income sent home by
migrant workers), which already constitute a major source of foreign exchange
for many developing countries.170 Remittances are not only lucrative, but also
offer a reliable source of revenue, given that the service sector, from which they
chiefly derive, is more stable than other sectors in the industrialized world.
Income provided by overseas earnings is used by individual workers both to
improve their family's standard of living and opportunities for investment, and
to fund community projects. If taxed by the government, remittances can also
170 The UNDP reports that in Vietnam remittance inflows account for around lo% of export
revenues and are roughly equivalent to the annual flows of overseas development assistance or
FDI. (UNDP 2006, loo).
146
be used to finance public development initiatives. Besides these direct benefits
in the form of increased revenue, temporary labor migration also results in more
indirect social and economic boons for sending countries. Migrant labor
produces experience, skills and contacts that can contribute to economic growth
in the sending country, and strengthens the social and economic freedom of
women (who make up the majority of migrants from many countries), with
positive knock-on effects for general development.
There are two main reasons to support a global development strategy focused
primarily on temporary migration over permanent immigration. First, the
positive development effects mentioned above are significantly more beneficial
in the case of short rather than long term migration. Long-term migrants are
less likely to send earnings home, and the permanent departure of skilled
professionals can produce detrimental labor shortages in sending countries.171
Second, increases in permanent immigration are politically very difficult to
effect. While increases in temporary labor migration are by no means
uncontroversial either, they are a good deal less so.
It is sometimes suggested that reliance on migration as a development tool is
fundamentally misguided. Would it not be simpler to move the goods to where
the people are, rather than vice versa? Tushnet writes, along these lines, that "to
the extent that migration occurs because of the maldistribution of the world's
resources, the proper response lies...in revising the distribution of wealth" (1995,
151). If this claim is interpreted as suggesting that liberalized labor movement is
only one of a number of strategies that ought to be employed for promoting
global decency, the point is well taken. If it is interpreted as suggesting that
liberalized labor movement is not an important one of those strategies, it is
mistaken. Increased migration has the edge over other methods of global
redistribution in several respects. Labor migration, within appropriate limits, is
likely to be more economically efficient than foreign aid. It is also bypasses the
problems of corrupt and ineffective political institutions in developing countries
that bedevil some foreign aid efforts.172 Unlike many other major development
strategies, we have strong evidence that it works. And targeted and well-
regulated programs of temporary labor migration are likely to have a better hope
of success in at least some industrialized countries than campaigns to increase
overseas aid from its stably meager levels.
If the empirical claims made above are correct, the preceding points would
constitute a strong case on decency grounds for the liberalization of temporary
international labor movement. How much liberalization would be desirable? As
171 The UNDP claims that, in the case of the Philippines, the departure of professional and
technical workers (who make up one third of its migrant workers) has led to significant labor
shortages in the health sector. Between 1995 and 2000, the number of registered nurses fell from
27,272 to 5, 874 (2oo6, 103).
172 Pritchett claims that "if rich countries were to permit a mere 3 percent increase in the size of
their labor force by easing restrictions on labor mobility, the benefits to citizens of poor countries
would be $3o5 billion a year--almost twice the combined annual benefits of full trade
liberalization, foreign aid and debt relief" (2006, 1)
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the earlier discussion of open borders suggested, there are limits on how many
people are able to migrate to the developed world without undermining the
absorption and wealth-generating capacities of the latter. Clearly, if global
decency is our goal, increases in temporary labor migration should not proceed
beyond the point at which admission of foreigners would reduce the prospect of
achieving that goal over the long term. But it is almost certain that that limit
point is currently very distant.173 On grounds of decency, then, the developed
world is plausibly required to admit many more workers from the developing
world than it does at present.
6.3.2. Fairness and immigration
An argument for fairly extensive international labor migration can, then, be
derived from the goal of global decency. But global distributive justice, I argued
in Chapter 5, is about more than decency. A full account of the ethics of
immigration policy also needs to consider how principles of global or
international fairness might apply to it.
Eric Cavallero presents an argument for the relevance of fairness to immigration
in his 2006. The argument is based on a principle that Cavallero terms "the
cosmopolitan premise", according to which "ongoing institutions of
international law should not systematically disadvantage anyone on the basis of
involuntary national citizenship or national origin" (2006, 98). Cavallero
suggests that this principle is violated in our world, as indicated by the failure of
that world to exhibit "immigration-pressure equilibrium": the state in which the
ratio of people wanting to enter and to leave is identical for all countries.174 He
argues that fairness implies that, until we reach the equilibrium in question,
countries under positive immigration pressure - countries that, on balance,
more people want to enter than leave - have a duty to assist countries under
negative immigration pressure - those that, on balance, more people want to
leave than enter. This duty can be discharged either by increasing immigration
from countries under negative immigration pressure, or by providing aid that
will make those countries a more appealing place to stay. To put this proposal in
the terms I have been employing, international law (or, more specifically, that
part of it which confers on states the right to restrict immigration, which I will
refer to as "IIL", for "international immigration law"), is the intended context of
173 The World Bank reports research by Walmsley and Winters (2002) that suggests that an
increase of temporary migration into industrial countries by 3 percent of host countries' current
skilled and unskilled workforce would not even begin to compromise the latter countries' ability
to promote decency. Such an increase - "equivalent to permitting an extra 8 million skilled and
8.4 million unskilled workers to be employed at any time, roughly a doubling of current net
migration into high income countries" - would, it is claimed, result in "an estimated increase in
world welfare of more than 150 billion a year...shared fairly equally between developing- and
developed-country citizens" (World Bank 2005, 209).
174 Cavallero has in mind not actual but hypothetical desires to immigrate: specifically, those
desires that would exist if the process of applying for a visa were realistically possible, and the
necessary material means for relocation were realistically available, for all who might be
interested in applying.
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governance; non-discrimination the relevant norm of fairness; and "life
prospects" or "opportunities" the metric of fairness.
One way of rejecting Cavallero's argument is to claim that the norm of non-
discrimination is applicable solely to domestic legal systems or, less radically,
that, whether or not it applies to contexts other than the state, it at least does not
apply to international law. Nagel (2005) rejects the claim that immigration
policy is a proper target for claims of fairness on the first of these grounds175,
Rawls (1999) on the second. In Chapter 5 I disagreed. According to the
governance conception of structural fairness that I endorsed there, IIL is a
plausible subject for norms of fairness. It involves regular, intentional and
normatively guided collective behavior, is chosen in the presence of feasible
alternatives (e.g. open borders), and has a consequential impact on the life
prospects of those whom it affects. It is therefore a context of governance
within which a norm of non-discrimination might well be appropriate.
In my view, the main problem with Cavallero's argument is not the norm of
fairness that he selects, but rather his choice of metric: his understanding of
what it is that we are to use to compare relative advantage under IIL (see 1.3
supra). Cavallero claims that political communities are systematically
disadvantaged by IIL compared to other communities if their members have
"generally lower life prospects that are in some part explained" (98) by IIL. I am
with him thus far.176 Under the governance conception adopted in Chapter 5,
structural fairness is concerned only with created advantages and disadvantages:
those produced by the context of governance at issue. Cavallero then goes on,
however, to claim that the solution to the systematic disadvantage that he
identifies by reference to this criterion in the contemporary world is to "equalize
opportunities for success across international borders" (1oo, italics mine). This
is mistaken. If differences in life prospects are only partly explained by IIL (a
possibility that Cavallero himself leaves room for in the earlier citation), such
equalization will not be fair. And a merely partial explanation is surely what we
have here. Global inequality of opportunity is not produced simply by the bare
fact that international law allows for immigration restrictions. It also has
domestic causes, such as differing economic systems, population sizes and
natural resource endowments.177 These domestic factors created differences in
175 "The immigration policies of one country may impose large effects on the lives of those living in
other countries, but under the political conception that by itself does not imply that such policies
should be determined in a way that gives the interests and opportunities of those others equal
consideration. Immigration policies are simply enforced against the nationals of other states; the
laws are not imposed in their name, nor are they asked to accept and uphold those laws. Since no
acceptance is demanded of them, no justification is required that explains why they should accept
such discriminatory policies, or why their interests have been given equal consideration. It is
sufficient justification to claim that the policies do not violate their prepolitical human rights."
(Nagel 2005, 129-30)
176 Or, at least, I am with him if we construe those opportunities or prospects in terms of resource
holdings (see 1.3.3 supra), which Cavallero notes as one of the options (98).
77 This move, as should be clear, is analogous to the one made earlier in regard to the global
property regime in natural resources. It parallels the first reason that I gave for rejecting
egalitarian distributive outcomes as an implication of fairness, applied to that regime (5.4-1).
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the opportunities available to individuals belonging to distinct political
communities before international law was ever invented. It is inappropriate,
then, to hold international law to account for all of those differences.
As suggested above, we can interpret this as a disagreement over the metric of
fairness under IIL. When comparing relative advantage under the latter, we
should not focus on all differences in opportunities or life prospects, but only on
that subset of differences that is traceable to IIL. My second disagreement with
Cavallero is of a more explicitly moral nature. Although Cavallero explicitly
leaves the normative basis of his argument undefended (98), the emphasis on
involuntariness in his "cosmopolitan premise" suggests that he shares Carens'
view that allowing unchosen facts about a person to justify inequalities in their
treatment constitutes discrimination on morally arbitrary grounds. I argued
above against Carens that this alleged connection between involuntary attributes
and morally arbitrary treatment ought to be severed. We should at least leave
room for the possibility that there is a non-arbitrary moral justification for
giving a person's nationality weight in certain global allocations of rights or
resources, even if nationality is unchosen.
A helpful way of clarifying the nature of these disagreements between Cavallero
and myself is to replace Cavallero's "cosmopolitan premise" with the following
principle, which I take it that we both endorse:
Fair Immigration. The benefits and burdens created by international law on
immigration ought to be distributed equally amongst participants, unless special
justification can be given for unequal treatment.
The differences highlighted above are that a) Cavallero slips into construing the
relevant benefits and burdens too broadly, and b) assumes that nationality
cannot be a candidate for a special justification for unequal treatment in this
context.
If Fair Immigration does not have the extensive redistributive implications that
Cavallero has in mind, what distributive outcomes does it imply instead in our
world? To answer this question precisely we would need to determine exactly
which opportunity differences are created by ILL. It is clear that doing so will be
very difficult; indeed, it might be pretty much impossible. Cavallero's
immigration-pressure equilibrium model, certainly, is not going to do the job. I
suggest that it is plausible, however, that at the very least, Fair Immigration
imposes a requirement akin to that imposed by Fair Exclusion in regard to the
global property regime, viz. an assurance that those excluded from countries
with greater opportunities at least satisfice. If this is so, fairness in immigration
will provide an important additional reason for honoring the requirements of
decency argued for in Chapter 4 - and hence, if the arguments of the preceding
section are correct, for a significant increase in at least temporary labor
migration to the developed world.
6.3.3 Domestic welfare and immigration
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The foregoing discussion has produced a recommendation, on grounds of global
distributive justice, for a quite extensive increase in at least temporary labor
immigration to developed countries - arguably, at a minimum, a doubling of
present levels (see fn 173 supra). If this recommendation is to be conclusive, we
need to consider how considerations relating to the domestic welfare of receiving
states enter into the moral equation. Domestic welfare plays too extensive a
role in public debate over immigration policy in developed countries, where it is
often presented as the only relevant consideration - with some exceptions made
for the interests of refugees and separated family members. This is wrong.
Rights to immigrate should not be construed as privileges to be metered out
according to the discretion of the receiving community, in line with its collective
self-interest. Instead, a state's immigration policy should be set in a way
consistent with the negative and positive duties that that state is under regarding
the welfare of political communities other than its own. Nonetheless,
considerations of domestic welfare should play some significant role in the
determination of immigration policy. As I argued in Chapter 2, giving some
degree of special priority to the interests of oneself and one's co-citizens is not
only permitted but required by utilitarianism, properly understood. The
question, as always, is how to balance these two sets of considerations against
each other.
I will approach this question by considering a pair of arguments attempting to
justify a rejection of an increase in immigration from current levels by reference
to the supposedly negative effects that such an increase would have on receiving
communities. The general form of the argument is the same in each case. We
are first given a claim to the effect that, for some domestic good x, an increase in
immigration would damage x. And we are then given a claim to the effect that
the prospect of x's being damaged is sufficient reason to reject the increase in
question. Each argument, then, is vulnerable to a denial of one, the other or
both of these claims, which I will term "the empirical claim" and "the normative
claim", respectively.
For the first of these arguments, substitute x in the above schema with
"economic prosperity". The resulting argument claims that an increase in
immigration from current levels would reduce economic prosperity in countries
of the developed world, and that that is sufficient reason for those countries to
refuse to allow it. The empirical claim is insecure here, if interpreted in a quite
general fashion. The overall socio-economic effects of immigration are poorly
understood. While it is plausible in many cases that increases in immigration
would reduce the earnings of some specific groups within a receiving country's
population, how precisely these effects would translate into changes at the
aggregate level will depend on the amount of increased immigration at issue,
and on the particular circumstances (economic, political and demographic) of
the receiving country.'78 Many economists argue that developing countries in
178 Consider, in this vein, the most likely immediate effect of increased immigration into the
developed world: wage depression in some sectors due to increased wage competition. This is not
good news for the native Californian fruit-picker who loses income due to the arrival of a fruit-
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fact look to benefit economically from increased immigration in specific sectors
over the next few decades, due to projected labor and skills shortages in health
care, domestic work, hospitality and construction, caused by rising levels of age,
education and training in the developed world. But, in any case, even if the
empirical claim were true in a specific case, the normative claim would fail. It is
not plausible that the fact per se that increased immigration would reduce a
developed country's economic prosperity constitutes grounds to reject it. What
would need to be shown for that purpose is that the reduction in question would
be sufficiently large and disvaluable to outweigh the positive duties of the
country in question to promote global distributive justice. I suggest that, given
the extent of the economic gap that we see today between rich and poor
countries, we have room for significantly more immigration to the developed
world than we see at present before that latter claim can be rendered plausible.
This suggests that the increase in immigration called for by global distributive
justice would have to be very large before the argument under consideration
could reasonably be used to reject it.
A better argument substitutes x with one of a set of what might be called "liberal
egalitarian projects" at the domestic level. One commonly proffered such
candidate is the welfare state. There are four distinct ways in which an increase
in immigration from current levels might be claimed to threaten the latter. First,
increased numbers of low-income immigrants might place pressure on public
services, rendering their provision unmanageable and ineffective. Second,
reductions in economic growth due to immigration might render budget cuts in
welfare programs economically necessary. Third, cultural disparities between
immigrants and native residents might reduce the sentiments of social solidarity
that tend to underlie willingness to support redistributive measures.179 Fourth,
over time, a large increase in immigrants from non-liberal cultures might be
expected to reduce the overall commitment to liberal egalitarian values in the
population, a commitment on which much of the welfare state depends.
It is unclear how likely the first two of these mechanisms are to eventuate. As
noted above, the effects of immigration on economic growth are mixed, and
highly likely to vary by country. If current demographic projections are correct,
the "support ratio" of workers to retirees in Europe and Japan may decline to the
point at which immigration in fact becomes necessary in order to sustain current
pension and transfer schemes (World Bank 2005, 209). Moreover, receiving
communities are not powerless in the face of pressure on their social programs:
services can be maintained or expanded by means of resources shifted from
other parts of the public sector. I consider the third and fourth mechanisms to
picker from Mexico. But it need not necessarily be a bad thing for the society as a whole - and,
consequently, even for that native fruit-picker herself over the longer term. This is because
moderation of wage growth can contribute to higher profits, resulting in both more profitable
investment and increased savings, each of which can accelerate growth.
179 This might happen either gradually as immigrants arrive, or prior to their arrival. The
expectation that a particularly generous welfare state might result in one's country being
especially attractive to culturally alien immigrants might encourage cut-backs as a disincentive.
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be more likely to occur. The claim that increased cultural diversity as a result of
immigration might reduce social solidarity and commitment to liberal values in
developed countries is not implausible. Nor is the claim that an erosion of the
welfare state might ensue. A similar argument on these cultural diversity
grounds is often made in regard to another central liberal egalitarian project:
viz., democracy, understood as a particular type of egalitarian society, rather
than merely as a formal political system. If it is to be successful and sustain
itself over time, democracy in this broader sense plausibly requires a shared set
of commitments, values or beliefs - whether thin and political in nature (e.g.
allegiance to the basic principles of the constitution) or thick and comprehensive
(e.g. veneration of the national hero) - held, if not by all, then at least by a large
majority of the population. Cultural diversity might be expected to undermine
this shared set of commitments, and with it the values, institutions and policies
required to sustain a democratic community.1so
The question that we are interested in here is not whether some degree of
immigration would have these worrisome effects, but rather whether the
increase demanded by global distributive justice in particular would have them.
That would seem to depend on three factors. The first is how large the increase
in question actually is: presumably the larger the increase, the higher the risk. I
think that it would take a large increase in persons espousing non-liberal values
before the welfare state and democracy became endangered; a somewhat lesser
increase before concerns about social solidarity due purely to cultural difference
became pressing. The latter, then, is the mechanism more likely to cause
trouble. The second factor is the cultural and demographic character of the
particular receiving state at issue. States plausibly vary in the extent to which
they can increase in cultural diversity while retaining social cohesiveness. The
third factor is the extent to which people's attitudes towards foreigners are
malleable. One of the more promising things about xenophobia is that, in at
least some cases, it decreases in the face of sustained, mutually beneficial
interaction with the hated party. It is possible that governments can do
something to further this outcome, by creating opportunities for cooperation
between distinct cultural groups, and promoting tolerance in the general
population.
Uncertainty about each of these things makes it unclear to what extent the
empirical claim will go through in a particular case. What of the normative
claim? This second claim has a better chance of succeeding in the case of the
8so The claim that shifts in cultural dynamics as a result of immigration may be harmful to a
liberal egalitarian project needs to be stated carefully, given that it sometimes tends in a direction
we should not want to go. The suggestion is not that a liberal society depends on complete
cultural homogeneity. This is highly implausible, given that a) many multinational and
multiethnic liberal societies exist, and b) cultural homogeneity beyond a certain point is itself
likely to threaten the liberal project, by virtue of being oppressive and stultifying. Nor is the
suggestion that liberal egalitarianism entails a right of societies to protect their distinctive culture
from the ravaging foreign hordes. This sounds more like communitarianism or perfectionism
than liberalism, as well as resting on the dubious idea that we can identify any one single culture
in modern states.
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arguments now under consideration than in the case of the economic prosperity
argument given earlier. This is because the former can be more easily given a
universalistic spin, insofar as the existence and success of the projects to which
they refer can be claimed to have positive value even for those who are excluded
from liberal egalitarian societies. The liberal egalitarian character of a society is
of significant benefit to those who live in one, and for that reason it carries some
weight purely on grounds of domestic welfare promotion. But liberal egalitarian
societies also hold out two more general benefits.
First, the existence of liberal states serves to promote the extension of liberalism
to other parts of the world.181 Existing liberal states can serve as a source of
inspiration for those living in other states, demonstrating "that a strongly
redistributive economy is more than a fancy dream, and...thereby provid[ing] a
tangible model...for redistributive strategies in each country..." (van Parijs 1992,
164). They are also able, in more ambitious guise, to provide active assistance to
those working to establish liberal rights in their own states. Second, liberal
states have historically been more likely than non-liberal states to promote a
number of valuable causes and outcomes other than liberalism itself. Barry's
claim that the global environmental movement is one such cause was noted
earlier (1992, 282). Similar things might be said of the development of the
global economy, the expansion of international law, and the initiation of
denuclearization programs, international peacekeeping operations, and global
measures for the protection of human rights. Such achievements as have been
made in these and allied areas are admittedly fragile and incomplete, but, to the
extent that they have succeeded, they have led to genuine improvements in
global welfare.
I am inclined to think that arguments based on "liberal egalitarian projects"
currently provide the best available case for justifying restrictions on
immigration into developed countries.182 But note that it would be odd to say
that such arguments might be used to justify levels of immigration below those
required by global distributive justice. For these arguments are themselves, at
least in part, based on global concerns. If immigration beyond a certain point
were to result in the destruction of liberal egalitarianism in the developed world,
and with it one of the more promising routes to decency and domestic
distributive justice worldwide, global distributive justice itself would call for a
halt.
6.3.4 Conclusion
18i This argument assumes, of course, that such expansion would be a good thing, an argument
that will be rejected by non-liberals; I will not defend it here.
182 One implication of this suggestion is that liberal societies may have a stronger moral case than
non-liberal societies for rejecting increases in immigration beyond a certain level. This is
plausibly another case (see fn 118 supra) where we face "second-level" questions of fairness:
questions concerning fairness in the distribution of responsibility to promote an independently
specified moral requirement. I do not have space to address this issue here, but signal it as an
area where more needs to be said.
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To sum up the preceding sections, the precise extent of increased immigration
that a country is morally required to allow on grounds of global distributive
justice, depends on at least the following factors: its capacity to absorb more
people without reducing its ability to promote decency worldwide; the extent to
which it is benefited or burdened by international immigration law; and the
effects of immigration on its liberal egalitarian character, should it have one.
These are currently great unknowns for any country. I do think, however, that
as the evidence currently stands, the foregoing discussion provides a case on
grounds of global distributive justice for a significant increase in at least
temporary labor movement towards industrialized countries.
I want to briefly note in closing a set of concerns about post-admission policy
regarding temporary labor migrants that may temper enthusiasm for this
conclusion. Guest worker programs generally include restrictions on
employment, including occupational mobility; restrict opportunities for family
reunification; permit discrimination in wages and working conditions between
temporary migrants and citizens; exclude temporary migrants from full access to
public benefits; and incorporate sometimes aggressive measures aimed at
monitoring guest workers and enforcing their return to their home countries on
expiration of their visas. Policies of this general sort are necessary both to keep
temporary migration temporary and to sustain public support for the programs.
But in doing so they essentially create a legally sanctioned underclass: a group of
residents who contribute to the receiving country in a variety of ways, but are
denied the rights accorded to its citizens. This is worrisome for two reasons.
The first is that the insecure protection of rights afforded by some post-
admission policies renders migrant workers vulnerable to exploitation and
abuse. Female workers in the domestic service sector, for instance, are
frequently subject to excessively long workdays, poor working conditions, sexual
harassment, violence, and inability to contact their families, problems worsened
by their lack of familiarity with the culture and language of their receiving
country (see Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2002). If such problems are widespread,
they may place a dent in the extent to which increased temporary labor
migration would further global decency. The second concern is that the
existence of an underclass is in tension with some of the basic principles of
liberal egalitarianism, including that requiring equal protection of the laws.
One might view this as of concern because it is wrong as a matter of fundamental
principle for liberal egalitarians to betray their own values in this way. Or, more
attractively, I think, one might claim that a willingness to discriminate in this
fashion threatens to destabilize commitment to liberal egalitarian values over
time. If the gains for global distributive justice of increasing temporary labor
migration are as large as I am here assuming that they are, I do not consider the
preceding concerns to undermine the case for an increase, at least for the
moment. They do however suggest both that the merits of guest worker
programs ought not to be overstated, and that any stepping up of those
programs ought to be combined with efforts to "[seek] the broadest rights
possible for aliens within the constraints of political feasibility" (Chang 2003).
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6.3.5. Recommendations
Both sending and receiving governments need to take action if the conclusion
reached above is to be implemented, and executed in a way most likely to help
the global poor. Among the more important current recommendations are the
following.
Sending governments should make greater efforts to spread opportunities for
overseas work more evenly across their populations. At the moment guest
worker programs are imperfectly targeted on the most needy, due to barriers in
the form of access to information and capital for upfront expenses. This is
inefficient, given that the poorest and least skilled are both those most likely to
benefit from migration and those whose departure is least likely to create skill
shortages in the sending country. Improved dispersal of information and
subsidized loans for recruitment agency fees and travel might rectify this
situation. Sending governments also have a role to play in promoting respect for
migrant worker rights. Some recent suggestions include organizing pre-
migration seminars on labor rights and sources of recourse in case of abuse,
increasing the number of labor officers in foreign embassies, and providing
language and cultural immersion classes (UNDP 2006, 104-6). There also needs
to be improved regulation and monitoring of recruitment agencies, to prevent
them from overcharging or cheating people seeking to migrate, and effective
counseling and resettling programs for returning workers, for whom
reintegration can be very difficult.
Receiving governments, for their part, should issue increased numbers of
temporary working visas, and give priority in their allocation to the unskilled
and needy. The best way to make progress on this front is via multilateral
action, which the International Organization for Migration claims "has the
greatest chance of reaping benefits for countries of origin, countries of
destination, individual migrants and the communities with which they are
affiliated" (2004, 6). The current state of international cooperation in this area
can be described as "at a confidence-building stage" (IOM et al. 2004, 11). Most
current international labor agreements are of a bilateral nature, and although
the WTO offers a framework to address migration under Mode IV of the GATS
(addressing the "temporary movement of natural persons"), existing
commitments under it are weak, and progress is slow. Future developments
might take the form either of progressive evolution of Mode IV, or regional
migrant labor agreements for specific professions and occupations. Increased
immigration could be made more palatable to developed world voters by
adopting India's proposal of a time-bound and employment-specific 'GATS visa',
incapable of being converted to another employment visa or to permanent
residency (UNDP 2006, 107), and by introducing improved (non-persecutory)
measures of monitoring and enforcement to reduce overstaying. In order to
minimize the risks of cultural discord canvassed earlier, increases may need to
be made in a gradual fashion, and be accompanied by efforts to promote tolerant
attitudes in the public. In the meantime, developed countries ought to ratify the
U.N.'s International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
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Workers and Members of Their Families,S83
institutions might be encouraged to reduce foreign
(Kapstein 2006, 132).
and international financial
exchange fees for remittances
The case of immigration policy, I suggest, is one of those instances where, for
immediate practical purposes, all relevant considerations of global distributive
justice point in the same direction. I hope to have shown that my utilitarian
account allows us to sort out which considerations are and are not relevant, and
how they interact with each other. In this area, as I believe in others, my
account has what I consider to be intuitive implications concerning the nature
and extent of our duties towards those with whom we share the world. And its
underlying framework provides what I consider to be a highly compelling set of
reasons for caring about what happens to those people in the future, and for
getting that future right.
183 The Convention was passed in 1990o, came into force in 2003, and currently has 37
ratifications, all of which have been deposited by developing countries. The text of the
Convention can be found here: http://www.migrantsrights.org/
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Conclusion
This dissertation can be interpreted as an attempt to perform three distinct tasks.
The first task is that of giving a partial defense of utilitarianism, by showing how
the latter has the resources to accommodate concerns of distributive justice in
one very important arena of moral and political decision. The second task is that
of providing a defense of the project of theorizing about distributive justice
beyond the state, against some general doubts about the viability and interest of
that project. The third task is that of constructing and defending a specific set of
attractive and useful principles for evaluating the global distribution of
advantages.
I believe that the conception of global distributive justice that I have developed,
in the course of pursuing these three tasks, is capable of deflecting a number of
criticisms to which utilitarian attempts at tackling questions of global distributive
justice are likely to be prone. These criticisms derive from the following familiar
objections to utilitarianism, taken as a quite general moral theory:
1. Utilitarians are "simple-minded" (Williams 1973, 149). Utilitarianism
attempts to reduce all of morality to a single endeavor: the maximization
of aggregate wellbeing. But the story is surely much more complex than
this. Our moral world is constituted by a wide variety of ideas, practices,
attitudes and ideals that, on the face of it, are both fundamentally distinct
from each other and, in many cases, have nothing to do with the
production of wellbeing, maximal or otherwise. Utilitarianism is
incapable of doing justice to this diversity. It tries to force each of these
phenomena into a narrow, simplistic picture of the nature and point of
human relations, in the process riding roughshod over an array of delicate
and morally significant distinctions.
2. Utilitarianism is unable to provide an adequate account of the moral
significance of special duties. Most of us feel that the special relations in
which we stand to particular persons (parents, friends, team-members,
students) result in our having distinctive duties to those persons that we
do not have towards strangers or other persons to whom we are not so
closely related. Utilitarians are unable to give a proper account of these
special duties, in two ways. First, they give the wrong explanation of what
grounds the duties. Utilitarians must claim that so-called "special" duties
are not in fact special at all, but are derived from a quite general duty, and
have moral force only insofar as they contribute to the fulfillment of that
duty. But this is counter-intuitive. We think that the moral force of our
special relationships is basic, neither admitting of nor needing a further,
deeper justification.184 Second, utilitarians cannot explain why special
duties are as stringent as we generally feel them to be. If the rationale for
184 See, e.g. Rescher: "Obligations are obligations, and claims claims, in a basic and primary way,
irrespective of the utilitarian expediency of honoring them as such" (1966, 59).
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those duties were derivative in the way utilitarians suggest, they would
seem to be overly vulnerable to morally sanctioned violation.
3. Utilitarianism is inadequate as a guide to action. The principle of utility
is posed at such a high level of abstraction that it will prove impossible to
derive specific guidance from it in concrete contexts of moral decision.
But such guidance is part of the very point of moral theory.
4. Utilitarianism is overly demanding. This objection has two variants: i)
the moral exertions that utilitarianism expects of us are intuitively
excessive, and/or ii) we are incapable of making such exertions: moral
demands must "fit the human frame" (Griffin 1986, 306) and utilitarian
demands do not so fit.
5. Utilitarianism has wildly counter-intuitive implications in many
situations of moral decision. The most striking cases are those in which
the rights of individuals are at stake. There are certain things that we
ought not to do to people: things that are, ab initio, ruled out of court. But
utilitarianism would have us perform these intuitively impermissible
actions in some imaginable situations.
Someone who finds these objections to utilitarianism compelling will be inclined
to predict the following of any utilitarian approach to global distributive justice.
Such an approach will: a) either ignore or dismiss as irrelevant values or
distinctions that are crucial to a proper understanding of our global distributive
duties, and make light of what are in fact genuine conflicts between distinct
moral requirements; b) give an unsatisfying account of the ground and stringency
of co-citizen priority, or of the significance of increased cross-border interaction
for global political morality; c) leave us with no substantive guidance concerning
how to criticize or restructure the current global distribution of resources; d)
impose unbearably extensive demands on the global affluent, and/or e) fail to do
justice to such important moral constraints as the rights of political communities
to self-determination, or the claims of individuals to fair terms of international
cooperation.
I agree both that a theory of global distributive justice that did all of this would
not be a proper object of love, and that some clumsy applications of utilitarianism
to the topic might exhibit some of these flaws. But I think that the preceding
chapters have shown that the idea that a utilitarian approach to distributive
justice must necessarily exhibit them is mistaken. Take, first, the charge of
undue simplicity. The account that I have developed, by virtue of its indirect
nature, exhibits a significant degree of internal complexity. The various forms of
pluralism that it incorporates - about both the ground and content of distributive
justice, and, further, about the domain and content of global distributive fairness
in particular - allow room for a variety of secondary goals and values, some of
which are not, in the immediate sense, to do with the production of wellbeing.
The duties to which these distinct goals and values give rise may not be
distinguishable at the morally fundamental level - where things are, indeed,
pretty simple - but at the secondary level at which they operate, they are quite
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autonomous, to the extent that conflicts between them can be expected to arise in
some cases of moral decision.
Take next the charge that utilitarians cannot adequately account for special
relationships. Tan's response to Goodin's account of special duties towards
compatriots is typical of the first part of this charge described above, viz. that
utilitarians give the wrong story about the ground of those duties:
Just as it would be crass to reduce the worth of the relationship of friendship to
the merely instrumental one of promoting the greater good, likewise it would be a
serious misdescription of the moral worth of citizenship if we think it is merely an
administrative device for discharging our general duties to humanity (2004, 148).
This common criticism seems to me to be based on an attempt to squeeze too
much into the domain of morality. There is a distinction to be made between the
value that a relationship has for an individual, personally, and the moral value
that that relationship has. I value my relationship to my sister, for instance, for
reasons that have nothing to do with the extent to which that relationship
conduces to the general welfare. It would indeed be crass to suggest that its
value, for me, was exhausted by its tendency so to conduce. But it is not
inconsistent with this claim to say that the moral value of my relationship with
my sister is entirely derivative from general welfare considerations.'8 5 And that
latter claim, I suggest, is not crass on its face. Nor, I think, is it clearly counter-
intuitive. I suspect that most people out there do not even have a view about
what precisely it is that grounds special duties. What they do have is the view
that such duties exist, and are important, but neither of these things is something
that a utilitarian will deny. The related claim that utilitarians cannot account for
the stringency of special duties is likewise uncompelling. On an indirect
utilitarian approach, special duties worth their salt will not be liable to constant
overriding. (As Smart remarks, "one must not think of the utilitarian as the sort
of person who you would not trust further than you could kick him" (Smart and
Williams, 71)). And many commonly recognized special duties are worth their
salt, including, I have argued, those that hold between compatriots.
Another way in which its allegedly warped account of the ground of special duties
might be felt to hamper utilitarianism in its attempt to provide an adequate
account of global distributive justice is the following. Many of us feel that the
185 This response depends on a particular view about the way in which the "personal point of view"
relates to the "moral point of view". The view that I adopt on that question is roughly that
advocated in Brink 1986, as summed up in the following passage:
[T]he personal point of view is important, and we can recognize this without making
morality capture its importance. The worries that the importance of the personal point of
view raises can be viewed not as moral worries but as worries about morality....worries
about the justification or supremacy of moral demands, not about the correctness of a
utilitarian account of morality" (1986, 432-33, italics in original).
160
increased density of economic and political interactions across borders that we
have witnessed in the postwar period has had transformative effects on the
nature and extent of our global distributive duties.186 But it might be thought
difficult for utilitarians to accommodate this intuition, given that in their view,
associative relations are not of any fundamental moral significance. Again, the
account that I have provided shows this concern to be unfounded. I have argued
in the preceding that the facts of globalization have very significant implications
for utilitarian global distributive justice, not only because they have increased the
scope for both harmful and beneficial cross-border action, but also, significantly,
because they have created new fairness-apt contexts of governance.
What of the charge that utilitarianism is insufficiently action-guiding? Bertrand
Russell claimed that "to teach how to live without certainty, yet without being
paralyzed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy...can...do"
(2004, 2). The standard diagnosis of utilitarians is that they haven't learnt to do
either of these things. They cling to an all-encompassing basic principle
sufficiently general to give them an answer to any and every moral question. But
in order to enable them to do this, their principle has to be so breathtakingly
abstract that it ends up leaving them with no idea whatsoever of what, actually, to
do. O'Neill appears to find this problem compelling in regard to global
distributive justice:
Although [consequentialism] appears to offer an algorithm for right action, the
algorithm could only be used if we had a method for generating all the 'options' to
be compared, adequate causal understanding for predicting the likely results of
each 'option' and an adequate theory of value (Utilitarian or other) for evaluating
each result with sufficient precision to rank the 'options'. This procedure can
perhaps be approximately followed for some quite limited problems. It is a non-
starter for dealing with transnational justice. Here neither 'problems' nor
'options' for solving them can be uncontentiously listed, and the results of most
'options' are uncertain and of disputed value (2000, 123)
O'Neill notes that utilitarians are not the only theorists in danger here: if they go
down, they're taking cosmopolitan Rawlsians, at least, with them (134).187 But
186 Thus, Julius writes of the "appearance that global justice has become more important as the
world has become more connected", and states that he "[wants] a view for which the salience of
global justice is increasing in the density of interactions across borders" (2006). Similarly, Cohen
and Sabel write: "[t]he global space outside the state-the space of global politics-is
incomparably richer in interdependence, cooperation, rule-making, regimes, institutions, debate,
social movements, and political contest than in Hobbes' day - and this is relevant to questions of
global justice" (2005).
187 Rawls acknowledges the imprecision of the difference principle in the case of domestic
distributive justice in the following passage:
The question whether legislation is just or unjust, especially in connection with economic
and social policies, is commonly subject to reasonable differences of opinion. In these
cases judgment frequently depends upon speculative political and economic doctrines
and upon social theory generally. Often the best we can say of a law or policy is that it is
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are they going down? I think not. O'Neill is right to claim that an attempt to
apply the principle of utility (or some comparably general and information-
hungry principle) directly when faced with a global distributive problem is bound
to fail. But this is precisely why utilitarians should recommend no such thing.
Instead, as I have argued, they need to formulate a set of secondary principles
better suited to the strategic constraints (epistemic and other) that structure
everyday moral decision-making. These secondary principles, I hope to have
shown, can be quite specific enough to provide concrete guidance where
decisions between different global or international distributive schemes are
concerned. As I have acknowledged throughout, one can of course argue about
whether or not the secondary principles that an indirect utilitarian ends up with
are appropriately sanctioned by the principle of utility, or about whether or not
we can have any idea whether or not they are. Perhaps those that I have arrived
at are criticizable on these fronts. But this is the ground on which utilitarian
accounts of distributive justice need to be challenged, not the higher ground
focused on by O'Neill.
The final two charges listed earlier assume, against the previous one, that we can
work out what utilitarianism has to say regarding our global distributive duties.
Their problem is not with its silence, but rather with what it says. Utilitarianism
is, first, much too demanding of the global affluent.1la And it is, second,
insouciant about important moral constraints, such as those imposed by fairness
or the value of collective self-determination. Again, I think my approach shows
both of these concerns to be unfounded. The conception of global distributive
justice advocated here does not look set to be overly demanding - or, at least, not
any more so than most of its competitors. And nor does it trample all over
common moral intuitions about fairness and political autonomy, as Chapters 4
and 5 show. It does admittedly do some trampling in some other areas: but only,
in my view, where trampling is quite clearly in order.
Beyond the absence of these vices, I think that my approach exhibits a number of
more positive virtues, which give it a lead in some respects over both its (few)
welfare consequentialist competitors and those at a greater theoretical distance.
Its chief advantages over the former are its greater ambition and completeness.
The approach that I have argued for is more ambitious than existing welfare
consequentialist accounts of global distributive justice in not confining its
attentions to the needs of those in dire straits, but also developing a case for
additional and more extensive obligations. It is also more complete in range,
at least not clearly unjust. The application of the difference principle in a precise way
normally requires more information than we can expect to have... (1971, 174)
188 Perry implies this view in the following passage (italics mine):
...[A]ny liberal, nonutilitarian theory of justice must acknowledge the value of autonomy
by granting to individuals a certain measure of moral space in which to live their own
lives and pursue their own interests There is thus an upper limit on the self-sacrifice that
liberal states can demand of their citizens. (Schwarz, 105)
162
insofar as it takes up the question of how requirements of global distributive
justice might apply not only to states, but also to international contexts of
governance. The chief general advantages that my account possesses over non-
welfare consequentialist theories of global distributive justice, on the other hand,
are three. First, my account incorporates an attractive story about why there
morally ought to be separate political communities, rather than, like many of its
competitors, merely taking their existence as a moral given. Second, it has an in-
built flexibility lacking in many of its opponents. Due to their understanding of
principles of justice as founded on essentially strategic considerations,
utilitarians are able to justify changes in their principles over time in order to
meet changes in global circumstances, with an ease unavailable to many non-
consequentialists. The third general advantage of a utilitarian approach is the
way in which it places decency at the heart rather than at the periphery of (or
beyond) global distributive justice. Distributive justice does not end with
reducing global poverty, but if it does not begin there, something has gone
seriously awry.
Sidgwick writes, in regard to domestic affairs: "[t]he attempt to map out the
region of Justice reveals to us a sort of margin or dim borderland, tenanted by
expectations which are not quite claims and with regard to which we do not feel
sure whether Justice does or does not require us to satisfy them" (1907, 270).
When we introduce actual borderlands, and activities across them, into the
equation, the view gets, if anything, dimmer. It seems safe to say that none of
the present candidates for a theory of global distributive justice yet has a claim
to having mapped out this region perfectly. The main thesis that I hope to have
advanced in this dissertation is the modest one that utilitarianism deserves to be
taken seriously as one of those candidates. Whether or not something stronger
than this can ultimately be said will depend on a number of things. One is
whether or not utilitarians can adequately answer the formidable arsenal of
criticisms that their basic approach to morality has generated over the past few
centuries. Another is whether or not the account advanced here continues to
look viable when applied more broadly, to issues of global justice that I have not
addressed. Another is whether or not one of the many other available theories of
global distributive justice proves ultimately to be more compelling. All of these
things give utilitarian theorists of global distributive justice plenty left to think
and argue about. As things stand, I feel positive about the theory - and at least
hopeful about the world.
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